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Abstract
The purpose of the study is to explore the trend in natural fertility and its components 
in China over half a century from the 1940s to the 1980s. One of the most important 
components of fertility, natural fertility and its secular rising trend in modem China, have 
never been systematically addressed, thus providing the scope for the present study. By 
fully using recent information on China’s population and social development, this thesis 
documents and analyses the trend of natural fertility in China since the 1940s.
The literature review of natural fertility and its proximate and background 
determinants comes as the first part after the introduction. An important methodological 
part of the study comes next. The main data sources are introduced, problems of applying 
Coale and Trussed’s model are discussed and an adjusted version of the model is 
proposed. Finally, technical problems are also addressed, including such matters as 
modifying data sources to meet required measurements, assessing the limitations of 
estimated results, suggesting ways to avoid data truncation and so on.
The major part of the thesis consists in the next four chapters, which involve a 
thorough demographic analysis of natural fertility levels and trends for the nation as a 
whole, and of different aspects such as urban-rural differentials, regional variations and 
educational divergences. The proximate determinants: fecundability and birth intervals, 
breastfeeding, primary sterility, and age at first marriage are also analyzed at length.
Finally, the importance of socio-economic conditions on natural fertility change is
2
analysed. The quantitative relationship between natural fertility and these socio-economic 
conditions was statistically tested and an analytical model was built, which proves to be 
well able to simulate the identified trends in natural fertility.
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Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 Underlying reasons for proposing this study
Populations in which no deliberate attempt is made to limit the number of births, such 
as the now-famous Hutterites, are said to experience ‘natural fertility’. This very 
important and widely used concept was first identified and named by Henry (1961:81-91). 
Such fertility is essentially a biological phenomenon, and determined by a few factors 
which have come to be called the proximate determinants or the intermediate variables 
of fertility. These include fecundability, or the monthly probability of conception, which 
is itself determined by the length of the fertile period and the frequency and timing of 
intercourse in relation to ovulation; the nonsusceptible period of pregnancy and 
postpartum period until both ovulation and sexual relations resume; and the rate of 
intrauterine mortality. In addition, the probability of primary sterility, the age at 
menarche, at marriage or the start of sexual union, and secondary sterility, taken 
together, are the determinants of natural fertility.
However, the level of natural fertility varies between populations mainly according 
to social customs such as varying average ages at first marriage, differing breastfeeding 
patterns and coitus frequency, while these factors are also influenced by education, 
nutrition, health, and so on. This leads to problems in the ability of our demographic 
techniques to detect this mechanism, and more fundamentally in the availability of proper 
data, since there are many fewer studies on underlying fertility than on other topics such
15
as general fertility or mortality. Furthermore, much of Henry’s work and later research 
has concentrated on age patterns of fertility and on the proximate determinants, such as 
birth interval, breastfeeding and age at marriage.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the trend in natural fertility and its 
components in China over half a century from the 1940s to the 1980s, a period which 
interestingly also encompasses the onset of the fertility and mortality transitions. The 
recent history of demographic changes in China is intensely interesting, firstly because 
China contains the world’s largest population, and secondly because of the unique 
circumstances under which mortality and fertility change have occurred. While scholars 
interested in China’s demographic past have been concerned with the determinants of 
levels and trends of fertility, most of their attention has been directed at the family 
planning programme, the level of mortality, the female status and nuptiality, which are 
thought to influence the fertility decline. Few of them have mentioned an apparent slight 
increase in marital fertility, and shortening in birth intervals at low birth orders. No one 
has ever talked in detail about natural fertility, i.e. differences in trends in the underlying 
ability to produce. The absence of research on past levels of natural fertility in China is 
probably in part due to the lack of appropriate data, since most of what we know about 
fertility change in China over the past four decades comes from the One-Per-Thousand 
Fertility Survey conducted in 1982 (the 1/1000 Fertility Survey).
One intriguing feature of the results from the survey was that, after controlling for 
age of first marriage, marital fertility rates in marriage duration 13 to 24 months were 
higher in China in the 1960s than in the 1950s, and higher again in the 1970s than in the
16
1960s.1 The increase from decade to decade in marital fertility rates at early durations 
of marriage suggests that a substantial rise in the natural fertility of married cohorts 
occurred in the period 1950-1981. Other evidence, cited later, indicates that the mean 
length of interval between marriage and first birth was getting shorter. Similar trends are 
found in other low birth order intervals before the 1970s when there was an absence of 
effective contraception or abortion early in marriage. Again, similar evidence was found 
that the level of sterility was higher in older age cohorts among women over 40 years 
old. All of this evidence suggest a conjecture that natural fertility in China might have 
risen over time, which gave the original motive to pursue this question.
1.2 Data from demographic surveys
The demographic information employed in this study comes mainly from three 
sample surveys (introduced in Chapter 3 in detail): the 1/1000 Fertility Survey in 1982, 
the In-Depth Fertility Sample Survey in 1985, and the One-Percent Population Sample 
Survey in 1987. The 1/1000 Fertility Survey in 1982 covers 28 provinces in China 
(except Tibet), in which 311,000 women 15-67 years of age were interviewed and 
provided detailed fertility histories. The survey results have permitted the reconstruction 
of Chinese demographic history since the early 1940s, such as measures of fertility and 
nuptiality, as well as information to estimate fecundability, birth intervals, and primary 
sterility. The In-Depth Fertility Survey provides much important extra information, such 
as unique information on marriage patterns and breastfeeding by different social strata, 
supplementary information on birth intervals and so on. The One-Percent Population 
Sample Survey is used here to provide information on the mid-1980s, because the 1/1000
1 China State Family Planning Commission 1987:1986 Family Planning Statistical Yearbook, Beijing
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Fertility Survey only reached 1982. Thus the demographic data, such as age specific 
marital fertility in 1985, are vital information to estimate natural fertility for/1980s.
A
1.3 Summary of contributions and findings from the study
1.3.1 Methodological development
The most widely used model of human natural fertility is that developed by Coale and 
Trussell. As defined by them(1971, 1974, 1978), the model can be regarded as having 
two conveniently interpretable parameters. M indicates the underlying level of fertility 
and m indicates the deviation of the rate from the standard pattern and hence the degree 
of fertility control. In the model, the control schedule, v, is defined as zero for age group 
20-24, in other words, the fertility of age group 20-24 is assumed by the model to be 
natural. However, in some cases, such as in the 1970s and 1980s in China, in some other 
developing societies after World War Two, and many developed societies in this century 
or even earlier, the existence of birth control among young age groups including age 
group 20-24 seems likely. This raises a fundamental issue with regard to the model’s 
assumption that marital fertility at age 20-24 is a natural pattern when the model is 
applied to detect changes in natural fertility in China.
In this study, an adjusted version of the model is developed, which tries to overcome 
the problem. For purpose of comparison, both natural fertility levels (M) estimated from 
the original and adjusted version respectively, are presented. The result positively 
suggests that the adjusted version is a more sensitive and/better way to interpret changes
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in natural fertility in China. The statistical approach, again, presents a significant 
correlation coefficient between estimated mean fecundability level and M from the 
adjusted version, but a much less significant coefficient against M from the original 
version. By perceiving the limitation of the original version and providing a sensible way 
to tackle the problem, the methodological development here, therefore, not only benefits 
this Chinese case, but also potentially, contributes to other studies applying Coale and 
Trussed’s model and facing similar problems.
1.4.2 Demographic findings
A comprehensive study of the reproductive histories of couples married between the 
1940s and the 1980s in the three surveys strongly suggests that natural fertility increased 
significantly over time in China as a whole, though the results for the 1940s are estimated 
from an indirect approach and thus less robust than those from later periods. The results 
of our efforts to discover which components of natural fertility were responsible for the 
increase, although not conclusive, are clearest with respect to an increase in 
fecundability, and probably to a decrease in length of breastfeeding and birth intervals, 
and in primary sterility; less clear was evidence concerning a rise in age at first marriage. 
The attempt to discover which background determinants of the natural fertility were 
accountable for the increase, was most successful with respect to improvement in food 
consumption, education achieved by young mothers, and medical service. Changes in 
other socio-economic aspects proved not to be statistically significant.
In terms of urban and rural differentials, regional and educational variations, the 
conclusions are consistent that natural fertility increased in both urban and rural areas,
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in almost all sub-regions (including provinces, autonomous regions, municipality cities) 
and at all education levels of the population. One exception is the university educated 
population: the possibility remains that they might undertake more intensive spacing 
behaviour during the early years of first marriage, thus even the adjusted model is unable 
to discover their real natural fertility level. A further plausible finding is that those in 
better socio-economic positions had comparatively higher levels of natural fertility, such 
as those living in urban areas, or in the east coast regions, and those who were educated 
comparatively longer. These groups also tended to have higher levels of fecundability, 
undertake shorter durations of breastfeeding, have shorter birth intervals and later ages 
of first marriage. However, an unexpected finding is that these privileged groups had 
larger proportions of childless women, and possible reasons for this are discussed.
The conventional view is that in the West only pre-transition fertility satisfies the 
definition of natural fertility. As a consequence, it is not surprising that analysis of high 
fertility in developing societies is often conducted in the natural fertility framework. Thus 
a study of natural fertility in China, which has the largest population in the world, and 
particularly its interaction with the demographic transition and industrialization can 
contribute not only to our knowledge of the demographic past in China, but also to our 
understanding of demographic processes occurring in other parts of the world today, 
especially in Third World countries.
1.4 Organisation of the thesis
Natural fertility is one of the most important components of fertility. However, the 
secular changes7 in natural fertility in modem China has never been systematically
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addressed, thus providing the scope for the present study. By fully using recent 
information on China’s population and social development, this thesis documents and 
analyses approximately five decades of trends of natural fertility in China after the 1940s.
The literature review of the natural fertility and its proximate and background 
determinants comes as a first part after this introduction. Three methods, Coale and 
Trussell’s model and Page’s model for natural fertility, and Bongaarts’ model for 
fecundability are presented and discussed. The determinants of natural fertility such as: 
fecundity and fecundability, marriage pattern, breastfeeding, nutritional status, income 
level and education are also presented and examined. Finally, a review of studies on 
natural fertility and its determinants is provided.
A basic methodological part of the study comes next and is then employed in the later 
sections. In Chapter 3, the three fertility sample surveys, as main data sources, are 
introduced in great detail. Then problems of applying Coale and Trussed’s model are 
discussed and an adjusted version of the model is illustrated and proposed. Finally, the 
technical problems are also addressed. These include matters such as modifying data 
sources to meet required specifications, revealing the limitations of estimated results, 
suggesting ways to avoid time truncation and so on.
The major substantive part of the thesis is comprised by Chapters 4 to 7, which 
involve a thorough demographic analysis of levels and trends of natural fertility for the 
nation as a whole, and for its different dimensions such as urban-rural differentials, 
regional variations and educational divergences. This is accompanied by a brief 
introduction of socio-economic background and presentation of general fertility and
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marital fertility as preliminary contexts for each dimension. The proximate determinants: 
fecundability and birth intervals, breastfeeding, primary sterility, and age at first marriage 
are also consistently analysed in each dimension.
Finally, we come to the effect of socio-economic conditions on changes in natural 
fertility. On the one hand, this involves a search for possible explanations of rising 
natural fertility by examining the dynamic changes of some socio-economic aspects. On 
the other hand, the quantitative relationship between the natural fertility and these socio­
economic conditions has been statistically tested. In addition, a robust mathematical 
model has been built to simulate dynamic changes of the natural fertility over time.
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Chapter 2 Methodological and Conceptual Review
1.1 Fecundity and natural fertility
Fecundity is defined as the physiological capability of a man, woman or couple to 
produce a live birth. It is contrasted with fertility which is the actual reproductive 
performance of an individual, a group or a society.
Although widely invoked as a factor in determining fertility differentials, fecundity 
is still imperfectly understood in quantitative terms. Analysis of the fertility of 
populations not deliberately using birth control shows large variations in the level of 
fertility, although such populations do exhibit common age-specific patterns of 
childbearing. In terms of population as opposed to individuals, it is probably possible to 
assess fecundity only with reference to various behavioural factors, the proximate 
determinants, which are closely linked to reproductive physiology. The various 
components of fecundity, such as fecundability, foetal mortality, and breastfeeding, can 
also be investigated.
Natural fertility is defined as marital fertility, whereby couples do not alter their 
reproductive behaviour according to the number of children already bom. In practice, this 
can be taken to mean the fertility of populations whose members do not use contraception 
or induced abortion. The concept of natural fertility has subsequently been widely 
influential both in demographic analysis and in the development of mathematical models
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of the process of reproduction. The term ‘natural’ is an unfortunate adjective since it 
seems to imply that a unique level of fertility is natural to humanity (and possibly 
universal in the past). In reality natural fertility populations have wide variations in the 
level of fertility. For example, Leridon (1977:107-109) found total fertility rate variations 
between 3.7 and 9.5 in a group of 23 populations with natural fertility. Even allowing 
for the impact on these values of different marriage patterns, some populations had 
fertility close to double that of others. The differences arose from differences in the 
various proximate determinants, above all from variations in the post-partum non- 
susceptible period owing to different patterns of breastfeeding. This, along with such 
factors as sexual taboos, physiological sterility and foetal mortality, produces the great 
variation in levels. Natural fertility is not a given level, rather a reproductive strategy: 
births may be spaced at long or short intervals, but couples do not make extra efforts to 
reduce fertility after reaching any particular family size or parity. The term ‘parity- 
independent’ fertility is thus sometimes employed.
Although the overall level of fertility is a poor indicator of fertility regime, a number 
of other measures show consistency between natural fertility populations. That is, 
populations exhibiting natural fertility have different levels of age specific marital fertility 
rates, but show a common pattern when the rates are indexed to the rate for women aged 
20-24.
1.2 Coale and Trussell’s model
This model was originally proposed by Coale (1971:193-214) to describe and 
compare fertility schedules. In this study I shall employ it to investigate natural fertility.
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The main reasons for choosing this model as a basic measurement in this study are not 
only that it gives both underlying level of natural fertility and birth control, but also the 
lack of a better alternative measure when only limited historical data are available. It is 
hoped that adoption in the case of investigating Chinese natural fertility will be insightful. 
In any event, given the limited availability of historical data and the lack of a superior 
alternative method for the investigation, the model is virtually the only way that historical 
demographers can measure both natural fertility and the extent of birth control in the 
past.
Coale suggested that a standard pattern of natural fertility could be modified by 
incorporating a vector indicating the effect that birth control usually had in altering the 
age pattern. He also noted that the deviations from the natural pattern were similar in all 
the populations he had investigated. Three years later, Coale and Trussell (1974:185-258) 
produced a more detailed specification of the model of marital fertility. They defined it 
in the following equation:
r(a) = n(a) *M 'exp [m *v(a)]
where a stands for age, r(a) is the observed marital fertility schedule, n(a) is the 
empirically derived standard natural fertility, and m is the average magnitude of the 
divergence for the observed schedule. Since n(a) approximates the age pattern of fertility 
for populations without fertility control, the vector expressing the pattern of divergence 
from it, v(a), can be taken as representing a characteristic way in which control increases 
with age in contracepting populations; m can then be taken as the average intensity of 
birth control in a given population. The values of n(a) and v(a) are shown in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1 Coale and Trussell’s model: The values of n(a) and v(a)
Parameters 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
n(a) 0.460 0.431 0.395 0.322 0.167
v(a) 0.000 -0.279 -0.667 -1.042 -1.414
Technically, the parameters M and m are derived from this equation by a method 
suggested by Coale and Trussell (1978:203-205). By taking the natural logarithms of both 
sides of the equation, the result becomes:
L«(r(a)/n(a)) = LnM + m-v(a)
By letting L«(r(a)/n(a)) = y, LnM = c, and v(a) = x, LnM and m can be estimated 
by ordinary least squares in which all points have equal weight. This type of model falls 
in the class of generalized linear models described by Nelder and Wedderbum (1972:370- 
384), representing the special case where: (1) the error or stochastic structure is Poisson, 
(2) the link between the expectation of the dependent variable and the linear predictor is 
the logarithmic function, and (3) the linear predictor contains a known part or offset. An 
important implication of this fact is that maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters 
of the model are available, together with estimated standard errors and a likelihood ratio 
goodness of fit Chi-square statistic. Furthermore, all calculations may be performed by 
using statistical packages such as GLIM, SPSS, or SAS.
Though the technique to solve the equation has been developed, theoretical problems 
remain. Although Coale did not define M exactly as the population’s underlying level of 
natural fertility, he and Trussell (1974:188) gave M practical meaning in this way: "The 
factor M is a scale factor expressing the ratio r(a)/n(a) at some arbitrarily chosen age.
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. . .we are concerned only with the age pattern of fertility schedules.” However, as the 
model was defined in the above equation, the parameters were set in such a way that if 
there is no birth control, m is zero and the right-hand term ex/?(m-v(a)) becomes one. 
This means that the population has natural fertility at a level defined by the M parameter. 
In other words, if a fertility schedule is interpreted by M alone rather than both M and 
m, then it can be taken as a natural fertility schedule. Obviously, the model has an 
underlying assumption: that the fertility experienced by age group 20-24 is a natural 
level(v(20-24) = 0). Indeed, M, the scale factor expressing the ratio r(a)/n(a) at age 20- 
24, is widely interpreted as indicating the underlying level of marital fertility without any 
effect of birth control.
Until quite recently, most attempts to identify and to parameterize fertility patterns 
were based primarily on finding the mathematical function that best fits the observed 
range of overall age-specific fertility. This approach has produced some extremely useful 
functions: polynomials approximating cross-sectional fertility schedules underlie many of 
the methods that are frequently used for estimating fertility and mortality levels from 
defective or indirect data. Despite their great utility, however, models based simply on 
finding the function that best fits the data are not very satisfying, unless, the function’s 
parameters can be identified with the biological or social processes that govern fertility. 
There have been several conscious efforts to tease out patterns that can be explicitly 
linked with underlying processes or components. In some instances this effort has 
concentrated first on identifying a well-fitting function, and only then on attempting to 
find an interpretation for its parameters.
Since in this model voluntary control has been defined in the narrower sense of parity
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dependent behaviour, voluntary efforts to extend birth intervals which are not dependent 
on the number of children already bom can complicate interpretation of both M and m, 
i.e. the level of natural fertility and extent of birth control. This is because the model 
assumes that control can be equated with stopping behaviour. While it is certain that 
stopping behaviour must become widespread in any population if very low fertility is to 
be attained, Wilson, Oeppen and Pardoe (1988:4-20) suggest it is wrong to preclude the 
existence of conscious spacing behaviour purely because our statistical techniques are 
unable to detect it. So they suggest a more profitable way to interpret the model’s 
parameters as follows: m indicates the extent of stopping behaviour, which could be 
brought about either by deliberate attempts to limit the number of births or indirectly 
through the effect of non-volitional factors. Similarly, M indicates the extent of birth 
spacing, achieved either through deliberate interventions such as contraception or through 
less obviously volitional practices such as breastfeeding. It is certain that this 
interpretation with its greater caution marks an improvement on the original one which 
is quite crude. Obviously, young cohorts like those aged 20-24 practise contraception 
more for spacing purposes than for stopping, while among old cohorts stopping purposes 
are more likely. However, it appears that at least two questions remain.
First, when stopping is mixed with spacing behaviour in young age groups such as 
20-24, it is hardly valid to conclude that M exactly indicates the extent of birth spacing. 
For example, in the situation of the 1970s and 1980s in China when the mean age at first 
marriage was about 21, and family planning campaigns, the ‘Later-Longer-Less’1 and 
the ‘One Child’, were launched, stopping behaviour occurred among young cohorts 
including age group 20-24.
1 Later: to have children later; Longer: to space birth intervals; Less: to have fewer children.
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Second, when the M value represents only spacing behaviour, the model can only be 
used for the purpose of estimating birth control rather than for the underlying fertility 
level. Anyway, this interpretation seems unlikely to be a proper way to explain changes 
both in natural fertility and contraceptive practice for extreme cases, such as China in the 
1980s.
1.3 Page’s model
Another similar model to describe marital fertility and birth control was proposed by 
Page (1977:85-106), which follows on the earlier work of Henry, Coale, and Coale and 
Trussell. The common theme of these models is the assumption that lacking deliberate 
birth control marital fertility follows a typical age-pattem of natural fertility. In her study 
of levels and trends of fertility in Sweden, Page considered a general model of marital 
fertility and the duration of first marriage, where the marital fertility rate /(a,d ,t) at age 
a and duration of first marriage d for a given period t was given by:
/(a,d,t) = T(t) A(a,t)-D(d,t) (1)
where T(t) is a period effect on the overall level of fertility, A(a,t) is a time-varying age- 
pattem of fertility and D(d,t) is a time-varying duration-pattem of fertility. To estimate 
these functions she used a robust procedure based on trimmed means developed by Tukey 
(1977:46-47).
The fit of the model to the long series of Swedish data was excellent. Moreover, she 
found that the age pattern A(a,t) was fairly constant over time and resembled the average
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of Henry’s schedules of natural fertility. Furthermore, the duration pattern D(d,t) for 
each period was a monotonic function of duration which, except for some of the earlier 
cross-sections, could be approximated reasonably well by an exponential function. For 
a fixed period, these simplifications led to the model:
where /(a,d) is the marital fertility rate at age a and duration of first marriage d, 0  is a 
parameter representing the level of natural fertility, n(a) is the age pattern of natural 
fertility and B is a parameter representing the extent to which marital fertility at a given 
period departs from natural fertility as a function of increasing duration of first marriage.
If we divide both sides of (2) by n(a) and take logarithms, we obtain an alternative 
formulation of the model as:
where we have written a  for Ln(Q). The logarithm of the ratio of marital fertility at a 
given age and duration to natural fertility at that age is, therefore, a simple linear 
function of time elapsed since first marriage.
Model(2) follows the tradition of Coale and Trussell’s model. The fundamental 
difference between Page’s and Coale and Trussell’s model hinges on the assumptions 
concerning departure from natural fertility; whereas Coale and Trussell assumed that 
fertility control depends on age, Page assumed that it depends on duration of marriage.
/(a,d) = 0-n(a)-exp{Bti} (2)
L/z{/(a,d)/n(a)] = a + fid (3)
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Age and duration are, of course, closely interrelated; and one would expect the two 
models to be very similar.
The age-pattem of fertility implied by Page’s model is in the form
/(a) = n(2)-exp{a + B-d^a)} (4)
where do(a) is an age-dependent value of duration such that multiplication by 13 and 
exponentiation gives the average degree of control at age a. This value will, in general, 
depend on the unknown parameter 13.
A similar analysis shows that the duration-pattem of fertility implied by Page’s model 
is of the form
where n(d) is the average natural fertility of women at duration d. Note that this function 
does not depend on unknown parameters: it is fully determined by the distribution of 
women by age and duration.
Later, Rodriguez and Cleland (1988:241-257) suggested a method to derive the 
parameters a and d, which fits a simplified version of Page’s model, as given in Equation 
(2), to empirical data consisting of counts of births and exposure time for a fixed period. 
They assumed that the birth counts P(a,d) were independent Poisson random variables 
with mean (and variance) equal to the product of exposure time T(a,d) and a theoretical
/(d ) = n(d) -exp {a + 13-d} (5)
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marital fertility rate f(a,d):
J5[P(a,d)] = T(a,d)-f(a,d) (6)
From Equation (6) taking the logarithm of the expected number of births at a given 
age and duration they obtained:
LnE[ P(a,d)] = LflT(a,d) + Lrt{ n(a)} + a  + 13-d
from which the parameters a  and ft, the level of natural fertility and the degree of control 
of marital fertility can be estimated.
To my knowledge, Page’s model has not been extensively applied, presumably 
because it requires more information than Coale and Trussell’s model; namely marital 
fertility rates classified by both age and duration of first marriage, which are not available 
from traditional registration systems, nor from the data archive in this study. Secondly, 
Chinese fertility followed more or less a parity-dependent rather than a duration- 
dependent pattern after the birth control campaigns. In any event, Page’s model is not 
applicable to this study mainly due to lack of the data such as marital fertility rates by 
age and duration of first marriage.
1.4 Fecundabilitv. Bongaarts’ model and its modification
The concept of fecundability was introduced by Gini (1924:889-892) in 1924, and is 
defined as the probability of a married woman conceiving during a month without any
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deliberate attempt to limit procreation. Fecundability varies both among women of a 
given age and for a particular woman, by age. The variation is related to four variables: 
separation, which affects coital frequency; age, which represents biological changes and, 
perhaps decline in coital frequency, lactation practices and the duration of amenorrhoea. 
Fecundability and marital fertility are linked in the following way: frequency of 
unprotected coitus - fecundability - exposure interval - birth interval - marital fertility 
rate. In the past, at least five different methods for estimating the mean value of 
fecundability in a population have been explored:
1, Calculating fecundability from coital frequency and duration of the viability of 
sperm and ovum.2
2, Observing the proportion of women conceiving during a one-month period of 
exposure to risk of conception.3
3, Fitting models to the distribution of waiting times to conception.4
4, Fitting models to birth interval distributions.5
5, Fitting models to the distribution of parities attained within a certain period of time 
by a group of women.6
2D.V. Glass and E. Grebenik 1954: The Trend and Pattern o f Fertility in Great Britain: A Report on 
the Family Census o f1946, Papers o f Royal Commission on Population, Vol. 6, London, H.M. Stationery 
Office.
3J.C. Barrett 1969: A Monte Carlo Simulation of Human Reproduction, Genus 25, pp. 1-22. And 1971: 
Fecundability and Coitus Frequency, Population Studies 23, pp.309-313.
4L. Henry 1964: Mortalite Intra-Uterine et Fecondabilitd  ^Population 19, pp.899-940. M.C. Sheps and 
J.A. Menken 1973: Mathematical Models o f Conception and Birth, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
pp.82-83.
5S. D ’Souza 1973: Interlive Birth Intervals of Non-Contraceptive Populations: A Data Analytic Study, 
Social Action 23, pp.404-425.
6W. Brass 1958: The Distribution of Births in Human Population, Population Studies 12, pp.51-72.
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In recent years straightforward and easily applicable estimation procedures have been 
developed. The method used in the present study is based on the work of Bongaarts 
(1975:645-660). He proposed two methods for estimating of fecundability and tested them 
on data drawn from five historical family reconstitution studies. He showed that the two 
methods produced almost identical results in the five cases he analysed. One method 
involved the calculation of a simple statistic, namely the proportion of first births which 
occurred during the ninth, tenth and eleventh completed months after marriage, excluding 
those women who conceived their first child before marriage. By assuming a fixed 
coefficient of variation of fecundability, this proportion can be converted into a value of 
mean fecundability. Bongaarts assumed a Beta-distribution in total fecundability, and 
defined total fecundability as recognizable fecundability divided by 0.65, since he 
assumed a risk of 0.35 of spontaneous abortion within the first month.
Later, Knodel and Wilson (1981:53-84) found that at most values this was acceptable, 
but at high values of mean fecundability, to define the variation of fecundability in terms 
of total fecundability had drawbacks. They suggested that this was because at high values 
of recognizable fecundability (above 0.33) total fecundability exceeded 0.5. Given this 
value and a plausible figure for the coefficient of variation of fecundability, the two 
parameters of the Beta-distribution, a and b, both go below unity. So they found that this 
produced a shallow U-shaped distribution with high proportions of women with either 
very high or very low fecundability. They suggested that the effect of this was to make 
mean waiting times to conception stop decrease with higher fecundability and increase / 
instead. To circumvent this undesired effect, they defined the variance of fecundability 
in terms of recognizable fecundability. With this modification, new expected proportions 
of first births in completed months nine, ten and eleven were generated and used to
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estimate fecundability. They are presented in Table 2.2 and applied in later chapters.
Table 2.2 Predicted value for the proportion of first births occurring 
in completed months nine to eleven after marriage by mean fecundability 
(FB) given by the adjusted model
FB Proportion FB Proportion
0.03 0.0553 0.20 0.3700
0.04 0.0799 0.21 0.3834
0.05 0.1035 0.22 0.3964
0.06 0.1262 0.23 0.4089
0.07 0.1480 0.24 0.4210
0.08 0.1690 0.25 0.4328
0.09 0.1892 0.26 0.4441
0.10 0.2087 0.27 0.4551
0.11 0.2275 0.28 0.4656
0.12 0.2455 0.29 0.4759
0.13 0.2630 0.30 0.4857
0.14 0.2798 0.31 0.4952
0.15 0.2961 0.32 0.5044
0.16 0.3119 0.33 0.5132
0.17 0.3271 0.34 0.5218
0.18 0.3419 0.35 0.5300
0.19 0.3562
In interpreting the results of this method, it is important to realize that the values of 
mean fecundability obtained are actually estimates of fecundability immediately following 
marriage. If fecundability declines with the duration of marriage, as is often assumed, 
then the level of fecundability in the population at large could be substantially below that 
estimated here. Moreover, fecundability as assessed by this method is taken to be 
recognizable fecundability, i.e. the probability of conception occurring and the foetus 
surviving beyond the cycle of conception.
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1.5 The proximate determinants and background determinants
The analysis of fertility in terms of its proximate determinants, or intermediate 
fertility variables, as they are sometimes called, because they logically come between 
fertility and its "ultimate determinants", as suggested by Freedman (1987:773-795), is 
one of the most fruitful developments of recent demographic analysis. As Freedman 
suggested, the proximate variables stood between fertility and all other preceding 
variables. They immediately determined fertility, and all other variables acted through 
combinations of them. Quantifying the effects of the proximate determinants on fertility 
is one of the most important achievements in fertility research.7 The great improvement 
over earlier conceptual frameworks is that this one allows the demographers to move 
closer to the behavioural realities of the population being studied. As their name 
indicates, proximate determinants have a direct effect on fertility; background factors, 
such as cultural or socio-economic variables, can only influence fertility by altering one 
or more of the proximate determinants. Over the last four decades demographers have 
increasingly given attention to the interactions between biological factors such as the 
periods of anovulation, post-partum infecundability, fecundability, lactation, and natural 
sterility, the important proximate determinants of natural fertility.8
The process of human reproduction is far from simple and early mathematical or 
conceptual models of it reflected this complexity. Apart from fecundability, another major
See Wilson C. 1986: The Proximate Determinants of Marital Fertility in England 1600-1799, in 
Bonfield, et al. (eds.) The World We Have Gained, Blackwell, Oxford, pp.203-230.
8See J. Bongaarts 1976: Intermediate Fertility Variables and Marital Fertility Rates, Population Studies 
30, pp.227-241.
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component of natural fertility amenable to analysis with the above parity data is the non- 
susceptible period which follows a birth and during which a woman is not at risk of 
conceiving. Although there is still some debate on the role of nutritional factors in 
determining the length of this period, it is now widely accepted that differences in breast­
feeding practices have a major role to play in any explanation of differences. The 
mechanism linking the two is believed to be a neurally mediated hormonal reflex initiated 
by the suckling stimulus, whereby increases in the pituitary hormone prolactin act upon 
either the hypothalamus or the ovaries to prevent ovulation. One simple way to estimate 
the mean duration of the non-susceptible period from reproduction histories is to compare 
the interval between marriage and the birth of a first child (excluding intervals involving 
pre-marital conceptions) with the subsequent interval between first and second birth, and 
with intervals among higher parities. The difference should reflect the extent to which 
the birth interval is extended by non-susceptibility. The effect of lactation on fertility 
shows that the period of survival of one child is positively associated with the succeeding 
birth or pregnancy interval in a non-contracepting population. A number of studies have 
analysed the association between lactation and marital fertility or between lactation and 
the average birth interval. For example, Knodel and van de Walle observed a negative 
correlation ranging from -0.38 to -0.64 between indices of breastfeeding during 1904- 
1911 and indices of marital fertility during the 1880s in the German states of Bavaria and 
Hessen.9
A further factor is sterility. In any population of reasonable size at least a small 
proportion of couples are unable to bear any children because of physiological impairment 
to either or both spouses. Although the age pattern of sterility has proved to be very hard
9J. Knodel and van de Walle 1967: Breastfeeding, fertility and infant mortality, An analysis of some 
early German Data, Population Studies 21, pp. 109-131.
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to estimate with any degree of precision, some estimates have been made to show this 
pattern, such as those of by Trussell and Wilson (1985:269-286). Demographers 
distinguish between primary sterility, which is attributable to ageing and its effects on the 
male and female reproductive systems, and secondary sterility, which occurs as a 
consequence of a birth or, more generally, of a pregnancy. Primary sterility is 
straightforward to assess and is the principal component of the overall proportion of 
couples unable to have children in the populations under consideration here.
Behind all these proximate determinants mentioned above are the background or 
ultimate determinants of fertility. These background variables include: demographic 
characteristics of the couple, their socio-economic characteristics, those of the institutions 
and the community, religion, and nation and cultural factors related to any part of the 
reproductive system. While the discussion of the determinants of fertility is sometimes 
limited to the direct link between the proximate determinants and fertility, increasing 
attention to the system of intervening links between socio-economic variables and fertility 
makes it essential to consider these, too, in the evaluation of changes in natural fertility. 
Such factors as food supply, nutritional status, income, education achieved, occupation, 
type of place to live, social communication, medical services, and so on are very 
important background determinants of fertility. In particular, the process of 
modernization, including economic, technical, cultural factors, and environmental, shifts 
the determinants of fertility both in developed and developing societies. Boserup 
(1986:239-255) suggested that these shifts had a great impact on fertility regimes, 
although she only mentioned that most occupational shifts were from occupations with 
lower to those with higher income, and that income increase unaccompanied by 
occupational changes was unlikely to lead to reduced fertility. She found that when export
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prices fluctuated upwards in some African countries, a large share of the increase in 
income had been used to raise consumption of imported manufactures and food. 
Nevertheless, it seems obvious that occupation shifts, increased income, better education, 
improved medical service, and other effects of modernization could produce better 
consumption and health, and thus have positive effects on natural fertility.
Marriage is the main institution used by society to regulate and sanction the 
cohabitation of couples and their consequent fertility performance and achievement. As 
Harris (1969:37-61) suggested, marriage usually had the aim of ensuring legitimacy to 
the offspring. In most societies, fertility is realized within marriage, which is an 
important social mechanism for regulating the production of offspring and the level of 
natural fertility. In particular, the time and frequency of marriage are very important in 
either delaying or speeding-up the beginning of reproduction. Early and almost universal 
marriage is characteristic of many societies in natural fertility conditions. The marriage 
age pattern is also an important determinant of natural fertility. We know that natural 
fertility in a woman’s reproductive history is highest when she is 20-24 years old. If age 
at first marriage changes, marital fertility changes correspondingly. This might raise a 
crucial question as to whether changes in natural fertility level over time were due to 
mean age at first marriage changing from an age of lower reproductive potential to one 
of peak potential, or the reverse. Thus estimates of natural fertility, M, from data without 
controlling for age at first marriage could be inflated or deflated.
In many societies, premarital sexual behaviour is frowned upon in the same way as 
illegitimacy. This was true to such an extent in traditional China that premarital childbirth 
almost did not exist, especially in rural areas. It appears, therefore, that premarital sexual
39
behaviour and childbirth may have considerably less significant implication on natural 
fertility in China. The more remarkable aspect of the sexual behaviour concerns the 
spacing of births, particularly the interval between the time when ability to conceive 
returns and the time when conception takes place.10 Obviously, coital frequency 
determines the length of this conception delay.
The effect of nutrition on natural fertility in human populations has been a subject of 
considerable discussion. It is well known that nutritional status is likely to affect 
biological mechanisms directly related to fertility performance, such as age at menarche, 
reproductive life span, postpartum amenorrhea, fecundability, coital frequency, and /  
pregnancy outcome. Historical data on nutrition, growth, age specific fertility and the 
ages of reproductive events showed that slow growth to maturity of women and men due 
to undemutrition, hard work and disease were correlated with a reproductive span which 
is shorter and less efficient than that of a well-nourished population.11 Frisch suggested 
that physical differences in the rate of growth resulted not only in a displacement of the 
age specific fertility curve in time, but in a difference in the ultimate level: the faster the 
growth of the females, the earlier and more efficient the productive ability. The well- 
nourished human female, particularly on diets with a high percentage of calories from fat 
may have higher oestrogen level, which would result in a higher reproductive efficiency 
than is found in females with less adiposity.12 Another analysis which was made of the
10Bourgeois-Pichat, Jean. 1967: Social and biological determinants of human fertility in non-industrial 
societies, Proceedings o f the American Philosophical Society 3, pp. 160-163.
"R.E. Frisch 1978: Population, food intake and fertility: Historical evidence for a direct effect of 
nutrition on reproductive ability, Science 199, pp.22-30.
12R.E. Frisch, D.M. Hegsted, and K. Yoshinaga 1975: Body weight and food intake at early oestrus 
of rats on a high-fat diet, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci USA 72, pp.4172-4176. R.E. Frisch 1977: Food intake, 
fatness and reproductive ability, in R. Vigersky (ed.) Anorexia Nervosa, New York, Raven Publishing Co., 
pp. 109-133.
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effect of nutritional status on fertility among 400 rural Guatemalan women, by Bongaarts 
and Delgado (1979:120-128), suggested that nutrition was positively related to fertility, 
and demonstrated a negative relationship between the duration of postpartum amenorrhea 
and nutritional status.
If we assume that variation of the human biological capacity for reproduction is 
‘normal’, then the natural fertility level depends mainly on the operation and impact of 
sexual behaviour, and the socio-cultural and economic conditions which govern it directly 
or indirectly within marriage in the society. The primary socio-cultural influences on 
sexual behaviour are those concerned with the regulation and custom of premarital 
unions, the frequency of sexual intercourse within marriage and the interrelated events 
of breastfeeding, lactation taboo or abstinence from sexual unions after childbirth, and 
the reappearance of ovulation in the female. In the context of prolonging the period of 
temporary infecundity and maintaining long birth intervals, breastfeeding and sexual 
abstinence after confinement are the principal bio-social factors which operate. Both are 
governed by certain social customs and are also affected by contemporary change in 
socio-economic conditions.
The combined duration of breastfeeding and abstinence combined varies from society 
to society. In Africa, it was not uncommon to hear old people asserting that lactation and 
abstinence periods had traditionally varied as much as two or three years. Indeed, Talbot 
(1926) reported a varying period of one to three years as the traditional period of post­
natal abstinence for tribes in southern Nigeria. However, evidence is beginning to emerge 
that modernization is now an important eroding factor since with a rise in education, 
occupation, income, and urbanization, less emphasis is placed on the need for long
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periods of lactation and abstinence.13
Another social controls indirectly affecting the level of natural fertility derives from 
the social structure and organization of societies. This could create and reinforce cultural 
conditions and motivations which favour high fertility or encourage tendencies towards 
the control and reduction of fertility. Fundamentally, family and kinship groups constitute 
the basic unit of social organization and social control within which procreation is 
sanctioned and regulated according to the accepted social norms and values. Although the 
institution of the joint family is considered to be one of the main cultural forces favouring 
high fertility, this has not been adequately substantiated, since some data indicated that 
women in joint families had lower fertility levels than those in nuclear families. Nag 
(1965:160-163) suggested that generational taboo, particularly in joint families where 
women limited the frequency of coitus after their sons were married, was also possibly 
relevant. Thus the tendency towards a rising proportion of nuclear families, due to the 
process of modernization, could be another factor to affect natural fertility.
1.6 Studies of changes in natural fertility and its components
Several historical studies have focused on natural fertility and its proximate 
determinants, such as the one on England 1600-1799 by Wilson (1984:225-240). He 
illustrated the crucial role played by post-partum non-susceptibility (and hence 
breastfeeding) and a lesser role for fecundability. The combination of these two factors 
could contribute to the highest fertility (highest fecundability and the shortest NSP). The 
study also showed an increase from 0.213 to 0.248 in predicted fecundability during
13J.C. Caldwell and P. Caldwell 1977: The role of marital sexual abstinence in determining fertility: 
A study of the Yoruba in Nigeria, Population Studies 31, pp. 193-218.
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1600-1799 and a decline in NSP from 12.7 to 11.53 months over the period of 1600- 
1749. It is also generally believed that a substantial increase in natural fertility occurred 
in modem history in the developed world. One study of Greenland from 1851 to 1975, 
carried out by Hansen (1979:516), showed a dramatic increase in marital fertility between 
1851 and 1955 among age groups 15-19, 20-24, 25-29. The trend was consistent even 
before 1946 when a post world war baby boom took place. Perhaps the most illustrative 
study on changes in natural fertility is the one by Knodel and Wilson (1981:53-84). They 
explored the secular trend in fecundity and its components in a sample of German village 
populations over a century and a half of their demographic history. They found that a 
substantial rise in the level of fecundity of married couples occurred between the mid­
eighteenth and the end of the nineteenth century. They concluded that part of the increase 
in fecundity was attributable to increased fecundability, some decrease in the non- 
susceptible period following birth, which was mainly behavioural rather than biological 
in nature. But there also seems to be a trend in industrialised countries for the average 
age at menarche, a biological factor of fecundity, to decline slightly with improving 
standards of living. Brown’s (1966:9-14) estimates suggested that the age by which fifty 
per cent of girls had reached menarche in England in 1845 was over 15, whereas the 
comparable age in 1962 was less than 13. Another survey in 1976 showed that the mean 
age of menarche then was at 12.6 years for American girls. The difference was attributed 
to changes in the social and nutritional environment.
There is mounting evidence that substantial increases in fertility have taken place in 
various parts of the developing world. One of most comprehensive studies carried out by 
Dyson and Murphy (1985, 1986) found consistently that a crude birth rate rise occurred 
before demographic transition in most parts of the developing world. They further
43
suggested that age-standardized fertility rates probably rose even more, as the widespread 
mortality decline prior to 1960 led directly to reductions in the proportion of population 
in the childbearing years. Similar evidence also existed in rising marital fertility, which 
is directly related to natural fertility. Such increases also were shown for the Central 
Asian Republics of the Soviet Union between 1926 and 1970 in the work of Coale, 
Anderson and Harm (1979:85-121), who pointed to similar changes in marital fertility 
in Korea. Some evidence of substantial increase in marital fertility within the age group 
20-24, which was least likely group to control its fertility, was also shown for other 
Asian countries and areas by Knodel (1977:219-249), such as +11% between 1961 and 
1974 in Hong Kong, +15% between 1940 and 1970 in Japan, and +14% between 1957 
and 1967 in West Malaysia. Some recent studies again reveal that increases in marital 
fertility are at present under way in a number of African populations. For example, total 
fertility in Kenya appeared to rise from 6.8 to 8.1 births between the early 1960s and 
1980.14 Another study of 5000 married women between the ages of 20 and 39 living in 
Taiwan, carried out by Jain, Hermalin and Sun (1979:151-194), suggested that the level 
of modernization and development could affect the level of natural fertility in various 
ways: (1) the proportion of women who do not breastfeed their children is likely to 
increase, (2) the proportion of women who resume menstruation within a short period 
after childbirth is likely to increase, (3) the duration of lactation and the postpartum 
period is likely to decrease, (4) the period of lactation beyond the resumption of 
menstruation is likely to decrease and, (5) the average fecundability is likely to increase 
with modernization. They found, that the length of the menstruating interval for those 
who did not breastfeed or who weaned before resuming menstruation decreased from 5.3 
months to 3.5 months with an increase in the number of modem objects owned by the
14 Population Reference Bureau-Intercom, 7, 10, (1980) Fertility in Kenya: Alarmingly High and 
Continuing to Rise, see Knodel and Wilson (1981), p54, footnote 1.
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couple. A comparative study carried out by Hobcraft and Mcdonald (1984:23-24) based 
on the data of World Fertility Survey, shows that the proportion of the women having a 
first birth within five years of people’s first sexual union in Sudan, Bangladesh and Nepal 
rose over time, moving from 0.79 to 0.91, 0.6 to 0.81 and 0.58 to 0.69 in respectively 
for the periods from 16-20 years to 0-5 years before the survey. All these points imply 
an increase in natural fertility and average fecundability with socio-economic development 
in some developing countries.
1.7 Modern Chinese fertility and its derived studies
For arguments about Chinese fertility, we can trace history back to the supposition 
of Montesquieu, that "the climate of China is in any peculiar manner favourable to the 
production of Children, and that the women are more prolific than in any other part of 
the world."15 Such a view of Chinese women was widely accepted and became part 
of western understanding of how China could maintain such a large population in the 
face of frequent epidemics, recurrent famines, and ceaseless wars. Later, Mallory 
(1926:87) confirmed Montesquieu’s supposition and acclaimed the fecundity of the 
Chinese as very high and without parallel. But, in 1934, an average size of Chinese 
farm family of 5.56 was indicated by J. L. Buck’s first Chinese farm survey in 1921-23. 
This led Penrose (1934:108) to challenge the traditional view by saying that "certain 
quantitative investigations based on samples do not indicate that there is anything 
exceptional in Chinese fertility".
However, the Chinese population did not show a clear picture to the world until a
15See T. R. Malthus 1960: On Population, The Modem Library, New York, p.206.
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second Chinese farm survey was conducted by Buck and his Chinese colleagues during 
1929-31. The survey, commonly referred to as the Chinese Farm Survey, covered more 
than 46,000 farm families in 119 widely dispersed localities in 16 provinces. The 
general results of the survey were reported by Frank Notestein and Chi-ming Chiao in 
1937.16 The basic findings relating to fertility were, (1), universal and early marriage 
was the dominant pattern in the country, over 99% of females and 90% of males got 
married before age 29, (the mean ages at marriage were 18.2 and 20.5 for female^and 
mal§ respectively), and divorce was very rare among males and almost unknown among 
females. This marriage pattern was believed in the report to be an important factor in 
the high fertility; (2), The sex ratio of male to female births was higher than the 
corresponding experience in the West where the vital registration was much more 
reliable; a marked tendency to understate female births was suggested; (3), The crude 
birth rate was higher than in Japan and most Western countries, the births per 1000 
population was 38.3 for the total sample, 39.0 and 37.4 for South and North China 
respectively; (4), The conclusion about this high birth rate was that it was not because 
married women were more fertile in China but because there were more of them, so the 
universality of marriage in China more than counteracted the effect of the lower fertility 
of married women, yielding a higher crude birth rate in China than other countries, such 
as Japan. (5), As regards marital fertility, an average of around 5.28 children for married 
women aged 45 and over was estimated. The study thus suggested this level of marital 
fertility was much higher than that observed in the western countries at that time. 
However, if we compare Chinese marital fertility in 1929-31, as a non-contracepting 
population, with that of Western non-contracepting populations two centuries earlier, we 
would naturally conclude that Chinese women were not the most prolific, but rather the
16 J. L. Buck 1937: Land Utilization in China, Vol. 1, pp.358-399.
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opposite, as the Princeton Population Research Group did, (see Chapter 5).
In 1974, initiated by Taeuber, the Princeton Group, of Barclay, Coale, Stoto, and 
Trussell, started to reappraise the material of Chinese Farm Survey by means of 
presently available techniques for demographic analysis of faulty data.17 The findings 
from by applying these latest techniques, not only generally confirmed the results 
reached by Notestein and Chiao: high mortality, early and universal marriage, and 
moderate fertility, but also reached some stages deeper and further than the previous 
one. The new findings suggested, (1) The quality of age reporting was acceptable, and 
quite accurate; (2) Singulate mean ages at marriage (SMAM) were 17.52 and 21.32 for 
female and male respectively; nearly everyone was married by age 25; (3) The pattern 
of adjusted marital fertility rates modified for understated births appears to be similar 
to that of marital fertility which is characteristic of populations in which there is little 
or no control of births; the level of adjusted total fertility was 5.50; (4) Although the 
Chinese marital fertility pattern in the 1930s was well within the range of natural 
fertility described by Henry, the Chinese farmers experienced natural fertility very much 
lower than that of any other population which he studied. By applying Coale and 
Trussell’s model, a value of natural fertility level, M, of 0.62 was estimated for the 
whole country, 0.65 and 0.59 for south and north China respectively. (5) The possible 
reasons for this very low level of natural fertility regime were also suggested, as 
prolonged breastfeeding among inadequately nourished women, and reduced coital 
frequency due to suffering from chronic fever and other debilities.
In 1984, Wolf (1984:443-470) raised serious doubt about some of the conclusions
17 G. W. Barclay, et al. 1976: A Reassessment of the Demography of Traditional Rural China, 
Population Index 42 , pp.606-635.
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reached by the Princeton group, asking whether Chinese fertility was as low as they had 
suggested. Questioning the data quality from the Chinese Farm Survey to start, Wolf 
believed that the data did not represent China, where total marital fertility should be 
around 5.78 rather than 5.50 as estimated by the Princeton group, and that the real level 
of total marital fertility should exceed the Farm Survey figures about^by 21 percent. He " 
derived his conclusion mainly from three parallel comparisons. First, he compared the 
fertility rates derived from a register of births, deaths, and population in the Hai-shan 
region in Taiwan, then calculated age-specific fertility rates and age-specific marital 
fertility rates from the registers in this area during the period of 1906-45. These were 
about 14% higher than those in the Farm Survey. He argued that these registers were 
essentially complete and more reliable. Second, he compared the age-specific fertility 
rates of the Chinese farmers with the rates that he derived from the histories of the 
women aged over 55 whom he interviewed in seven villages of rural China in 1981. 
Again, the total fertility and total marital fertility were about 5.78 and 7.03 respectively, 
and 15.0% and 20.9% higher than the Farm Survey figures. Third, he compared the 
Farm Survey figures with fertility data from another survey conducted at Chiang-yin 
County (Jiangsu Province, mainland China) by Chen, Chiao, and Thompson in 1931,18 
which showed average total fertility for 1931-35 as 6.38, about 27.9 percent above the 
Farm Survey rates. Although he believed that the true level of fertility in rural China 
in the late 1920s and early 1930s was considerably higher than as recorded by the Farm 
Survey, he agreed^the general point made by the Princeton Group that the fertility of /  
Chinese women was much lower than that of European women, and that the pattern of 
fertility displayed by Chinese population was very similar to the natural fertility.
18 C. M. Chiao, Warren S. Thompson, and D. T. Chen 1938: An Experiment in the Registration o f  
Vital Statistics in China (Oxford, Ohio: Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, 1938)
48
Replying to Wolfs criticism, Coale made a strong defence for the Princeton group’s 
reassessment in a subsequent paper after W olfs article in 1984 (1984a). He explained 
the reassessment’s position was not to assert the Farm Survey data’ accuracy, nor ^n 
acceptance of the figures on fertility and mortality as given in the survey, but rather to 
subject the survey data to a battery of techniques of analysis recently developed for 
extracting valid demographic information from inaccurate data, that was, to subject the 
data to corrections that emerged from the data themselves. By calculating the degree of 
understatement of births in Farm Survey, the overall upward adjustment was worked out 
as 9%, but 12% for the South alone. Following W olfs comparisons, Coale also 
compared adjusted age-specific marital fertility in the assessment the with the fertility 
schedule of Hai-shan from Taiwan, and with the fertility rates that Wolf derived from 
the histories of older women whom he interviewed in seven villages of rural China. The 
agreement in both parallel comparisons were very good. The average total fertility rate 
for the period 1906-45 for the Hai-shan area was 5.46, for the Chinese farmers 5.50 
(adjusted), and for Wolfs respondents 5.76. The slightly higher figure for Wolfs 
respondents’ fertility could be due to the fact that they might have experienced slightly 
higher marital fertility in the 1940s or 1950s than in the 1930s, as Coale suggested. 
Finally, Coale tried to justify the adjusted farmer fertility by logical deduction from the 
population growth and the mortality, under the circumstance of an average life 
expectation, which was only 24 years, and an infant mortality as high as 300 per 1000. 
Fertility estimates derived from the age distribution and from the estimated infant and 
child mortality were also very nearly the same as those based on adjusted numbers of 
births for the year before the survey.
Prior to 1949, the time of founding of the People’s Republic of China, national
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statistical data for China were of questionable validity and frequently useless. After 
1949, population censuses were conducted in 1953, 1964, and 1982 (recently 1990) in 
order to discover the basic demographic facts, such as births, deaths, total population 
and their trends. However, for over 30 years after 1949, the population statistics 
collected about China were seldom published. The field of demography was taboo, so 
that important demographic indicators were not measured, and there were no 
representative sample surveys. During the early 1980s, a major transformation took 
place in the quality and availability of China’s collected demographic data. Some crucial 
demographic data from the last three decades were finally published, and their relatively 
high quality has been recognised by many western demographers. In addition, as 
China’s family-planning programme was so successful on a scale not previously seen 
anywhere, all these data have attracted interest from a range of people. Since the early 
1980s, studies of the Chinese population have been frequent in the demographic 
literature of both China and the western world. This was especially so after publication 
of the 1982 census which was more comprehensive and carefully planned than the 
previous two, and the 1/1000 Fertility Survey, which was the first retrospective fertility 
survey in China. As regards the fertility, major focuses of these studies about Chinese 
population have been oriented to Chinese population policies and birth control 
programmes, fertility transition and its socio-economic implications, and population 
trend and projections. Such were studies by Arid (1978, 1981), Yu (1979), Demberger 
(1981), Liu and Song (1981), Coale (1981, 1984b), Chen and Tyler (1982), Goodstadt 
(1982, 1986), Birdsall and Jamison (1983), Tien (1984), Caldwell and Srinivasan 
(1984), Croll, Davin, and Kane (1985), Bongaarts and Greenhalgh (1985), Greenhalgh
(1986), Arnold and Liu (1986), Banister (1987), Poston and Gu (1987), Feeney and Yu
(1987), Whyte and Gu (1987), Zeng (1988), Wang and Hall (1991), and Peng (1991).
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Based on the 1982 Census and the 1/1000 Fertility Survey, the most comprehensive 
study to document and analyse fertility transition in China since 1949 was carried out 
by Peng (1991). It describes the fertility level, trends, and differentials in terms of 
regional and rural-urban residence. He found that China had experienced a dramatic 
fertility transition, which was supported by the fact that fertility fell by more than 50% 
in a single decade. China’s fertility transition was also a process of diffusion. He 
suggested that there had been regional differentials in fertility and marriage behaviour, 
which became more marked during the 1960s and 1970s. The fertility transition in 
China’s urban areas began much earlier and progressed faster than in the rural areas. 
Sustained fertility decline started in a few large municipalities and some eastern 
provinces. They were then followed by the northern provinces, and transition gradually 
spread to the interior. The major determinant of this fertility transition, Peng strongly 
believed, was the success of the Chinese family-planning programme in which the 
government and political system played a prominent role. This fact made the fertility 
transition in China an exception to the classical theory of demographic transition, as it 
occurred in a society at a relative low level of modernization, but with strong 
government commitment and an effective family-planning programme. Thus he 
suggested that China’s transition might not have been a natural but rather an induced 
process. He found that mass mobilization had been a crucial factor in carrying out the 
family-planning programme, and that a well-built network for birth-control service 
penetrated every comer of the country. All people in the country were organized to 
participate in the programme. Apart from the birth control programme, women’s 
education, occupation and their place of residence also played parts in this transition. 
Women who were less educated, or living in rural areas, or working as peasants tended 
to have more children. A variety of other forces also combined to create regional
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diversity in China’s fertility transition. The success of the birth control programme 
depended largely upon the efforts made by local governments, and upon the local 
political and social environment. However, in the long run, he believed, socio-economic 
development would ultimately change people’s attitudes towards family and 
childbearing, and lead to a complete fertility transition.
1.7 Studies of Chinese natural fertility, its components
Compared with the study of Chinese fertility, which has advanced rapidly since the 
1982 Census and the 1/1000 Fertility Survey, much less research effort has been 
devoted so far to Chinese natural fertility and it components. Partly though lack of 
proper data and partly through failing to attract enough attention, Chinese natural 
fertility remains fairly untouched by scholars. Apart from Barclay et al. (1976), the only 
exceptions are Lavely (1986), Coale et al. (1988), and Lavely and Freedman (1990). 
Among these, Lavely’s work may be the only qualified study concentrated on the 
subject of Chinese natural fertility, although his real purpose was to find the change of 
Chinese fertility regime and its relationship with government policy.
Based on the information from the 1/1000 Fertility Survey, Lavely first estimated 
single years of age specific marital fertility (ASMFR) for China as whole, and for the 
urban and rural sections separately. By applying Coale and Trussell’s model directly, 
he estimated natural fertility level (M) and the index of marital fertility control (m) for 
both urban and rural China. According to his estimations of M, the level of natural 
fertility rose about 50 per cent from 1950 to 1981 among the rural Chinese, and 290 per 
cent in the urban areas. To account for these incredible and unrealistic estimates, two
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sources of error in the model were considered: random variation and systematic 
deviation. Lavely then tried to remove irregularities from annual fluctuations in 
childbearing, short-term marriage pattern, or sampling variation by using periodical 
average estimates. The result of this procedure, he admitted, had very little effect on the 
estimates of M and m. The irregularities, although they had been improved, still existed 
substantially, particularly for the urban population in recent years. He attributed this to 
a poor fit of the model due to systematic deviation and the urban ASMFR "heaping" at 
ages 23, 25, 27 and 35, which could affect his estimation when the single-year ASMFR, 
rather than five-year ASMFR by convention, was adopted. By using mse proposed by 
Coale and Trussell (1978:203), the mean square errors of the model, measuring 
goodness of fit (see Sheps and Menken 1973:82-83 for more details), he believed that 
he had achieved a good fit of the model up to 1971-75 and 1976-78 for urban and rural 
areas respectively.
This statement, in my view, is not robust. The mse in this case, may not be the best 
measure of the goodness of fit here, simply because it measures only the error or 
residuals, the part unexplained by the fitted curve, in absolute terms, rather than 
reporting the proportion of error of the explained part among total variation. In this 
case, when the age pattern of marital fertility deviated significantly from the standard 
natural fertility schedule n(a) (under strong pressures from the government’s birth 
control policy after the 1970s), the mse grew above 0.01 very easily, beyond the 
threshold of "terrible" fit suggested by Coale and Trussell (1978:203). However, this 
may not necessarily be a "terrible" fit if a fitted curve can explain a substantial part of 
total variation, say 75 percent. In fact, the most crucial reason which creates the 
unrealistic estimate of M and m, is not what Lavely suggested, such as sample variation,
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or poor fit, or ASMFR heaping at certain ages. The vital problems in Lavely’s 
estimation occurred, I believe, at the range of single ASMFR from 23 to 40 selected for 
estimating M and m, by following Coale and Trussell’s recommendation (1978:204). 
To avoid a high variation in fertility at ages 45-49, they suggested estimating M and m 
by using values of r(a) from age 22 or 23 to 40 rather than from 15 to 49 (by single 
year). However, this selection will lead to two biases. First, we know that women’s 
fecundability reaches its peak when they are in the middle of 20s, as Jain confirmed 
from his study of Taiwan women (1969a:80). Naturally, marital fertility is generally 
higher at age 23-24 than at 20-24. The pressure of the birth control policy, ‘Later- 
Longer-Less’, after the 1960s compressed childbearing after 23, and drove marital 
fertility even higher at age 23-24 than it would be in a normal situation. Thus selecting 
an age range to start from 23 will lead estimated M to be much greater than starting 
from 15 or 20 for the single year case, or 20-24 for the five year case. Secondly, 
selecting an age range ending at 40 rather than 44 or 49, will also serve to inflate M 
values here. As m is an average degree of birth control over all ages, a rise in the value 
of m would be interpreted as a slightly higher level of M by Coale and Trussell’s 
model, given the same marital fertility schedule. Under the family planning campaigns 
in China, younger age groups were influenced more than the elder ones, and 
correspondingly the reduction in marital fertility was much more significant among the 
younger ages. This pushed up the m estimate when the ASMFRs over age 40 were 
chopped away, thus overestimating M. So cutting away both ends of ASMFR range and 
shortening the age range from 15-49 or 20-44 to 23-40 would jointly contribute to 
inflate M estimates. A consequence of this selectivity bias will be discussed in Chapter 
5, when my results are compared with the estimates in Lavely’s study.
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The study carried out by Coale, Li, and Han (1988), in fact, is related to the 
Chinese birth intervals. They found that fecundability was most surprisingly low; that 
birth intervals before the first and second births became shorter in rural China from the 
1940s to the 1970s; that conception rates were lower following a male birth; that birth 
intervals were shorter after a child died in infancy; and that some women who lost a 
second child soon after its birth resumed breastfeeding an older child. In addition, the 
study suggested that the monthly probability of conception before the first and second 
births increased in rural areas.
)
Similar conclusions arose from a preliminary analysis of fecundity and other 
proximate determinants by the present author,19 However it appears that several related 
and interesting questions remain. Did natural fertility change occur generally during the 
demographic transition in China? If it did, what were the patterns of geographic 
variation, urban-rural differential and educational divergence? What were the roles 
played by the background and proximate determinants? Finally, there is a fundamental 
question of how to apply appropriate measures to estimate underlying level of natural 
fertility.
19Y. Pu 1989: Secular Increase in Fecundity in China, M.Sc dissertation, London School of 
Economics.
Chapter 3 The Data. Conception and Measurement of Natural 
Fertility and Its Proximate Determinants
1.1 Data from demographic surveys
1.1.1 One-Per-Thousand Fertility Sample Survey in 1982
The major source of demographic data used in this study is China’s National One- 
Per-Thousand-Population Fertility Sample Survey (the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey), 
conducted by the State Family Planning Commission in 1982. This was a stratified-cluster 
sample survey, using China’s 1982 Census listing as the sample frame. The stratification 
of urban and rural population was settled by using the address code of the Census. 815 
rural production brigades and urban resident committees were randomly selected as 
sample units with a total sample population of just over one million, or one per thousand 
of the national total population.1 Within the sample population, all women aged 15-67 
were interviewed about their marital and fertility histories. Contraceptive practice and 
women’s socio-economic background were also included in the survey questionnaire. 
Sampling and non-sampling errors were rigorously controlled throughout every stage. 
This survey was successfully undertaken with relatively high accuracy and the analyses 
suggest a very low level of error in its reporting of births. Both Coale and Banister have 
suggested that the fertility and nuptiality information from the survey can be accepted as
‘See Z. Xiao 1984: The Design of 1982’s Fertility Sampling Survey in China, in China Population 
Information Centre, Analysis on China*s National One-Per-Thousand-Population Fertility Sampling 
Survey, Beijing, pp.24-31.
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of high quality.2 Unfortunately, only tabulated results of the survey are available to this 
study. Nevertheless, full utilisation of this information enables us to document and 
analyse in great detail a half century of change in natural fertility and its components in 
China.
Table 3.1 Sample sizes and sample units of the 1/1000 Fertility Survey in 
1982 by region (provinces, municipality cities, minority autonomous regions)
Region
Sample size
Sample unitsTotal Urban Rural
Beijing 3103 1941 1162 7
Tianjin 3044 1719 1325 6
Hebei 17030 1575 15455 53
Shanxi 7681 955 6726 30
In. Mongolia 6257 1843 4414 16
Liaoning 12513 4836 7677 22
Jilin 6744 1892 4852 14
Heilongjiang 9599 3133 6466 23
Shanghai 4416 2888 1528 6
Jiangsu 21019 3447 17572 41
Zhejiang 11705 1440 10265 44
Anhui 14357 1662 12695 32
Fujian 7414 826 6588 17
Jiangxi 9509 1094 8415 24
Shangdong 23409 1559 21850 88
Henan 21717 1992 19725 50
Hubei 15638 2419 13219 38
Hunan 16727 1939 14788 50
Guangdong 17692 3020 14672 32
Guangxi 10512 973 9539 17
Sichuan 30114 4385 25729 85
Guizhou 7841 1108 6733 27
Yunnan 10088 1254 8834 16
Shaanxi 8956 1545 7411 35
Gansu 5732 1057 4675 19
Qinghai 1489 283 1206 6
Ningxia 1290 387 903 4
Xingjiang 4418 1241 3177 13
National total 310014 52413 257601 815
2 See J. Banister 1984: Analysis of Recent Data on the Population of China, Population and 
Development Review 10, No. 2, pp.241-271; and Coale (1984b:37-38).
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The total number of respondents in the survey was 310,014, which was quite 
exceptional compared with those of many other surveys, such as the World Fertility 
Survey (WFS) or Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). This was true for most 
individual provinces. For example (see Table 3.1), in the survey more than thirty 
thousand women were interviewed in Sichuan province alone. The sample size for each 
province, on average, was more than ten thousand. But this was not so for some small 
provinces because of the method of single stage proportional sampling. This is especially 
true when the sample was further broken down into rural and urban populations. As a 
result, stochastic variations were much greater in the fertility and nuptiality measures 
calculated for individual provinces than for China as a whole, and thus varied between 
provinces. The effects of small numbers were most obvious for the urban populations. 
Moreover, because people who lived in one place showed a statistical tendency to 
resemble each other more than people who lived far apart, the implication of clustering 
on analysis should be borne in mind. Sampling error caused by clustering seems to be 
larger in major municipalities and small provinces, due to the small number of sample 
units.
In addition, the extent of reporting errors varied between provinces. It is believed that 
misreporting was more severe in some interior provinces due in part to low education 
levels and local customs. Variability in annual rates, therefore, should be treated with 
some caution. Nevertheless, the original data are used with as little adjustment as possible 
in order to document genuine fluctuations.
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1.1.2 In-Depth Fertility Survey (Phase-D in 1985
Another source of demographic data available for this study is the In-Depth Fertility 
Survey (first phase) on the population, fertility and related factors in some provinces and 
municipalities of China. The objectives of the China In-Depth Fertility Survey are to 
provide the information needed to improve understanding of the levels, trends and 
determinants of fertility of the Chinese population and to provide the government with 
data useful in the formulation of population policy. The first phase involved a large scale 
representative sample survey on fertility, family planning and related factors in the 
provinces of Shaanxi and Hebei and the municipality of Shanghai. Table 3.2 shows the 
distribution of the populations surveyed according to urban-rural residence and level of 
education.
Table 3.2 Background characteristics of the 1985 In-Depth Fertility
Survey’s population
Region
Population 
(imillion)
Urban
(%)
Distribution^)1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shaanxi 28 21 37 36 27 0.5
Hebei 53 17 37 36 27 0.3
Shanghai 11 59 22 27 46 5.0
Women’s education level, (1): Illiteracy, (2): primary school, (3): secondary school, (4): higher.
Shaanxi is a typical inland province of China. Although it is a political, economic, 
and cultural centre for North-west China, this is the most undeveloped area in the 
country, thus Shaanxi represents the lower level socio-economic development areas. With 
abundant mineral resources, developed transport facilities and a moderate climate, Hebei 
is a relatively developed province in terms of industrial and agricultural production.
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Situated along the coast of the East China Sea, Shanghai Municipality is the biggest 
industrial base and one of the main seaports, and scientific, technological and educational 
centres in China.
The 1985 fertility survey was carried out by the State Statistical Bureau and the 
related provincial and municipal statistical bureaux during April 1985 in the three 
regions. All major operations of the first phase were successfully completed. It is very 
rich in content and covers a number of items never investigated before. The 
questionnaires were developed from the experience of the World Fertility Survey in many 
developing countries. The sample was designed with the objective of obtaining completed 
interviews for a representative sample of around 5,000 eligible women in Hebei, and 
4,000 each in Shaanxi and Shanghai.
In Hebei and Shaanxi, cities and counties formed the primary sampling units (PSUs). 
They were divided into three strata in each province, according to geographic and 
administrative location: cities, counties in the plains, and hilly counties. The number of 
units to be selected from each stratum was allocated according to its relative population 
size within the province, and a total of 34 PSUs in Hebei and 29 PSUs in Shaanxi were 
selected systematically from geographically ordered lists by probability proportional to 
population size. The only exception to this general procedure were three large cities in 
the two provinces which were taken into the sample with certainty. Within each PSU, 
ultimate area units were selected in three further stages, at each stage selecting by 
proportional probability to estimated total population using systematic sampling from 
ordered lists.
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In Shanghai, the area units were selected in three rather than four stages, eliminating 
the first stage of selecting counties. The PSUs consisted of street committees, towns or 
communes. Three strata were created, one for each of these types of units, from which 
a total of 54 PSUs was selected systematically by probability proportional to population 
size. Within each selected PSU, 3 neighbourhood committees/production brigades, and 
within each of the latter 3 neighbourhood groups/production teams were selected.
The number of households and women selected and successfully interviewed is shown 
in Table 3.3. About 2.3%, 2.9% and 4.0% of selected households could not be 
interviewed though absence, illness or occasionally refusal, in Hebei, Shaanxi, and 
Shanghai respectively. There was some further non-response at the stage of interviewing 
women because of the respondent being out or for other reasons. The overall response 
rates for the individual interviews, obtained by multiplying the response rates at the two 
stages, are high throughout, the lowest being in Shaanxi.
Table 3.3 Response rate(rr, %) of the In-Depth Fertility Survey in 1985
Region
Number of households Number of women Overall
selected interviewed rr selected interviewed rr rr
Shaanxi 5368 5215 97 4248 4084 96 93.4
Hebei 6750 6599 98 5151 5080 99 96.3
Shanghai 6149 5905 96 4178 4143 99 95.2
Accurate reporting of age is of crucial importance in a fertility survey. To ensure this 
the traditional Chinese method of reporting age was employed in the interviews. By 
comparing with the age distribution from the 1982 census and computing certain indices 
of age misreporting, an assessment of the quality of age reporting in the survey at the 
aggregate level was provided. Table 3.4 compares the age distributions of ever-married
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women as reported in the 1982 Census, and the this household survey. With the 
exception of age groups 25-29 and 30-34 in Hebei, the differences found are negligible, 
indicating very good quality of data.
Table 3.4 Age distributions of married women aged 15-49(%) in 1982 Census
and 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey
Age
Group
Shaanxi Hebei Shanghai
Census Survey Census Survey Census Survey
< 20 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.7
20-24 10.9 14.6 10.4 10.7 5.8 4.4
25-29 23.8 21.2 26.1 22.7 23.2 24.6
30-34 20.5 20.7 22.3 25.1 23.9 25.2
35-39 16.7 16.5 15.5 17.8 16.7 20.1
40-44 14.6 14.2 12.5 11.9 13.2 13.4
45-49 12.7 11.8 12.8 11.0 17.2 12.2
1.1.3 One-Percent Population Sample Survey in 1987
Another major source of demographic data available to this study is China’s National 
One-Percent Population Sample Survey (the 1/100 Population Survey), conducted by the 
Department of Population Statistics of the State Statistical Bureau and helped by each 
level of local government in 1987 with a standard recording time of 1st of July. This 
survey was a stratified-cluster sample survey.
The size of the each sample unit depends on size of representative population. 12540 
rural village resident committees or urban resident committees, located in 1045 different 
counties(cities), were randomly selected as sample units under the de jure  principle. A 
total sample population of 10.71 million or 2.49 million households (including military 
personnel), or 0.9999 per cent of the national total population were actually surveyed and 
enumerated. The sample size for each province, on average, was more than three hundred
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thousand. (See Table 3 .5 )
Table 3.5 Sample sizes and sample sex ratio of the One-Percent Population Sample
Survey in 1987
Region
Sample Size Sex ratio 
F=100Total City Town Rural
Beijing 97936 58018 5356 34562 100.75
Tianjin 82434 52679 5203 24552 101.77
Hebei 571449 104524 95838 371088 103.83
Shanxi 268904 66596 63886 138423 108.96
In. Mongolia 205503 59504 40394 105606 105.79
Liaoning 377337 140941 99979 136417 103.07
Jilin 234964 74831 93106 67027 103.61
Heilongjiang 339080 95221 110050 133809 103.21
Shanghai 123640 68799 6998 47843 98.73
Jiangsu 632598 78640 103472 450487 102.49
Zhejiang 409673 88499 100562 220611 103.10
Anhui 527262 67829 78488 380945 105.98
Fujian 278242 46039 64513 167690 103.28
Jiangxi 355468 50929 46067 258472 103.68
Shangdong 790567 233597 201024 355946 101.38
Henan 792405 86705 75579 630120 101.59
Hubei 506560 73444 128928 304188 102.26
Hunan 576453 48445 103006 425002 106.51
Guangdong 643171 84978 88433 469760 103.09
Guangxi 399929 22851 106424 270653 106.93
Sichuan 1043906 102886 170966 770053 106.57
Guizhou 305477 42353 57707 205417 104.38
Yunnan 350620 55837 45477 249307 102.53
Tibet 20847 96.92
Shaanxi 309411 53538 53732 202142 106.37
Gansu 209725 23801 32108 153816 104.76
Qinghai 41955 7440 3036 31480 100.15
Ningxia 42875 5349 7390 30136 100.33
Xingjiang 140915 35880 21015 84019 104.08
Total 10679308 1930154 2008736 6740417 103.89
Information about geographical distribution, national status, age structure, family, 
marriage, birth, death, migration and socio-economic background factors such as type of 
residence, education, occupation, were all reflected in the survey questionnaire, thus it 
can be regarded as a small census. Within the sample population, all women aged 15-64
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were interviewed about their marital status and fertility histories.
The sampling and non-sampling errors were rigorously controlled throughout every 
stage of the survey. This survey was also successfully undertaken with relatively high 
accuracy and the analyses suggested a very low level of error in reporting of births from 
the survey. Given 95% significance, the sample error on fertility level for the first half 
year of 1987 varies within (-0.011%, +0.011%), and mortality sample error within (- 
0.006%, +0.006%).3 Although only tabulated results of the survey, with complete 
demographic data, are available for only one year (1986), this information enables us to 
extend our study about changes in natural fertility in China from 1981 to 1986 when 
major economic reform was taking place and having a significant impact on many aspects 
of life.
Table 3.6 Age distribution of women (15-49)(%) in 1982 Census 
and the 1987 1/100 Population Survey
Age
group
1982 Census 1987 1% Survey
All1 Ever-M2 All Ever-M
15-19 24.77 1.64 21.94 1.33
20-24 14.68 11.51 21.18 18.21
25-29 18.04 24.97 12.67 17.41
30-34 14.10 20.46 15.32 21.80
35-39 10.32 15.04 12.14 17.32
40-44 9.10 13.27 8.89 12.70
45-49 8.99 13.11 7.86 11.23
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
1, All: All women; 2, Ever-M: ever married women.
Table 3.6 is a comparison of the age distributions of all women and ever-married
3 Department of Population Statistics, China State Statistical Bureau 1988: Tabulations o f  China 1%  
Population Sample Survey: National Volume, Beijing, China Statistical Press
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women as reported in the 1982 Census and the 1987 1/100 Population Survey. The age 
distribution of all women is quite consistent in these two surveys, a consistent pattern is 
seen between the five-year age groups in the 1982 Census and the next older five-year 
age group in the 1987 survey. For example, they are 14.68% and 18.08% in age groups 
20-24 and 25-29 respectively in the 1982 Census, while 12.67% and 15.32% in age 
groups 25-29 and 30-34 respectively in the 1987 1/100 Survey. The age distribution of 
ever-married women is also consistent between these two surveys, except for age groups 
20-24 and 25-29, which is due to a relaxation policy on marriage age after 1981. All of 
these points indicate that the 1987 1/100 Survey provides very good quality data.
1.1.4 Demographic data from other sources
It should be mentioned that other published demographic data will occasionally be 
used in this study, such as the Chinese Farm Survey, conducted in rural areas of China 
in 1929-1931. The main demographic findings have been analysed elsewhere and are 
presented in the volume reporting the general results of the survey (see Barclay et al. 
1976:606-631). They generated some considerable debate and speculation about the 
Chinese population. The controversies over the interpretation of the survey have been 
detailed in Chapter 2. However, this body of material has not been reappraised 
consistently with new demographic data in China on topics such as the study of natural 
fertility. Other demographic data, such as the 1982 Census and 1988 Two-Per-1000 
Fertility Survey from published studies such as Feeney and Wang (1993), will also be 
used in this study where they are relevant.
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1.2 Natural fertility: definition and conception in this study
Ever since it was first proposed by Henry, the concept of natural fertility has been 
the subject of considerable discussion, even controversy. The principal problems lie in 
the ability of our demographic techniques to detect this feature of fertility, the 
comparability of data, and, even more fundamentally, the definition of relevant 
demographic variables, especially in the conceptualization and explanation of natural 
fertility. In spite of these points of discussion, here we employ natural fertility as a 
measure of underlying fertility rather than fecundity. Natural fertility is defined as marital 
fertility where couples do not alter their reproductive behaviour according to the number 
of children already bom. In practice, this can be taken to mean fertility in populations 
whose members do not use contraception or induced abortion. In contrast, fecundity is 
defined as the physiological capability of a man, woman or couple to produce a live 
birth. It may be contrasted with fertility which is the actual reproductive performance of 
an individual, a group or a society. Although widely invoked as a factor in determining 
fertility differentials, fecundity is a purely biological term and still imperfectly understood 
in quantitative terms.
Analysis of the fertility of populations not deliberately using birth control or induced 
abortion shows large variations in the levels, though such populations do exhibit common 
age-specific patterns of childbearing. This is obviously produced by behavioural factors 
which are probably not originally intended to alter reproductive behaviour but rather are 
determined by social custom. Two examples of such behavioural factors are the frequency 
of intercourse, and infant feeding habits. Both are to a large extent socially or culturally
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determined, yet they interact with the biological processes underlying reproduction and 
thus influence a couple’s real ability to bear children, though not their theoretical 
physiological capability to produce children. Therefore, different populations could have 
different levels of natural fertility while their fecundity levels might be the same. In other 
words, behavioural factors, apart from those of birth control or induced abortion, make 
the difference between fecundity and natural fertility.
Natural fertility, as a measure to evaluate the fertility level, which only excludes 
deliberate behaviour to limit the number of births, is thus a more practical way to 
measure underlying fertility than fecundity. In this study, the measures used are based 
on a behavioural rather than a purely biological definition of natural fertility. This is true 
not only for the index of natural fertility proposed by Coale and Trussell, M, which is 
taken to be an indication of overall natural fertility, but also for the measures to examine 
the various components of natural fertility. In other words, we are interested not only in 
the biological processes which determine a couple’s ability to reproduce, but also the in 
behavioural practices which interact with these biological processes, provided they are 
not linked to volitional attempts to reduce marital fertility.
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1.3 Natural fertility: basic model and its adjustment
1.3.1 The model’s application problem in the Chinese case
The most widely and successfully used model for estimating natural fertility is that 
developed by Coale and Trussell in 1974. However, by applying this model to Sweden 
in 1871-1974, Trussell (1979:46-48) noted that the value of M-estimated Swedish natural 
fertility declined over the period, when "there is no reason to suppose that, in general, 
the level of natural fertility should fall as control is increased". As the living conditions 
in developed countries like Sweden have substantially improved since the last century in 
ways which could be expected to favour natural fertility, the estimated value of M should 
be expected to rise rather than decline over the period. Trussell further questioned this 
phenomenon - "Put another way, there is no plausible reason why the underlying level 
of natural fertility in the U.S. or U.K. or Sweden in 1975 should be lower than that 
experienced by any of the populations listed by Henry". Without trying to discover the 
underlying mechanism of Coale Trussell’s (CT) model which caused this problem in the 
estimation of M, he concluded "in the presence of control, discovery of the underlying 
level of natural fertility from existing models of age-specific (marital) fertility rates is not 
possible". A consideration of the model’s basic structure and assumptions, however, leads 
to the possibility of generalizing it and discovering problems in its application.
As defined by Coale and Trussell, the model can be regarded as having two 
conveniently interpretable parameters. M indicates the underlying level of fertility or 
natural fertility and m indicates the deviation of the rates from the standard pattern and
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hence the degree of fertility control. When the transition is basically a move from natural 
to controlled fertility, and changes in the level of fertility are taken care of by varying 
M, then changes in m should indicate solely changes in the age profile of fertility. In the 
model, the control schedule, v, is defined as zero for ages 20-24. This can be understood 
in two alternative ways: no birth control is practised in age group 20-24, thus the m(20- 
24) = 0; or age group 20-24 shows the same tendency of birth control as other age 
groups, but the impact of contraception on fertility is negligible as this age group is at 
the very beginning of exposure to birth, and hence the observed marital fertility among 
this age group can be interpreted fully by varying M. In either interpretation, the fertility 
of age group 20-24 is assumed by the model to be natural.
In many cases, however, such as in the 1970s in China, some developing societies 
after World War Two, and many developed societies, such as Sweden in this century or 
even earlier, the existence of birth control among young age groups including age group 
20-24 seems likely. The Chinese evidence for the 1970s also shows that marital fertility 
declined more quickly in young age groups: 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 than in old age 
groups such as 40-44 (see Figure 4.2b). Generally speaking, the main reasons for 
younger women practising birth control are probably twofold. Firstly, young cohorts 
more easily accept new ideas because of a higher proportion of literacy than among older 
cohorts. Secondly, they have a higher chance of being employed than older cohorts due 
to age or education, hence they are more likely to practise contraception. This raises a 
fundamental issue with regard to the model’s assumption that marital fertility at age 20-24 
is a natural pattern. Certainly, it is applicable when practising contraception is only 
moderate, but it would be a misleading interpretation of M in the case of a high degree 
of fertility control.
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One of the weak points arising from this assumption in the model seems to be that 
the estimate of M is regarded as quite independent from m. However, it appears that 
estimates of these two parameters must be seen as closely related, and the value estimated 
for m influences the estimate of M. This is true algebraically since the two parameters 
are in same equation of the model, and it is unlikely that parameter covariance is zero, 
but also, from a logical point of view, it is clear that there should be a strong relationship 
between them. For any observed fertility schedule, m and M represent two different 
things: the age pattern of fertility and the underlying level of fertility respectively, thus 
they should be independent. However, the model is a sort of comparison between a 
standard and a specific fertility schedule. The function of M and m in the model is to try 
to explain the differences between these two fertility schedules in two parts: the 
difference in underlying fertility level between the standard and the observed, and the 
difference in the degree of birth control between them. Thus M and m in the model 
explain jointly the difference between the two fertility schedules, and therefore influence 
each other.
To pursue some of these points further, we consider the following. Table 3.7 shows 
three fertility schedules r(a) as given by the model, r ’(a )  and r” (a). The table sets all age 
groups’ fertility of r ’(a) as r ’(a) = 0.9*r(a). For the r” (a) schedule, it sets r ” (20-24) = 
r(20-24) and the rest of r” (a) slightly different from r(a) schedule. In the panel where 
v(a) is applied, the difference between the first two sets of rates is produced by 
differences in M rather than m. In other words, as m governs the age pattern of fertility, 
it remains the same when the age pattern of fertility remains unchanged no matter how 
much the underlying fertility fluctuates. In contrast, the difference between r(a) and r” (a) 
is mainly in the m value rather than M. As M is determined by the position of r(a)
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starting from r(20-24) relative to v(a), the impact of change in the age pattern on M is 
almost negligible while m rises substantially, as a consequence of the model’s v(a) 
working. But in reality, changes in the age pattern of fertility due to birth control should 
be expected to have some effect on M because M should represent a different level of 
underlying fertility when the new age pattern of fertility schedule r ” (a) is applied. Putting 
this more precisely, M should indicate a higher underlying fertility level when m rises 
substantially if the value of r” (20-24) is unchanged from r(20-24). In other words, the 
model should provide a higher underlying fertility level when birth control is stronger 
than before if the observed fertility level at age 20-24 remains the same as before. But 
it scarcely does so. The results in Table 3.7 are based on one of the two procedures 
suggested by Coale and Trussell (1978:204) which is to use numerical optimization 
techniques to choose M and m simultaneously.
Table 3.7 Assumed fertility schedules and the parameters
Age group n(a) v(a) v’(a) r(a) r ’(a) r” (a)
20-24 0.460 0.000 -0.140 0.308 0.277 0.308
25-29 0.431 -0.279 -0.419 0.286 0.257 0.284
30-34 0.395 -0.667 -0.807 0.247 0.223 0.238
35-39 0.322 -1.042 -1.182 0.190 0.171 0.185
40-44 0.160 -1.414 -1.554 0.088 0.079 0.080
M v(a) 0.688 0.620 0.691
m v(a) 0.171 0.171 0.227
M v’(a) 0.704 0.634 0.714
m v’(a) 0.171 0.171 0.227
If we use another procedure proposed by Coale and Trussell (1978:203), in which 
M is determined solely by the value for age group 20-24 as M = r(20-24)/n(20-24), we 
would expect exactly the same M values in r(a) and r” (a). From the point of any 
observed r(a), once the m and M value are estimated, their relationship is settled through 
the equation. However, it is fair to say that the factors used to estimate them are
independent, thus they are not related to each other due to the model’s assumption that 
the m value depends on the deviation of observed fertility schedule r(a) from standard 
fertility schedule n(a) while the M value mainly depends on the level of observed fertility 
at age 20-24.
From a logical point of view, whatever the m value, if each woman at this age group 
is at the very beginning of duration of exposure to birth, or only experiences a very 
limited time period, e.g. less than one year, then the duration may not be long enough 
for her to start practising birth control yet. Thus, although the practice of birth control 
has been prevalent in China since the 1960s, the effect of m might have been fairly 
negligible making it rational to assume no limiting behaviour among 20-24 year old 
women in this period. However, in a five-year age group each woman has 2.5 years ~ 
average marriage duration if the ages of entry to marriage are distributed evenly from 20 
to 24, and it may not be appropriate to ignore the effect of birth control completely, 
particularly in the case of China after the 1960s.
1.3.2 The model’s adjustment
Following the points made above, an adjustment of the weak points of the model 
seems necessary in order to measure Chinese women’s underlying fertility appropriately. 
We know the model’s vital problem lies in the assumption that at age 20-24 no birth 
control exists and so v(20-24) was set as zero originally. If this assumption is not true, 
as women aged 20-24 may use some contraception, we have to adjust the v(a) schedule 
correspondingly. Here, first, we have to understand how v(a) works and what is its 
function in the model. As defined in the model, m and M are estimated through a linear
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relationship between a set of parameters v(a) and a series of transformed observations 
L«[r(a)/n(a)]. This linear relationship, in fact, is the model itself, as has been given by 
Coale and Trussell (1978:204),
Z>z[r(a)/n(a)] = LnM + m-v(a) (3.1)
They explained this relationship: "if we let L«[r(a)/n(a)] = y, LnM = c, and v(a) 
= x, we see that (3) (here 3.1) is a linear equation y = c + mx. Thus LnM and m can 
be estimated simply by ordinary least squares." The underlying assumption is clear: v(a) 
is acting as the X-axis or a dimension to measure changes of Lw[r(a)/n(a)], therefore it 
has to be linear with respect to age. In other words, because age has constant intervals, 
then v(a)’s values, corresponding to age and acting as measurements, ought to have 
constant intervals as well. So in principle, if v(a) with respect to age is not a monotonic 
and linear function, it is not qualified to act as a dimension, and the model will lose its 
legitimate ground for any practical application. However, v(a) with its single-year plots 
in Coale and Trussell’s study (1975:188-189) is only approximately linear and does not 
display strictly constant intervals (see Figure 3.1). The nonlinearity of v(a) can be 
explained, however, as v(a) given by Coale and Trussell (1975:188) was the average 
estimates of 43 sets of v(a) empirically derived from real fertility schedules, selected 
from the 1965 U.N. Demographic Yearbook. "Schedules known or suspected to be 
distorted by age misreporting or other forms of faulty data were discarded", so selected 
43 schedules "on this basis were provisionally accepted as embodying, each in its own 
degree, the typical pattern of departure from natural fertility". If we follow the 
conventional view, such as taken by Wilson, Oeppen and Pardoe (1988), to accept that 
Henry’s assumption of human populations displaying a common pattern of underlying
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fertility and take the view that CT’s model is a simple and reasonable approximation of 
any real fertility schedule, we would make allowance for the fact that v(a), the 
empirically derived real fertility schedules, cannot have a perfect linearity. In short, v(a) 
is a group of empirically derived measurements, rather than something that can be set 
beforehand like scales on a ruler with constant intervals. Its function might best be seen, 
therefore, not as being to measure the change of Ln[r(a)/n(a)], but how to interpret these 
changes, or equivalently how to locate M and subsequently m. This depends upon a 
purely arbitrary assumption about the position at which you start to measure. If v(20-24)
is deliberately set as zero, then it is just/same as a starting point to measure Ln[r(a)/n(a)]
./V ,
chosen at age 20-24. However, other ages could be chosen.
Table 3.8 The v(a) parameters and M, m estimates
Age group r(a) n(a) v(a) v’(a) v” (a)
20-24 0.308 0.460 0.000 -0.140 0.000
25-29 0.286 0.431 -0.279 -0.419 -0.558
30-34 0.247 0.395 -0.667 -0.807 -1.334
35-39 0.190 0.322 -1.042 -1.182 -2.084
40-44 0.088 0.167 -1.414 -1.554 -2.828
M 0.688 0.704 0.688
m 0.171 0.171 0.086
Two examples in Table 3.8 can further illustrate v(a)’s function. First, v’(a) = v(a) - 
0.14, when v(a) shifts to v’(a), the m value remains the same while M rises from 0.688 
to 0.704. This means that fertility r(a) has been measured on a new scale or on the same 
scale but starting from a new position, which locates r(a) starting at a position where age 
20-24 shows some birth control, thus the underlying fertility should be a higher level than 
when L«[r(a)/n(a)] is located by the original v(a) and the same fertility schedule r(a) is 
applied. Second, v” (a) = v(a)*2, here, the M value remains the same because v(20-24) 
= v” (20-24), but the m is value reduced by a half from 0.171 to 0.0855 since each v(a)
value doubles. In the second case, the same amount of change in L«[r(a)/n(a)] is now 
assessed by a new measurement twice as large as before, but starting from exactly the 
same beginning point as before (as we set v” (20-24) = v(20-24)), we therefore get only 
a half value of the previous slope. Obviously, the m value is determined by the scale of 
each v(a) value (the differences between every two neighbouring v(a) values), while the 
M value is determined by structure of v(a), or precisely by each v(a) value with respect 
to age. Clearly, v(20-24) as a starting point crucially determines M, if only r(20-24) to 
r(40-44) are included in the estimation as recommended by Coale and Trussell 
(1978:204).
It would be possible to find a new set of v(a) values best suited to this case by fitting 
Chinese marital fertility schedules into the standard fertility curve, minimising the 
differences between the two schedules, and thus solving this nonlinear problem optimally, 
and subsequently setting v(a) to match our case best. However, one feature of the CT 
model does not allow us to work in this direction, unless we completely give up the 
whole CT model, which is not our intention. Employing the 43 marital fertility schedules, 
Coale and Trussell (1975:188) calculated v(a) by setting m = 1.0 in Equation (3.1) and 
rearranging to get the following equation (3.2):
v(a) = L«[r(a)/(M-n(a))] (3.2)
Given (3.2), obviously, the v(a) can not be calculated without setting M first. As a 
basic feature, any optimization problem needs to have constraints first, upon which you 
may minimise/maximise its objective function. These constraints will be transferred into 
an optimal solution for those free variables whose objective function can be minimised
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or maximised. So crucially, a genuine optimal solution for any specific unknown 
variable, such as v(a), should be expressed only by concrete numbers without containing 
any unknown variable, otherwise no optimal solution can be found. In this case, if the 
(3.2) is used as an objective function, then we do not have any other equation working 
as a constraint to solve for an optimal solution. As a consequence, the M value cannot 
be determined before v(a) is calculated, and v(a)’s setting has to rely on M first. Thus 
the ‘optimization process’ to set v(a) here in fact will become an unsolvable loop.
To avoid falling into such a loop, M was chosen by Coale and Trussell (1975:188) 
so that v(20-24) is set as zero. Let us temporarily ignore the M values chosen by them, 
and just concentrate on the way v(a) was set first. The equation (3.2) can be expressed 
as (3.3):
Because M could be not computed by the model before setting v(a), Coale and 
Trussell had to set M arbitrarily first, and then v(a) can be settled by (3.3). As they 
assumed r(20-24) was natural fertility in any case, they set M = r(20-24)/n(20-24), and 
LnM = L/z[r(20-24)/n(20-24)]. Replacing the right hand side into (3.3), we have (3.4) 
as the original v(a)’s setting,
v(a) = Lfl[r(a)/n(a))] - LnM (3.3)
v(a) = L/z[r(a)/n(a))] - Lw[r(20-24)/n(20-24)] (3.4)
Obviously, even if we retreat from the strong assumption that v(a) itself with respect 
to age is linear, (3.4) indicates that the relationship between LnM or v(20-24) and/rest
of v(a) is linear, and that the M or subsequently v(20-24) has to be chosen or set 
arbitrarily anyway. Therefore, any adjustment of v(a), if necessary is simply an exact 
same amount of linear shifting from each of original v(a)’s value consistently. Now the 
question is, if v(a) has to be set arbitrarily anyway, how big an adjustment or shift is 
appropriate?
To answer this question, we have to come back to address the problem about Coale 
and Trussell’s assumption on fertility of women 20-24. They assumed that married 
women at ages 20-24 did not practise birth control, thus r(20-24) was natural fertility. 
As this assumption may not be proper, at least for China after the 1960s, so the question 
here becomes how to decide an age interval which represents a natural fertility pattern, 
so as the starting point of v(a) too, i.e. v(20-24). In reality, a complete five-year age 
interval, in which all women have fully five years marital duration but without any birth 
control, is almost impossible to find in the modem world. This is because it needs to 
satisfy two conditions simultaneously. First, all women have to get married before age 
20. Second, they must not control their births before age 25.
We know that almost all births in China occur within marriage; cohabitation and 
illegitimate births are very rare. Thus age at first marriage is a fairly precise date for 
when sexual union begins. The mean age at first marriage for Chinese women rose from 
about 19-20 in the 1950s to about 21-22 in the 1970s (see Banister 1987:156, Coale 
1989:834). We can also add to this about one and half years of average duration between 
marriage and first birth during which time birth control is unlikely according to the 
Chinese custom, as Peng (1991:146) also found. Although China’s family planning 
programme effectively pushed women to get married later, it did not affect childbearing
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immediately thereafter, as marital fertility of 0-4 year marriage duration rose until the 
late 1960s and remain unchanged during the 1970s, when the family planning programme 
went into effect. Here, since we take the marital fertility only in the duration of 0-1.5 
years after marriage rather than 0-4 years as ‘natural’, the assumption is even safer. This 
is because Chinese women would not commit themselves on birth control until a target 
of a certain number of children, say one, has been achieved. So we can reasonably 
assume that fertility, at least in the first one and a half years of marriage, is natural. By 
adding this one and half to the mean age at first marriage of about 21-22 in the 1970s, 
we can assume that, on average, the marital fertility of age 17.5-22.5 is a more or less 
a natural pattern in China, or at least much closer to "natural'' than that of those aged 20- 
24.
We know the assumption made above is not completely true, as we do find evidence 
that some married women were using contraception even at age 15-19. These women, 
presumably already had one child at least, and will be even more likely to use birth 
control when they enter age 20-24 under the ‘one child’ policy. Moreover, other women 
in this age group (15-19) who did not practise birth control may join the control exercise 
when they reach age 20-24 if they achieve the ‘birth target’ just after 20, thus 
contaminating the assumption of fertility aged in those 17.5-22.5 being ‘natural’. There 
is evidence to indicate that married women aged 15-19 have been using contraception 
since the 1970s. About 30% of the married women aged 15-19 in Hebei were using 
contraception in 1982 in Wang’s study (1988:266) based on the 1982 1/1000 Survey, and 
the national level is expected to be close to this proportion. However, taking a broader 
view, the total number of married women aged 15-19 was only about a tenth of the 
numbers married at age 20-24 in Hebei, so the number of married contraception users
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aged 15-19 against the total number of the married aged 20-24 is 1:40 in Hebei. So the 
effect of the bias would be limited. A further difficulty is that the age at which women 
enter marriage is not quite clear-cut, although the majority are married before age 25 in 
China. So if we shift our assumption of ‘natural fertility’ towards younger women, say 
15-19, to guarantee a more ‘natural’ fertility, then, the problem is probably over-adjusted 
when it assumes that fertility only at a younger age interval, say 15-19, is ‘natural’, and 
the model will interpret this as an unrealistically high level of underlying fertility. A 
similar suggestion was made by Lavely (1986:426). So we should not adjust v(a) up to 
a point which assumes ‘natural fertility’ only at the very youngest age interval, such as 
15-19. On balance, the ‘natural’ interval is better set at 17.5-22.5.
Here we try another way to justify our adjustment of v(a). As we know, natural 
fertility is defined as marital fertility where couples do not practise any contraception or 
induced abortion to alter their reproductive behaviour. Fecundability is defined as the 
probability of a married woman conceiving during a month in the absence of any 
deliberate attempt to limit procreation. Although these two ideas differ both in definition 
and measurement, they share one common feature: they both measure natural human 
reproductive behaviour in the absence of any deliberate attempt to alter procreation. 
Therefore they should be linked to each other in some way, in spite of natural fertility 
usually being seen as a yearly and fecundability as a monthly measurement. In this study 
of long-term patterns of natural fertility, when the level is found to change over time, 
changes in its proximate determinants must also occur. This implies changes in 
fecundability, primary sterility, breastfeeding and so on. Thus changes in natural fertility, 
M, and in fecundability ought to be found to have a strong relationship, in statistical 
terms. If estimates of fecundability (FB) are robust and correct, there should be a high
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and positive correlation between these two sorts of change. This idea provides a simple 
way to examine the issue of what constitutes an appropriate adjustment of v(a).
According to equations 3.3 and 3.4, v(a) should be a linear function with respect to 
LnM  or its starting value v(20-24). We make an alteration in the following way: shifting 
the v(a) values by five different amounts: +0.14, 0.0 (original v(a)), -0.05, -0.10, and - 
0.14 respectively. Like the other four numbers, -0.14 is an arbitrary number which 
equals half of the v(25-29) as -0.279/2 and is close to the -0.15 originally suggested by 
Coale and Trussell (1978:211) for v(24) in the single-year estimation of the model. This 
seems valid as we are here shifting the age interval of no birth control by 2.5 years 
younger from the 20-24 originally assumed. Here, we assume that marital fertility in the 
age interval 17.5-22.5 is ‘natural’. Corresponding to this assumption, the adjustment of 
v(a) is -0.14, implying that we assume that some women at 20-24 now control their 
fertility. Keeping the linearity indicated by equation 3.4, the rest of the values of v’(a) 
are also consistently shifted by -0.14. If the adjustment on v(a) is +0.14, then the v(a) 
is shifted in the opposite direction. The way to make the other amounts of adjustments, 
within these two extreme shifts of +0.14 and -0.14, is the same.
Table 3.9 Age intervals assuming no birth control, related adjustments on v(a), 
and Correlation coefficients between mean fecundability(FB) and indices of 
natural fertility(M) from the varying v(a)1
Natural Fertility 
Indices
assumed age interval 
(no birth control)
adjustment 
on v(a)
Correlation 
with FB
NF0 22.5-27.5 +0.14 0.0967
NF1 20.0-24.9 0.00 0.3464
NF11 19.3-24.2 -0.05 0.4446
NF12 18.5-23.4 -0.10 0.5390*
NF2 17.5-22.5 -0.14 0.6091**
27 annual estimates of M from 1952 to 1978 (see Appendix) are used. Values of FB from 1952 to 
75 are estimated from the 1/1000 Survey, and the three values of 1976-78, 0.149, 0.159 and 0.176, 
are estimated from the 1985 In-Depth Survey, (see Chapter 4). ** 1-tailed Significance 0.001
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From Table 3.9, the correlation coefficient 0.6091 between mean fecundability and 
the index of natural fertility, M, by adjusting v(a) -0.14 is significantly higher than the 
value (0.3464) between fecundability and the original v(a). The contrast would be much 
more significant, if we had FB estimates of the period from 1978 to 1986, during which
^  5 lA -
underestimating problem caused by the original model become more severe, (see Chapter i 
4). This suggests that the adjusted model has a much higher chance of providing a better 
estimate of natural fertility, at least in the circumstances studied here. The results of 
shifting v(a) from +0.14 to -0.14, corresponding to assumed different age intervals of 
‘natural fertility’, also indicate that underlying fertility estimates based on the assumption 
of fertility of women at age interval 17.5-22.5 being ‘natural’, have the highest 
correlation with fecundability. So the adjustment on v(a) by -0.14 seems preferable to the 
other suggested adjustments in Table 3.9.
However, we must acknowledge that the adjustment of v(a) by -0.14 remains 
essentially arbitrary. Shifting v(a) by this amount is not necessarily the best adjustment 
for this test, as an even higher correlation with the fecundability seems possible if a 
further shift (a number greater than -0.14 in absolute terms) can be employed to adjust 
v(a), given the tendency of the correlation coefficients indicated in Table 3.9. However, 
we can justify the choice of adjusting by -0.14 for the following reasons.
First, mean fecundability here is a measure based on the first birth intervals, while 
underlying fertility, M, is the index estimated from marital fertility, which involves all 
parities of births, so the correlation coefficient may be capable of providing a direction 
in which the adjustment should be made, but not a uniquely solid criterion upon which 
an optimal solution can be reached, simply because they are two different measures.
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Fecundability is mainly affected by coital frequency, but underlying fertility is also 
affected by breastfeeding, primary sterility, postpartum non-susceptibility, and other 
proximate determinants.
Second, it is a feature of the CT model itself that an optimal adjustment on v(a) is 
unobtainable purely within the terms of the model. Reference must always be made to 
some external source of information to set v(a). Thus, as we discussed above, v(a) has 
to be set arbitrarily. Unless ages at entering marriage and childbearing are homogeneous, 
any arbitrary assumption of the same five-year age interval being ‘natural’, which can 
also fit the reality well seems unlikely. In short, so long as there is not a unique and 
reliable criterion quantitatively to judge the fitness of our present adjustment, the decision 
that any adjustment on v(a) is better than another alternative is difficult to reach. The best 
idea is to assess it relative to reality to see whether it provides more plausible results.
Third, as there were some women practising birth control at age 15-19, the 
adjustment of -0.14, based on the assumption of marital fertility at age 17.5-22.5 being 
‘natural’, will exert on M a downward bias, and thus make the estimates more 
‘conservative’. On the other hand, this downward bias will be somewhat offset by a 
different upward bias. Although on average Chinese women got married at about 22 in 
the 1980s, there still existed a small proportion of women who got married after age 24, 
and whose fertility at early marriage durations, say up to two years, was ‘natural’. 
However, they would be interpreted by the assumption to be ‘controlled fertility’, 
producing a higher level of underlying fertility by the adjusted model (-0.14), resulting 
in a small upward bias. Although the effect of the downward bias on underlying fertility 
estimates could not be offset completely by the upward bias, it certainly will be reduced.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the downward bias is unlikely to affect our 
observed increasing trend in underlying fertility. If we can identify such a secular 
increasing trend by a ‘conservative* estimation with a net downward bias, which 
minimises any estimates of increasing changes on the underlying fertility, rather than 
inflating the estimates, then our estimation are all the more robust. Moreover, since we 
are mainly concerned about the changes in the underlying fertility over time rather than 
with any particular level at a certain time, if the downward bias consistently feeds 
through all the estimates of each period, the effect on relative changes between every two 
consecutive periods is negligible.
To sum up, bearing in mind the Coale-Trussell model’s implicit linearity and the 
circumstances of China after the 1950s, I believe that the proposed modification of the 
model is a profitable way to improve it. First, it establishes a closer link between m and 
M, while recognizing that m and M are different indices representing in broad terms birth 
control and natural fertility respectively. Second, having accepted the fact that no optimal 
adjustment can be achieved, the adjusted model appears to provide improved and more 
robust estimates for underlying fertility, at least in China after the 1960s. As Table 3.7 
shows, the model with v’(a) (shifted by -0.14) gives r” (a) a higher M value 0.714 rather 
than 0.688 or 0.691. This means that in the new situation with the observed fertility 
schedule r ” (a), with the practice of birth control substantially growing, the m value rises 
from 0.171 to 0.227, but because r” (20-24) remains the same as r(20-24), the model 
estimates a higher level of underlying fertility. Obviously, the improvement seems 
reasonable from the logical perspective of the model itself. However, even though the 
adjusted model seems plausible, given external information, discovering whether or not
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it really can give a more insightful interpretation of the actual demographic process needs 
further empirical testing.
1.3.3 An empirical test and assessment of the adjusted model
Three sets of marital fertility schedules, two from non-mainland Chinese 
populations, Taiwan and Hong Kong, and one from Japan, are selected to test our 
adjusted version of the model. The underlying fertility estimates (M), the index of 
fertility control (m) and goodness of fit by marriage cohort based on both the original 
model with (vl) and its adjusted version with (v2) for these three populations are listed 
in Table 3.10. Apart from Hong Kong, where the marital fertility data before the war are 
not available to the author, the level and pattern of marital fertility schedules from 
Taiwan in the 1940s and Japan in the 1920s were very close to those of mainland Chinese 
before the 1960s (see Chapter 5), and were mainly ‘natural fertility’. The underlying 
fertility level rose until the 1960s in both versions of the model. After then the rising 
trend stopped when assessed by the original model. This phenomenon, similar to what 
was found by Trussell in the Swedish case, is unlikely to match reality as a dramatic 
economic development and significant improvements in consumption occurred for all 
three populations after the post-war period, which makes an arrested increase in trend in 
underlying fertility very difficult to explain. The problem is clear, the increasing 
popularity of family planning since the 1960s led younger married women to use birth 
control, even including those aged 20-24.
Japanese marital fertility for younger aged cohorts, such as those aged 20-24, kept 
rising until the middle of the 1960s (see Kobayashi et al. 1969:54-55), although the birth
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control index was already quite high (over 2.0), a level of significant birth control 
suggested by Coale (1992:340). This feature could be captured by the original model, as 
it is still close to the assumption in the model that younger women aged 20-24 are not to 
restrict their fertility. So an increasing trend up to 1965 is still indicated by the original 
model. However, the end of the rise or even a reduction of young women’s marital 
fertility after 1965 was more likely due to birth control spreading from the older age 
groups to younger cohorts, rather than socio-economic conditions deteriorating in ways 
less favourable to natural fertility. In fact, Japan experienced rapid economic growth in 
the 1950s, and even more dramatic economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s. In this 
circumstance, the index of natural fertility should be more likely to rise than remain 
unchanged, as indicated by the original model. Instead, the adjusted model estimates a 
more realistic trend of M(v2), indicating that the underlying fertility level rose over time. 
But, the adjustment (shifting -0.14) of the model is based upon the situation of China, for 
Japan, it may be more or less over-adjusted, so it is always possible that the scale of the 
rise is overestimated by the M(v2).
Although the postwar economic recovery and growth in Hong Kong was similar to 
that in Japan, the problem of estimating M is the opposite. The underlying fertility level 
after 1966 stopped rising and dropped slightly even by the adjusted model, while it fell 
dramatically according to the original model. The estimates from the adjusted model are 
obviously closer to the real situation, but some underestimation is still clear. The 
problem, again, is believed to be related to assumption about v(a). Evidence from Mok’s 
study (1979:193) suggested that the highest proportion of contraception acceptors shifted 
from women aged 25-29 to those aged 20-24 after the 1960s in the colony. Compared 
with mainland China after 1979, where fertility of those aged 20-24 was partly controlled
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and contraception was much less prevalent than for 25-29, Hong Kong, as a British 
colony and under the western influence much earlier, seems to have stronger fertility 
control among those aged 20-24. Thus the amount of adjustment (-0.14) may not be 
adequate to match the real situation, and the scale of the changes in underlying fertility 
is thus underestimated.
Table 3.10 Marital fertility schedules by marriage cohort from Taiwan, HongKong, and Japan, 
their underlying fertility estimates (M), index of fertility control (m) and goodness of fit: R2 and 
mse, based on both original Coale and Trussell’s model (vl) and its adjusted version (v2)
Age specific marital fertility rates Underlying fertility estimation
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 M(vl) M(v2) m R2 mse(%)
Taiwan
1941-45 0.316 0.283 0.243 0.182 0.100 0.675 0.686 0.117 0.76 0.114
1959 0.406 0.374 0.296 0.212 0.100 0.908 0.946 0.295 0.98 0.048
1964 0.433 0.377 0.231 0.132 0.060 0.982 1.091 0.751 0.97 0.447
1969 0.473 0.338 0.162 0.068 0.026 1.064 1.298 1.420 0.99 0.716
1974 0.444 0.277 0.103 0.037 0.011 1.005 1.326 1.978 0.99 0.604
Hong Kong
1961 0.458 0.368 0.248 0.152 0.066 1.002 1.102 0.680 0.99 0.081
1966 0.499 0.342 0.220 0.119 0.047 1.057 1.210 0.963 0.99 0.094
1971 0.451 0.307 0.174 0.088 0.031 0.980 1.160 1.194 1.00 0.038
1976 0.301 0.241 0.126 0.047 0.014 0.763 0.946 1.529 0.98 1.293
1981 0.284 0.219 0.111 0.037 0.007 0.785 1.030 1.927 0.96 3.687
Japan
1925 0.340 0.297 0.253 0.196 0.088 0.741 0.765 0.223 0.97 0.041
1955 0.342 0.237 0.132 0.059 0.016 0.804 0.985 1.452 0.99 0.492
1960 0.341 0.238 0.093 0.028 0.006 0.891 1.215 2.213 0.99 1.443
1965 0.357 0.255 0.099 0.022 0.004 1.024 1.467 2.557 0.97 4.915
1970 0.346 0.259 0.095 0.022 0.003 1.060 1.550 2.708 0.97 6.268
1980 0.349 0.239 0.082 0.014 0.002 1.073 1.645 3.042 0.97 6.879
Source: Taiwan, Wolf(1984:455), Sun and Soong(1979:120). Hong Kong, Mok (1979:187), and UN Demographic 
Yearbook, 1981(p839), 1985(p875). Japan, Kobayashi et al.(1979:53-56), and UN Demographic Yearbook, 1981(p839).
Among the three selected populations, the Taiwanese are closest to the mainland 
Chinese in terms of socio-cultural background. The marked difference in economic 
growth between the mainland and the island emerged only from the 1960s, and apart 
from this, other conditions of the two populations were very similar. Taiwan also has 
been experiencing economic recovery and growth since the 1950s. Corresponding to this,
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natural fertility should have risen steadily since then. This increasing trend until 1969 is 
well shown by the original model, as there is no significant evidence that the assumption 
of fertility of women aged 20-24 being ‘natural’ was violated before the 1970s. However, 
the Taiwan government then started introducing a national family planning programme. 
The cumulative rate of acceptance of IUDs, which was the main contraception method 
during the time, rose from 1.1% in 1964 to 21.4% among married women aged 20-24, 
and about half of those aged 25-29 were users (45%) in 1974, according to Sun et al. 
(1979:132). This pattern is very similar to what happened on the mainland during the 
1970s and 1980s. Under these circumstances, the adjusted model seems able to provide 
plausible estimates of underlying fertility, in terms of both trend and level. It is 
noteworthy, for example, that the mean squared error(mse) for Taiwan remains at much 
more acceptable levels throughout the period studied, while the mse values for Hong 
Kong and Japan, though very good at first, become poor by the 1970s and 1980s.
Evidence from three selected populations close to the Chinese, particularly from 
Taiwan, suggests that the modified version of the model is able to provide more realistic 
estimates of underlying fertility (M) than the original version. However, the amount of 
adjustment, which is based on the situation in mainland China, may not be the most 
appropriate to all three populations, as overestimates and underestimates are obvious for 
Japan and Hong Kong respectively. For the Taiwanese, who had the closest conditions 
to the mainland (the patterns and levels of marital fertility in both were almost identical), 
the adjusted model seems able to provide the most plausible estimate. This further 
indicates that the modified assumption of natural fertility at age interval 17.5-22.5 and 
subsequently the amount of adjustment, -0.14 on v(a), designed for the Chinese case, is 
simple but reasonable and sufficient for our purpose. Most applications in the later
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chapters further suggest this, although underestimation problem still exists on one or two 
occasions, such as in the estimation for university educated women.
In the remainder of this study we will try to use both the original model (applying 
v(a) labelled as vl(a)) and its adjusted version (applying v’(a) labelled as v2(a)) as basic 
measurements to examine changes in underlying fertility in China. Both schedules of v(a) 
in each version are given in Table 3.11. A visual representation of the adjustment implied 
here is given in Figure 3.1, which plots the values of v(a) for each age group.
Two versions of the model’s 
v(a)
— I-------------------------------- 1-----------------------------------1-------------
25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
O v1C»D + v2C«)
Table 3.11 The n(a) and two versions of the model’s parameters v(a)
Parameters 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
n(a) 0.460 0.431 0.395 0.322 0.167
vl(a) 0.000 -0.279 -0.667 -1.042 -1.414
v2(a) -0.140 -0.419 -0.807 -1.182 -1.552
Figure 3.1 
parameters
- 1 . 1  -  
- 1 . 2  - 
- 1.3  -
- 1 . 6 --------
20-24
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1.4 Natural fertility and its proximate determinants: measurements and their 
data sources
1.4.1 Marital fertility and ever-married fertility
The main measurement to estimate the index of underlying natural fertility is the CT 
model, as it gives levels of both underlying fertility and birth control. Thus, it seems best 
to begin with those rates most often quoted for historical data: marital fertility rates. The 
main data available on the trend in China come from the 1/1000 Fertility Survey in 1982 
and One-Percent Population Sample Survey in 1987. These include: (1), age-specific 
ever-married fertility rates by five-year of age groups from 1950 to 1981 and 1986; (2), 
age-specific fertility rates by five-year age groups from 1940 to 1981 and 1986; (3), age- 
specific rates of women at first marriage from 1940 to 1981; (4), age distribution of 
women at first marriage 1940-1981; and (5), age distribution of never married women 
in 1986. The data from other fertility sample surveys include: (1), age-specific marital 
fertility by five-year age groups from the Farm Survey in 1929-1931; and (2) age-specific 
marital fertility by five-year age groups from 1981 to 1984. Now the crucial question is 
whether or not the data can illuminate the issue in hand.
The time series of proportions of women currently married at each age in different 
time periods are not available, since the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey did not inquire 
about the timing of divorce, widowhood and separation. It needs to be borne in mind, 
however, that the proportion of women ever married can be estimated by summing age- 
specific first marriage rates through the cohort diagram. However, ever-married fertility, 
which is then available, is a different measure from marital fertility due to mortality and
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marriage dissolution. Coale and Trussell’s study (1974:190), for the purpose of 
simulating an actual age-specific fertility schedule/(a), expressed their model as follows:
/(a) = G(a)*n(a)«em,v(a) (3.5)
where G(a) is the proportion ever married estimated by the earliest age at which marriage 
occurred, a<), and another parameter, k, indicating the degree of variation among couples 
in age at marriage. In this case, because the real G(a) is available, we can ignore the 
problem caused by using estimated G(a), and only pay attention to the effect of using 
ever-married fertility rather than current marital fertility. For this effect, Coale and 
Trussell (1974:191) wrote that "the proportion of ever married population that is 
widowed and divorced rises monotonically with age, thus reducing fertility toward the 
end of childbearing in a way that is topographically similar to the effect of v(a) on marital 
fertility". So they suggested that "it is probable that modification of natural fertility by 
proper choice of m by which to multiply v(a) can serve to approximate the effect both 
of marital dissolution in reducing the fraction married at higher ages and of control of 
fertility on marital fertility.". In other words, using ever-married fertility to estimate M 
and m here is possible and reasonable, though we may need to adjust our estimate. This 
is the matter we now examine.
In this study, one of the benefits of the detailed information that appears in the 
report of the 1982 1/1000 Survey is the feasibility of computing age-specific marital 
fertility schedules. To do this the proportion of ever-married women by age is determined 
from the data on first marriage, a fertility schedule of the ever-married women is then 
obtained by dividing the overall fertility of women at each age by the proportion ever
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married. Finally, the marital fertility schedule is derived by a further division of the ever- 
married women. This last proportion can be estimated as having approximately the same 
values in different calendar years because of the surprisingly little difference for this 
distribution between the 1982 Census data and the Chinese farm population in 1930. The 
proportions of currently married to ever-married women in these three years are as 
follows:
Table 3.12 The ratios of currently married to ever-married women in
1930, 1982 and 1986
Year 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
1930 0.991 0.981 0.968 0.953 0.916 0.860
1982 0.990 0.986 0.977 0.960 0.933 0.888
1986 0.990 0.996 0.995 0.987 0.973 0.946
The very slight difference in these ratios of 1930 and 1982, despite the very 
substantial difference in mortality, implies that the higher incidence of widowhood at the 
earlier date must have been offset by a high rate of remarriage of widows, as suggested 
by Coale (1984b:35). Approximate age-specific marital fertility schedules by five-year 
age groups from 1950 to 1981 can be constructed by assuming that the ratio of currently 
married to ever-married women in every year is equal to the average of the ratios for 
1930 and 1982. However, if we are only interested in changes in underlying fertility over 
time, rather than comparisons between China and other countries, it would not make any 
difference if estimation of underlying fertility level was based on either of these two, 
because the age-specific marital fertility here can be worked out by dividing the ever- 
married fertility rate by the average (thus a set of constant numbers) of ratios of currently 
married to ever-married between 1929-31 and 1982. Thus, the marital fertility rate here 
is simply a linear transformation of ever-married fertility obtained by dividing by a 
constant number at each age.
An increasing difference by age occurred in these ratios between 1982 and 1986 with 
no substantial difference in mortality, implying an even higher level of remarriage of 
widows. It is also possible that this contributes some inconsistency to the estimates of 
underlying fertility level when they are extended from 1981 to 1986 using data from the 
1/100 Population Survey in 1987. However, under the ‘One-Child’ policy, the effect of 
this slight inconsistency (most severe in older age groups) is negligible. Ever-married 
fertility is definitely lower than current marital fertility at comparable ages, so estimates 
of underlying fertility tend to be lower if based on ever-married fertility. This would 
minimise rather than exaggerate any increasing trend in underlying fertility. Again, it 
only makes our conclusion more robust.
In a study analysing the negative relationship between fertility and education in 
China, Lavely and Freedman (1990:358) also have to use ever-married fertility to apply 
the CT model. The effect of doing this is to "tend to lower their fertility rates" and thus 
to make observed trends more conservative, they suggest. In dealing with fertility 
transition in China, Peng (1991:264) meets the same difficulty: he also believes that it 
is valid to use ever-married fertility instead of normal marital fertility. As he puts it, 
"Given the stability of Chinese marriage, combined with the sharp decline in mortality, 
this is reasonable."
In spite of all these comments, however, we are still not sure precisely how much 
difference it makes when the estimation of natural fertility is based on ever-married 
fertility rather than marital fertility, as the original model required. Is it really so very 
serious that we have modified our estimate if the ever-married fertility is applied as Coale 
and Trussell suggested? We know, as Coale and Trussell pointed out, that switching from
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current marital fertility to ever-married fertility inflates m estimates. However, here, our 
primarily interest lies in the underlying fertility level rather than in the index of fertility 
control, so the more important question is: how much difference does it make to our 
estimate of M? Would the level of underlying fertility based on ever-married fertility be 
considerably underestimated? Table 3.12 presents estimated M and m by both kinds of 
marital fertility schedule, and for both original CT’s model and its adjusted version.
Table 3.13 Estimated index of natural fertility level (M), and index of 
fertility control (m), based on both current- and ever-married fertility rates, 
and by original Coale-Trussell’s model and its adjusted version.
1929-1931(Farmer) 1981(Nation)
Current- Ever- Current- Ever-
Marital Fertility 
15-19 0.174 0.173 0.202 0.200
20-24 0.287 0.281 0.355 0.350
25-29 0.272 0.264 0.231 0.226
30-34 0.233 0.222 0.075 0.072
35-39 0.171 0.157 0.033 0.031
40-44 0.086 0.074 0.015 0.013
Original Model(vl) 
M 0.641 0.637 0.733 0.729
Adjusted Model(v2) 
M 0.655 0.659 0.925 0.930
m 0.154 0.243 1.673 1.745
R2 0.919 0.947 0.953 0.960
Note: Marital fertility of five-year age groups from 20-24 to 40-44 are used in estimation as 
suggested by Coale and Trussell (1978:204). The m and R2 (goodness of fit) are the same in 
both the original and the adjusted model.
The results in Table 3.13 confirm Coale and Trussell’s comment on m, that 
estimated m based on ever-married fertility is inflated significantly, although the 
differences narrowed a lot in 1981. However, it hardly has any impact on the M 
estimates, as the differences in estimated values of M between two marital fertility
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schedules are less than 0.005 in all cases. Again, since we are primarily interested in the 
underlying fertility trend over time rather than in either the absolute level at any given 
time or the index of birth control, the bias introduced by using ever-married fertility 
rather than marital fertility is negligible. Given that the ratio of currently married to ever- 
married women changed little over time, any modification in M estimates seems quite 
unnecessary.
1.4.2 The estimation of fecundability and its data source
The measurement of fecundability proposed by Bongaarts (see Chapter 2) is based 
on the proportion of married women who have their first births within nine to eleven 
months of marriage. The published data of the In-Depth Fertility Survey provide these 
proportions from the 1950s to the 1980 (for three provinces).
Unfortunately, the published tabulated data of the 1/1000 Fertility Survey provide the 
distribution of women at first marriage by interval between first birth and marriage only 
in the following groups of months: 0-7; 8-11; 12; 13-24; 25-36; 37-48; 49+. If 
categories of 13-24 and 25-36 include those women who bore their first child in the 
second and third years after marriage, then 0-7, 8-11, and 12 should include those 
women who bore their children within one year of marriage. But the categories of 0-7, 
8-11, and 12 usually mean thirteen months, a possible mistake. It is quite likely that ‘12’ 
means twelfth month after marriage, thus ‘8-11’ could mean from eighth to eleventh 
month rather than from ninth to eleventh month after marriage. As in this method the 
proportion of post-nuptially conceived first births occurring with nine to eleven months 
of marriage is used to estimate mean fecundability, if the data on the proportion of post­
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nuptially conceived first births occurring within eight to eleven months of marriage are 
available, a slight overestimate will be made by the difference between these two 
proportions. However, since we are again more interested in the trend of fecundability 
over time rather than in the absolute level at any given time, these biases are of minor 
consequence for our analysis provided they changed little over time.
1.4.3 The measurement of breastfeeding and its data source
Although the 1/1000 Fertility Survey contributes very limited information about 
Chinese women’s breastfeeding experience, through the In-Depth Fertility Survey the data 
were collected systematically for the first time in China, providing a unique opportunity 
for discussion of questions such as whether changes in the average duration of 
breastfeeding contributed to those in natural fertility.
The broader methodological aspects of the problems of measurement and analysis of 
breastfeeding have been amply covered by many previous studies. The material available 
here provides the basic data for average and differential analyses, such as ‘distribution 
of children according to length of breastfeeding by years since birth occurred’, 
‘distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding by current age of the 
mother’. Here I confine attention to children bom at least three years before and exclude 
children who died before age two from later analyses to avoid the bias resulting from 
open and closed intervals. The data on mean length of breastfeeding were confined to 
those weaned in the first 35 months and included those not breastfed as zero. The 
proportion of children not breastfed is also available.
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1.4.4 The estimation of primary sterility and its data source
With the available data, two measures could be used for the study of infecundity. The 
first is the proportion of women with no living children. This measure captures the 
linguistic notion of childlessness and its obvious socio-economic importance. However, 
the measure is influenced by both the fecundity of the couple and the level of mortality 
to which children are subject throughout their lifetime.
The second measure which could be used is the proportion of women who never had 
any live birth. This measure remedies the shortcoming of taking living children as a 
measure of primary sterility, in that the effect of child mortality has been eliminated. 
However, primary sterility does not necessarily mean that women never experienced any 
pregnancy. In other words, this measure is still influenced by intra-uterine mortality, and 
unfortunately information on intra-uterine mortality is very difficult to collect and not 
available here. However, as most pregnancies lead to a live birth, this measure is a quite 
reasonable approximation of primary sterility.
One question we could ask is whether there might be women who had no birth 
because of the absence of sexual relations, or who used abortion or contraception and 
thus who may really be fecund. There might be such cases in some areas or in some 
periods in China. For example, hundreds of thousands of husbands left their home towns 
to find jobs and food during the famine period of 1959-61. In addition, many wives and 
husbands worked in different towns or areas, such as those in low ranking military 
service, who usually only had one month’s vacation to join their families each year.
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However, such problems were often temporary and related to a small proportion, 
compared with the total population. As we know, in traditional Chinese society, the 
family and kinship circle were the most important units of organisation to serve the 
individual’s social and economic needs. So getting married and having children were seen 
as moral obligations. Voluntary childlessness was virtually unacceptable to society, 
especially to both husband’s and wife’s parents. According to Confucianism, the greatest 
sin a son could commit against his parents was not to bring offspring to their family. 
Since the 1950s women’s societal role has been transformed, and more and more women 
have participated in economic activities, so that both work and motherhood are 
considered important roles for Chinese women. Nevertheless, popular attitudes still tend 
to favour motherhood as the primary one. Even in recent family planning campaigns, 
messages on birth control are always combined with some propaganda to tell people how 
to have a healthy and intelligent child.
97
1.5 Data truncation
1.5.1 Data truncation 1: the period 1940-1960
Although age specific and total fertility rates can be derived from data collected in 
the 1/1000 Fertility Survey, the upper age limit of the survey was set at 67, which means 
that women aged 67 at the time of the survey were 25 years old in 1940, 35 in 1950, and 
so forth. As a result, age-specific fertility rates in five-year age groups from 15-19 to 40- 
44, the information required for directly computing natural fertility level (M), are only 
available from 1960 on. For the period prior to 1960, we have only truncated fertility 
rates for younger ages. Although, for the period of 1950-60, only an incomplete set of 
marital fertility is available, we still have more than two five-year age group marital 
fertility rates in each year. From this a complete set of marital fertility can be 
constructed, given the fact that the fertility schedule remained a natural pattern until the 
1960s. Thus it enables us to compute natural fertility (M) for this period. A further 
evaluation and discussion in Chapter 5 suggest that the constructed ever-married fertility 
rates are rather robust (A full set of ever-married fertility rates from 1950 to 1981 for 
China as a whole is presented in Table 10.1 in Appendix).
Very few data (two age groups or less) on age specific ever-married fertility from 
1940 to 1949 are available. The alternative data on this period are the marital fertility 
rates by single-year duration since first marriage from 1930 to 1981. Duration-specific 
fertility is a measure showing the average number of births for ever-married women at 
each duration since first marriage. Although it is a different index from age-specific ever-
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married fertility, trends and changes in duration-specific marital fertility do reflect the 
same underlying fertility as age-specific marital fertility, provided that patterns of the 
natural fertility and marriage stay consistent. So for the period 1940-49 we can use the 
trend of duration specific marital fertility to present indirectly the natural fertility level. 
These two indices were very consistent during the period of 1950-1970, when the fertility 
pattern was not affected by birth control practices and the marriage pattern remained 
more or less the same. The 1/1000 Fertility Survey shows that the proportion remaining 
single among respondents in the survey was less than 1.0 percent at every age above 30. 
Moreover, female mean age at first marriage in China rose only a little from 17.52 
(SMAM) for the Chinese farm population in 1930, to 18.46 in the 1940s for China as a 
whole, and to 18.68 in 1950. The small increase in age at first marriage occurred without 
any change in the universality of marriage for women in China. The total first-marriage 
rate for birth cohorts in China was very near 1.0 in the 1980s. In this context, the 
unchanged marriage and natural fertility patterns again lead to the possibility of 
presenting natural fertility trends from 1940 to 1949 by displaying the duration-specific 
marital fertility at this period.
1.5.2 Data truncation 2: the period 1971-1980
Although the 1/1000 Fertility Survey was conducted in 1982, it fails to provide 
complete reproductive information on the 1970s, such as the distribution of women at 
first marriage by interval between first birth and marriage, which is the information 
needed to estimate birth intervals and fecundability. For example, when we estimate the 
mean first birth interval, these women should have at least five years of time in 
observation. Thus, a reasonable estimation of the mean first birth interval was only
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possible up to 1975 from the truncated data of the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey. In this 
circumstance, it is worthwhile exploring the possibility of providing a full reproductive 
version up to 1980, by joining information from the two fertility surveys carried out in 
1982 and 1985 respectively.
Figure 3.2 Consistency of the two fertility surveys
The births occurring at 8-11 months in the 1982 1/1000 Survey, and 9-11 months in the 1985 In-Depth 
Survey, see text 1.4.2 in this chapter for more detail.
a: Mean length of the first birth interval 
(month)
b: The proportions(%) of first births 
occurring 8/9-11 months of first marriage1
In Figure 3.2 we present: from the 1/1000 Fertility Survey in 1982 and the In-Depth 
Fertility Survey in 1985 respectively, (a), mean first birth interval (1953-75) and (1953- 
1980), and (b), the proportion of post-nuptially conceived first births occurring within 
eight to eleven months of marriage( 1953-75), and nine to eleven months of 
marriage( 1953-80). Despite the fact that the two surveys cover very different sizes of area 
(three regions in the In-Depth Fertility Survey and twenty-eight regions in the 1982 
1/1000 Fertility Survey) there is a broad similarity of pattern. Nevertheless, differences 
do exist: the mean first birth interval estimated from the In-Depth Survey is consistently 
lower than that for the 1/1000 Survey. Similarly, the proportions of women whose first
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births occurred at nine to eleven months of marriage estimated from the In-Depth Survey 
are also mostly lower than those from the 1982 survey, except for one period (1961-65) 
which might be due to geographic variation in the severity of the famine. Overall, 
however, the two surveys illustrate a consistent story and show very similar trends in the 
two estimates. It is possible, therefore, to join information from these two surveys to 
show a full picture up to 1980. Of course, a certain caution and appropriate adjustment 
are necessary when joint information is used and the results are interpreted.
101
Chapter 4 Natural Fertility: China As a Whole
1.1 General fertility
The information required for directly computing complete sets of age-specific fertility 
rates is available only from 1964 onward from the 1982 1/1000 Survey. For the period 
prior to 1964, we have only truncated fertility rates for younger ages. Several efforts 
have been made. A curve-based extrapolation method has been employed by Chinese 
demographers based on a standard relation between two sets of age specific fertility rates 
from different years.1 This approach provides a complete set of age specific fertility rates 
by single years of age from 15 to 49 over the period 1940 to 1981. More recently, Coale 
and Chen have reconstructed total fertility rates by age and total marital fertility rates by 
duration for the whole period 1940-1982. They estimated the total fertility rate for 1945- 
1981 from duration specific fertility rates and total first marriage rates.2 Yearly and 
single-year age fluctuations were smoothed. The basic assumptions and estimates of the 
two methods are similar. In this chapter, estimates of TFR between 1945-1963 given by 
Coale and Chen are accepted with caution. Rates from 1964 onward are derived directly 
from the survey. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 contain the TFR over the 38 years from 1945 
to 1986 for China as a whole and the total duration marital fertility rates(TDMFR) 
separately.
lrThe data and method can be found in ‘An Analysis of a National One per Thousand Population Sample 
Survey In Birth Rate’, a special issue of Population and Economy, Beijing, 1983, pp. 10-53.
2 A. Coale and S. Chen 1987: Basic Data on the Fertility in the Provinces of China, 1940-82, Papers 
o f  The East-West Population Institute, No. 104, East-West Population Institute, Honolulu, pp. 1-40.
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Table 4 .1  Total fertility rates(TFR) and total duration marital fertility rates(TDM FR)
1945-86: China as a whole
Year TFR TDMFR Year TFR TDMFR
1945 4.766 5.154 1966 6.211 6.891
1946 4.999 5.401 1967 5.252 5.894
1947 5.199 5.605 1968 6.370 7.153
1948 4.906 5.271 1969 5.670 6.351
1949 5.537 5.903 1970 5.746 6.455
1950 5.292 5.592 1971 5.396 6.110
1951 5.262 5.555 1972 4.920 5.664
1952 5.973 6.324 1973 4.506 5.337
1953 5.669 6.021 1974 4.150 5.067
1954 5.955 6.337 1975 3.576 4.482
1955 5.978 6.376 1976 3.254 4.162
1956 5.605 5.995 1977 2.866 3.763
1957 6.205 6.656 1978 2.748 3.620
1958 5.496 5.923 1979 2.798 3.649
1959 4.233 4.594 1980 2.316 2.883
1960 3.986 4.350 1981 2.713 3.149
1961 3.280 3.592 1982 2.860 3.024
1962 5.969 6.497 1983 2.420
1963 7.413 8.020 1984 2.350
1964 6.120 6.654 1985 2.200
1965 6.022 6.605 1986 2.420
Note: TFR and TDFR 1945-81 are from Coale and Chen (1987), TFR after 1981 is from China Population Yearbook 1989, 131.
The fertility level before 1950 is not so clear. Although the establishment of the 
Nationalist government in Nanjing in 1927 signified a new era, it is well known that its 
authority was accepted reluctantly and only gradually by the provinces. The government 
was confronted with a gigantic task in seeking to unify the country and renovate the 
ruling system. Virtually no vital registration or population registration system existed at 
that time. A national census was to be carried out to count total population in 1928 and 
the provinces were twice instructed to carry out this task through the county 
governments, but only 16 provinces reported before the end of 1928 and 12 failed to 
report up to the mid-1930s. So Ho (1959:79-86) suggested that the figures of national 
population in the two decades before 1949 were mainly guesswork.
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Figure 4.1 Total fertility rates(TFR) and total duration marital
fertility rates(TDMFR) 1945-86
China as a whole
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However, a TFR of around 5.4 was estimated for the 1940s using the 1982 1/1000 
Fertility Survey data. This is a level close to that estimated by George Barclay et al. 
(1976:614) for the Chinese rural population in the 1930s from information from the 
Chinese Farm Survey. In the mid-1950s, China’s national total fertility rate was around 
6 and remained so till the end of the 1960s. In the early 1970s, the fertility transition 
began in earnest. The national TFR declined from 5.7 in 1970 to 3.6 in 1975, and to 
2.31 in 1980. In other words, China’s fertility decreased by more than 50 percent in only 
one decade. In 1985, the TFR reported by a national sample survey on population change 
was 1.996. More recently, China’s fertility has risen slightly, but still remains at a low 
level.
Before going on to more detailed analysis, let us first divide China’s fertility
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transition into periods constructed so as to be homogeneous with respect to economic 
conditions and population policy. The dates when marked fertility changes occurred are 
informative, especially when linked to other socio-economic factors and to the efforts of 
the Chinese government to control population growth. Here, the emphasis is mainly on 
fertility change since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949; the fertility 
situation before that year is excluded as being largely unrepresented in the data.
First period: 1950-54. China’s fertility during this period rose steadily to a level 
around 6. Peaceful social conditions after the Japanese War and the civil wars, and the 
recovery of the national economy were the major factors responsible for this. In 
particular, by the mid-1950s health had improved to such a extent that one would expect 
rising natural fertility. The increase can also be attributed to several policy factors, 
among which the uncritical following of the development strategy of the Soviet Union 
was important.3 In fact, government policy in this period was pronatalist. Bearing more 
children was encouraged and prolific mothers were widely honoured.
Second period: 1955-1958. The TFR remained at a fairly high level around 6 with 
small fluctuations. Birth control was discussed on some occasions, but no effective family 
planning policy was implemented. Economic development, health care and education 
programmes, social welfare improvements, and general modernization all probably 
contributed to this fertility level. The fertility pattern in this period and before can be 
regarded as the natural one in China.
Third period: 1959-1961. This was characterised by a huge drop in the fertility level.
3 Tian Xueyuan 1981: A Survey of Population Growth Since 1949, in Lui, et al., (1981) China’s 
Population: Problems and Prospects, Beijing, New World Press.
105
In early 1958, the ‘Great Leap Forward’ was launched by the government. This 
movement soon led to an economic breakdown, including a nationwide famine between 
1959 and 1961. It is likely that the birth rate dipped because of the low caloric intake 
during the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and that the reduced fertility came nine months after 
widespread and serious food shortages. In consequence, fertility dropped dramatically 
from 1959 and reached a trough in 1961.
Fourth period: 1962-66. Beginning in 1962,/socio-economic situation returned to /  
normal. With consumption levels improving, the TFR rose to a peak value of 7.4 in 
1963, the highest since 1949, which was more or less a making up for fertility loss in the 
last crisis. This post-famine baby boom followed a surge of marriages in 1962, so there 
was an unusual concentration of first births in 1963. In addition, couples married in 
earlier years may have had a birth in 1963 to make up for some of the subfecundity, 
postponed childbearing, stillbirths, and excess infant and child deaths of the famine years. 
Alarmed by the huge fertility rise, the government started to carry out a birth control 
programme in this period. This focused first on the urban population and no compulsory 
measures were adopted. The effect on the national fertility level of this programme was 
minor as the urban population was only a small proportion. The demographic impact of 
these measures was discussed by Peng (1987:639-670) in great detail.
Fifth period: 1967-1969. After the massive fluctuation of the two previous periods, 
the TFR returned to a relatively stable high level. In 1966, the leadership launched the 
so-called ‘Cultural Revolution’, and all Chinese people were mobilized to take part in the 
movement. Socio-economic development was severely disrupted again. Virtually no 
family planning programme existed during this period. The fertility regime went back to
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‘natural’. Banister (1987:231) observed that the overall fertility level and pattern in 1970 
showed very little difference from that of 1955.
Sixth period: 1970-1978. This period is well-known for its significant fertility 
decline. Although the people’s living conditions saw virtually no improvement, and may 
even have worsened in many rural areas, the nationwide family planning programme of 
‘Later-Longer-Less’ went to effect from 1971. The appropriate marriage age was set out 
by local governments, normally around 23-25 for females and 25-27 for males. Women 
were encouraged, in some circumstances forced, to postpone their marriage. Coale 
(1984:51-54) estimated that increasing age at first marriage accounted for over 40 per 
cent of the rapid fertility decline in the 1970s. A well-organized birth control network 
also played a very important role in reducing fertility from 5.7 in 1970 to 2.7 in 1978.
Seventh period: 1979-1981. The economic reform, especially the implementation of 
the rural responsibility system, started and was very successful in terms of economic 
growth and the improvement of living conditions. Meanwhile, the family planning 
programme was extended and strengthened, and the ‘One Child’ policy was first put 
forward. This policy, its implementation and its demographic and social responses have 
been discussed in great detail in a number of studies, such as Davin and Kane (Croll et 
al.; 1985:37-113), Banister (1987:183-226). The TFR declined to another trough of 2.3 
in 1980.
Eighth period: 1982-1986. The economic reform became widespread. Overall 
consumption levels rose dramatically in the whole nation. However, the TFR showed a 
slight increase in 1981 and reached another peak in 1982. The major factors responsible
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for that were a marriage boom and a relaxation of birth control efforts and of controls 
on age at first marriage in 1981, when the new marriage law went into effect.4 This set 
the legal age of marriage two years higher than in the old marriage law but well below 
the official requirement prevailing in the 1970s. As mentioned earlier, controlling of the 
age at marriage in the later 1970s was not through the legal age for marriage, but rather 
through the recommended age set by local authorities which was usually at least 23 for 
females. In the 1980s the previous recommended age for marriage ceased to be effective 
and the only controlling age is the legal marriage age, which is 20 years old for females, 
set by China’s 1980 marriage law. Although late marriage is still strongly encouraged by 
propaganda and family-planning programmes, it is no longer compulsory. A lowering of 
the age at marriage is likely to lead to a lower age at first birth, thus prompting a fertility 
rise. However, Feeney et al. (1989:306) believe that this effect on TFR results from a 
change in the timing of childbearing and is thus transitory, if there is no big change in 
completed family size. More recently, Feeney and Wang (1993:70) have argued that the 
decline in mean age at first marriage began after 1979, with the introduction of the ‘One 
Child’ policy, rather than after the 1980 Marriage Law. So a relaxation of late marriage 
requirements in 1979, which was before the new marriage law, is a more plausible 
explanation of this recent fertility rise.
1.2 Marital fertility
Marital fertility can be estimated from age-specific fertility rates and women’s marital 
status. In this section, all figures refer to period measures of ever-married women’s 
fertility. As we illustrated in Chapter 3, because of the stability of Chinese marriage in
4See ‘China’s Marriage Law’, Beijing Review, 24(11), pp.24-27, (16 March 1981).
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the past, this alternative is plausible. The trends in the observed age-specific marital 
fertility rates at the national level against age and time are plotted in Figure 4.2a and 
Figure 4.2b for couples married in the periods between 1929-31 and 1986.
Figure 4.2a Age specific ever-married fertility 1930-1986
I. Pre-transition periods: 1930-65 II. Post-transition periods: 1966-86
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In the early 1950s, age specific marital fertility experienced a substantial increase 
among all age groups, especially among younger married cohorts. Similar patterns were 
also found in other countries, and are well known as the post war ‘baby boom’. 
However, compared with finding of the Farm Survey, the marital fertility in this period 
was by no means markedly higher, though a general increase is obvious. We will make 
further comparison in detail in Chapter 5, but here we can already see that the shapes of 
the marital fertility curves in 1929-31, 1950-54, and 1955-58 are almost identical (see 
Figure 4.2a (I)). All were ‘natural’ fertility schedules. Although the precise levels of 
marital fertility during the 1930s and 1940s are not known, when the Japanese War and
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the civil wars were taking place throughout the country, it must have been a crisis period 
for the fertility, which then returned to the pre-war level after the coming of peace and 
with the recovering national economy.
A great fluctuation occurred during 1959-1966, when prolonged drought, heavy 
floods and other natural calamities along with a general disruption to life severely 
damaged agricultural production and caused famine.5 Biological studies have proved that 
nutritional condition can have an impact on fertility, through its effect on menarche, 
lactation, amenorrhea and other processes affecting reproduction. The decrease in 
fecundity in the famine period, however, was probably not only caused biologically by 
malnutrition, as was suggested by Coale (1984a: 57), but also by the psychological 
stresses associated with the crisis. Caldwell and Srinivasan (1984:74) suggested that 
reduced fertility in this period could be mainly voluntary, due to sexual abstinence and 
abortion. The pattern of marital fertility in 1959-61 remained ‘natural’, although a great 
reduction over all ages was clear. In terms of difference between the age groups, the 
younger the marital cohort was, the deeper the trough of marital fertility in all regions 
(see Figure 4.2b), which probably indicates that malnutrition affected young cohorts’ 
fecundability more than that of older ones. This evidence at the national level is 
consistent with what will be found at the regional in Chapter 6. Figure 4.5 also shows 
that first birth intervals had a deeper trough than second ones during this period, and 
obviously on average women who only had their first births were younger than those who 
had had the second already. Or, perhaps younger women were more affected by 
separation. After that fertility crisis, another ‘baby boom’ took place, understandable as 
a ‘compensation’ for the opportunities to have children lost during the crisis.
5 Peng, X. 1987: Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China’s Provinces, 
Population and Development Review 13, No. 4, pp.639-670.
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Figure 4.2b Age specific ever-married fertility rates 1950-86
China as a whole
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A transitional period occurred around 1967-1969. Before this a general move towards 
higher fertility among younger married women is evident, particularly among those aged 
15-19 and 20-24, while there was slightly lower fertility among older women. After 
1967-69, a dramatic decline in fertility among all age groups of married women took 
place, except for age group 15-19. The decline undoubtedly reflected the overwhelming 
increase in the practice of family planning, which was being propagandized by the 
national government, as well as by local governments. The data show that the trend 
towards lower fertility among women aged 40-44 before 1970 was mainly due to those 
women who lived in urban areas practising birth control and thus the trend of fertility 
among women of this age group was towards a substantially lower level. However, the 
urban population was a quite low proportion of total national population before the 1970s;
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it was only 17.4% in 1970.6 Thus the impact on the national fertility level of older 
women in urban areas practising birth control before the 1970s was not very significant, 
and the shape of fertility of 1966-69 was still close to ‘natural’.
Another interesting phenomenon was a national campaign after 1972 to promote 
family planning. Marital fertility among women of all age groups began to decline, 
except in age group 15-19, whose marital fertility showed a considerable increase. The 
increase in fertility among this group is difficult to interpret in terms of volitional control, 
since these young women were at the very beginning of marriage and thus the least likely 
to limit fertility deliberately. Instead, the rise in fertility among young married women 
appears to be due to the rising mean age at marriage, as suggested by Peng (1991:146), 
and to an increase in natural fertility and its proximate determinants, such as 
fecundability. For example, the rise in fecundability could be because if women got 
married later under the pressure of a family planning programme, with a rise from say, 
18 to 20, then their fecundability was higher than if they had married younger. It also 
could be because of another biological effect such as a decrease of age at menarche, and 
or a behaviourial effect, that people might want children as soon as possible to avoid 
anticipated further pressure from the ‘Later-Longer-Less’ policy. Meanwhile the birth 
control programme did not affect women’s fertility in the early stage of marriage, at least 
between marriage and first birth. Thus the net effect of the family planning programme 
on the younger marital cohorts, particularly those aged 15-19, was not to depress, but 
rather to promote marital fertility.
The shape of marital fertility after 1970 changed dramatically, from a ‘natural’ and
6 China State Statistical Bureau 1988:1988 China Statistical YearBook, Beijing, p97.
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convex profile to more and more steeply concave. It reflects the fact that family planning 
campaigns influenced much more strongly younger married cohorts than the old. 
However, the marital fertility of very young cohorts remained unchanged, and 
presumably these were at earlier durations of marriage. It is probably not correct, as 
Coale claimed (1989:837), that family planning policy did not have an effect on their 
fertility. Evidence does suggest that although they were not practising birth control as 
much as the older cohorts, this does not mean no practice at all, as observed by Wang 
(1988:266) from Hebei province. My interpretation is that the reduction effect on younger 
cohorts’ fertility, particularly the 20-24 group, who had relative longer marriage duration 
than 15-19 group, was offset by the rising natural fertility. In other words, without the 
government’s birth control policy, we should have been able to observe an increasing 
trend in marital fertility among these younger married women.
A sharp increase in marital fertility occurred among young cohorts between 1981 and 
1986. Feeney et al. (1989:306-307), Luther et al. (1990:342) and Zeng et al. (1991:453), 
also noticed an increase in marital fertility between 1984 and 1987, for which the 
relaxation of the fertility control policy in rural areas, by officially allowing more couples 
to have a second child, was generally held responsible. Apart from this, several other 
factors may also have contributed. Firstly, a natural fertility increase due to better living 
conditions, as a by-product of economic reform. Secondly, fecundability rise due to 
changing reproductive behaviour, for example, increased frequency of intercourse. 
Evidence of persistent shortening of the interval between marriage and first child after 
1980 does confirm this possibility. Thirdly, I suspect that another boom in marriage and 
birth occurred in the mid 1980s. This is the result of women bom during the post famine 
baby boom of 1962-64 entering the marriage and childbearing age. Kaufman et al.
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(1989:708) also refer to it as an ‘echo baby boom’. Although Coale et al. (1991:391, 
393) suggest that total rate of first marriage rose above 1.0 in 1980 and remained above 
1.0 through 1987 unchanged. Finally, perhaps there was also an increase in pre-marital 
conceptions which led to births within marriage and which are counted as legitimate (see 
Table 4.4), thus pushing up the marital fertility, particularly among young age cohorts.
1.3 Natural fertility
As has been already stated in Chapters 2 and 3, the model proposed by Coale and 
Trussell enables an estimation of the underlying level of natural fertility, M, in 
populations where birth control is practised, while m, the index of fertility control, 
indicates the extent to which deliberate family limitation is practised. Here, we present 
the indices of M and m estimated from original Coale-Trussell’s model and its adjusted 
version in Table 4.2 for marriage cohorts of 33 years for China as a whole.7 The 
estimated results from the two versions of the model in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 are quite 
consistent; in both the increasing trend in both M and m is evident in all periods before 
the 1970s, except during the crisis period of 1959-61.
For the periods of 1940-44 and 1945-49, we have only truncated fertility rates for 
younger ages, which are not enough to estimate the underlying level of natural 
fertility(M). However, data of the duration marital fertility rates (DMFR) at 0-4 years 
marriage from 1940 to 1981 is available and shown in Figure 4.3. This measure is less 
affected by birth control behaviour and thus the best proxy for natural fertility in this 
period, at least before the first family planning campaign in 1962-66. Coale (1989:837)
7 The annual estimates of M and m from 1950 to 1986 by the two versions of CT model are presented 
in Table 10.2 in Appendix.
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even claimed that birth control policy did not have any effect on the DMFR in the first 
five years of marriage. The graph shows that the DMFR moved quite consistently along 
with the underlying level of natural fertility(M) before 1962-66, when China’s fertility 
was mainly a natural pattern. This increasing trend also matched the similarly rising 
fecundability during the 1940s (see Table 4.5). In addition, Table 4.1 also shows that 
fertility began rising in the late 1940’s. This consistency leads to the possibility that the 
underlying level of natural fertility, M, substantially rose during 1940-49 like the DMFR. 
However, the precise levels of M during the 1940s remain unknown.
Table 4.2 Index of fertility control(m) and underlying level of fertility(M), by 
Coale-Trussell’s model(vl) and its adjusted version (v2) 1950-86: China as a whole
Marriage
Cohort
underlying level of fertility control index/goodness of fit*8
M(v2) M(vl) m R2
1950-54 0.690 0.673 0.180 0.954
1955-58 0.720 0.702 0.185 0.968
1959-61 0.495 0.480 0.224 0.905
1962-66 0.810 0.788 0.197 0.971
1967-69 0.791 0.761 0.271 0.964
1970-78 0.765 0.700 0.637 0.973
1979-81 0.876 0.699 1.626 0.959
1986 0.951 0.701 2.175 0.990
Restriction: the five-year age groups from 20-24 to 40-44 are used for the estimation. 
* m estimates and R2 are/same between two versions of the CT model.
Nk
The level of underlying fertility in China in the 1950s seems to confirm the general 
observation of Barclay et al. (1976:615) that fertility in rural China was remarkable low 
relative to recorded European populations. Their estimate of the natural fertility level in 
rural China was about 0.62 in 1929-31, which was quite close to the national level of the 
1950s (see Table 4.2). Here, the estimated M for China during 1967-69 was about 0.79
8 In this case to investigate Chinese natural fertility, R2, as discussed in Chapter 2, is preferred to mse 
as a measure of goodness of fit, although mse was suggested by Coale and Trussell (1978:203).
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(0.76 by the original model), while it was 0.82 for Taiwan in 1956, 1.02 for Hong Kong 
in 1961, 1.00 for Singapore in 1957, and 0.81 for Korea in 1961, as estimated by Knodel 
(1977:228).
Figure 4.3 Duration(0-4 years of first marriage) marital fertility rates 
(multiplied by 2.5) and index of underlying level of natural fertility 
M(v2) 1940-81: China as a whole
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The general increase in marital fertility among younger married women is reflected 
in the substantial increase in M in successive marriage cohorts before the 1970s in both 
versions of the model. The increase in natural fertility in the 1950s was supported by 
Banister’s suggestion that improvement in life expectancy and health prompted increase 
in fecundity at that time (1987:233). The sharp increase in M value in 1962-66, in 
contrast to the previous periods, was certainly contributed by behaviourial rather than 
biological factors. It is most unlikely that Chinese women became more capable to bear 
children physically after the great famine, but instead the post-famine marriage boom, or 
‘catch-up’ baby boom to compensate fertility loss during the famine. Figure 4.2b shows
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a shift in the age pattern of marital fertility towards a decline with age during the period 
1967-1969, indicative of a slightly increasing practice of family limitation, mainly 
contributed by the urban population, with modestly rising values of m from a quite stable 
level around 0.19 before 1966, indicative of natural fertility, to a level substantially above 
0.2, which suggests at least some fertility control within marriage before 1970.
After 1970 the national family planning campaigns took place, age specific marital 
fertility of all age groups began to decline, except that of age group 15-19. As Figure 
4.2b shows, the most intriguing feature was that marital fertility declined much more 
quickly in young age groups: 25-29, 30-34 and 35-39 than among old age groups like 40- 
44. This feature, again, contradicts the assumption set in the original version of Coale 
and Trussell’s model, which assumes that young married women, especially age group 
20-24, are much less likely to limit fertility deliberately than older cohorts and that 
couples commonly practise birth control mainly for stopping rather than for spacing 
purposes. So, in new circumstances as in China after 1970, M estimated from the original 
model cannot be taken as an unambiguous estimate of the underlying level of natural 
fertility.
The main reasons for the marital fertility of older women declining more slowly than 
that of the younger women are probably twofold. First, there was a higher proportion of 
illiteracy among older cohorts. The 1/1000 Fertility Survey shows that the illiteracy rates 
for the cohorts aged 40-44 in 1975 were 79% for the nation as a whole, 89% and 40% 
in rural and urban areas respectively, while for the 30-34 cohort the rates were only 50% 
for the nation, 57 % and 9% respectively in rural and urban areas. Second, because of age 
and education, lower proportions of employment were prevalent among older cohorts,
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thus older women were more likely to be isolated from outside influences. Quite naturally 
the national family planning campaigns had less influence on them, especially those living 
in rural areas.
Table 4.3 Change in index of underlying level of natural fertility(M) 
by marriage cohort 1958-86: China as a whole
Marriage Cohort Adjusted Model Original Model
1950-54/1955-58 +0.030 +0.029
1955-58/1959-61 -0.225 -0.222
1959-61/1962-66 +0.315 +0.308
1962-66/1967-70 -0.019 -0.027
1967-70/1971-78 -0.026 -0.061
1971-78/1979-81 +0.111 0.000
1979-81/1986 +0.075 +0.001
1950-54/1986 +0.261 +0.028
In Table 4.3, a dramatic increase in natural fertility after 1979 is indicated by the 
adjusted model, while almost no change in natural fertility is estimated by the original 
model. In fact, actual income level, nutrition status from food supply, accommodation 
conditions, medical services, and social welfare in China were substantially improved 
after 1979 due to economic reform and the ‘Open-Door’ policy. This not only contributed 
to consumption levels but also brought about a change of social ideology, such as the
attitudes towards marriage formation and dissolution, sexual behaviour and family
\
patterns. All of these changes were likely to result in a rise in natural fertility rather than 
almost no change at all. Here, again, Trussell’s problem (1979:47-48) is confirmed, as 
he noted that values of M declined over time in Sweden, when there was no reason to 
suppose that, in general, the level of natural fertility should fall as control increased. 
Under these circumstances, the adjusted model is believed to be a more sensitive way to 
simulate real changes of the underlying level of natural fertility than the original model.
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A similar increasing pattern in fecundability in the later 1970s is also found from 
estimates of mean fecundability. This consistent relationship is reflected in a significant 
correlation between M(v2), estimated by the adjusted model, and FB, the estimate of 
mean fecundability, whereas a much lower correlation exists between M(vl), estimated 
by the original model, and mean fecundability (see Chapter 3).
It is also important to discuss the possibility that the observed trend is wholly or in 
part an artefact of changing patterns of premarital sexual behaviour. Pre-nuptial 
pregnancies leading to post-nuptial births artificially inflate marital fertility at ages where 
newly-weds make up a large proportion of married women. The reason for this is that 
in the calculation of marital fertility rates, brides who are pregnant at the time of their 
wedding are treated as if they were at risk of conceiving only from the date of the 
wedding, when in fact they were obviously exposed to the risk of pregnancy for some 
period before marriage. This inflated marital fertility leads to M being overestimated.
Historical evidence from several European countries shows that the proportion of 
brides pregnant at marriage increased during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. For 
example, the study of fecundity in German village populations by Knodel and Wilson 
(1981:61), indicates that about twenty percent of women from the sample were pregnant 
at marriage and bore a child on average within four to five months after their wedding, 
whereas only approximately one percent of Chinese brides were pregnant on the day of 
the wedding before the 1970s. In China, at least for the majority Han population (about 
90% of the total Chinese population), sexual activity outside marriage has been a cultural 
taboo. Cohabitation and illegitimate births do exist, but are very, very rare. Although 
there was growing evidence of premarital sexual behaviour in China from 1970s, as
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shown in Table 4.4, the absolute proportion of pregnant brides in China was still much 
lower than in many other countries. In order to eliminate the influence on M of from the 
changing extent of pre-marital pregnancy in this case, M(v2) value is re-calculated on the 
basis of age-specific marital fertility schedules adjusted for pre-marital pregnancies. A 
comparison of adjusted M(v2) values in Table 4.4 and unadjusted M(v2) values in Table 
4.2 strongly suggests that the influence on M value contributed by pre-marital 
pregnancies is negligible. Moreover, the fact that some women who were not pregnant 
at the time of the wedding could also be engaged in pre-marital sexual relationships and 
hence risked pregnancy before marriage does not bias the marital fertility rate, as long 
as the probability of conceiving in a given month is independent of having sexual 
relations in a previous month.
Table 4.4 Proportion(%) of births occurring in 0-7 and 8-11 months of the first marriage, 
M(v2) adjusted for pre-nuptial pregnancy by marriage cohort 1950-86: China as a whole
Marriage
Cohort
Percentage of births of 1st marriage 
within duration(month)1 Adjusted
M(v2)0-7 8-11
1950-54 1.14 13.85 0.685
1955-58 1.05 15.30 0.716
1959-61 0.81 10.48 0.493
1962-66 1.18 19.07 0.804
1967-69 1.38 25.02 0.785
1970-75 1.61 25.01 0.757
1976-802 1.81 28.20 0.866
19863 2.21 0.935
1,Proportion of married women who gave birth within the first seven months and from eighth and eleventh 
month of first marriage respectively. 2,the values for 1976-80 is based on information of the 1985 In-Depth 
Fertility Survey. 3, the value is estimated from the previous trend.
Perhaps we might ask another related question: In the context of Chinese culture, in 
which a high premium was placed on pre-marital virginity and conjugal fidelity, was it
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possible for some people to decide to marry either fully or partly due to fact that their 
girlfriend or fiancee was pregnant rather than for other reasons, thus artificially inflating 
marital fertility and fecundability. In fact it seems likely that some people who engaged 
in pre-marital sexual relationships did often decide to marry, or^> brought forward the 
date of the wedding which was acceptable by tradition and popular as a date for a couple 
to live together, under the pressure of a girlfriend’s or fiancee’s pregnancy. After all, 
bearing an illegitimate child and thus being identified as a non-virgin bride has always 
been discriminated against by the society.
Table 4.4 indicates that the proportion of women who gave birth in the eighth to 
eleventh month of marriage increased over time, which logically could be affected not 
only by rising fecundability but also by pre-marital sex. But, the situation in China was 
far more complicated than that. It usually took more than a month for a woman to realize 
that she is pregnant, and in China it was very embarrassing for an unmarried woman to 
see a doctor to make sure of it. She usually consulted her female friends in the first 
place, then parents and finally doctors, which usually means more or less publicly, when 
she felt it really necessary. Before the government relaxation of abortion policy for 
unmarried women in the middle 1980s, such as waiving the need for permission from her 
company to have an abortion operation, the usual way to avoid such a ‘scandal’ was to 
marry as soon as possible. It also took time to get everything ready for a wedding, such 
as obtaining legal permission from the local government and from both family’s parents 
(which usually implied financial support from them); choosing the date of the wedding 
(people usually liked to choose an auspicious day for a marriage, such as New Year’s 
Day or the National Day). For urban couples perhaps the biggest difficulty was to 
manage to get themselves a bedroom; it was said that it was easier to find a wife than to
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secure accommodation, even among those who had registered for marriage, as shortage 
of housing prevented them from living together,9 and finally they needed to decorate the 
bedroom and got furniture ready. All this means that it usually took at least a couple of 
months to prepare for a wedding after realizing the pregnancy if they decided to keep this 
child. Thus, it is very unlikely, that the increasing proportion of women who gave birth 
within the first eighth to eleventh month of marriage was mainly due to bridal 
pregnancies rather than rising fecundability. This is simply because these women did not 
have enough time to be counted in this proportion. If it was the case that some people 
marry under the pressure of a pregnancy, then they were much more likely to enter the 
proportion of women who gave birth within the first seven months of marriage. 
Nevertheless, this proportion was extremely low (see Table 4.4) and its influence was 
negligible before the 1980s, although it grew later.
Caldwell and Srinivasan (1984:75-76) noticed that the proportion of marriages 
experiencing a birth within early durations of marriage (one to three years) had risen 
since the 1950s in China. The relative constancy of the achieved level of marital fertility 
for successive marriage cohorts before 1986 stands in marked contrast to the increase 
(with the one major fluctuation) in the value of M, and is apparently the result of 
substantial but countervailing increases in family limitation at older ages and in fertility 
levels at younger ages. After all, a substantial increase in natural fertility for the whole 
nation is evident, taking place over the 47 years from 1940 to 1986 on the basis of 
available information.
9See Peng (1991) p82.
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1.4 Fecundability
Now we can proceed to examine the trends in fecundability. This study is based on 
using the waiting time to an identified pregnancy to estimate recognizable fecundability, 
which is lower than total fecundability, the difference being a function of the spontaneous 
abortion rate in the first few weeks of pregnancy. In Figure 3.1 we presented the 
proportion of post-nuptially conceived first births occurring within eight to eleven months 
of marriage (1953-75), and nine to eleven months of marriage(1953-80) from the two 
fertility surveys respectively. And in Table 4.5 and Figure 4.4 (three-year moving 
average trend) we present mean fecundability for China as whole. To avoid selectivity 
and truncation biases (see Chapter 3), we combine the data from the two surveys, to 
provide a complete picture of fecundability from 1940 to 1980, thus all women who had 
enough time (five years) under observation were in the samples.
In Figure 3.1 both surveys give us an illustrative version: the proportion of first 
births occurring within eight/nine to eleven months of marriage increased significantly 
and dramatically. These proportions allow us apply the Bongaarts’ model, as adjusted by 
Knodel and Wilson, to estimate the mean fecundability level(FB) for China as a whole 
from 1940 to 1980. FB estimates before 1975 are based on the proportion of first births 
that occurred within 8-11 months after marriage from the 1/1000 Fertility Survey.10 
After 1975 they are based on the proportion of first births which occurred from the ninth 
to eleventh month after marriage from the 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey. As this survey 
covered only three provinces which represented a slightly higher proportion than the
10 See 1.3.2 The estimation of fecundability and its data source in Chapter 3.
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national average, this proportion is adjusted to fit the national level before being used to 
estimate the mean fecundability. The same procedure is done for the mean of first birth 
interval as presented in Table 4.5, 4.7 and Figure 4.4, 4.5.
Table 4.5 Mean fecundability (FB) by marriage cohort 1940-80: China as a whole
Marriage
Cohort
FB Marriage
Cohort
FB Marriage
Cohort
FB
1940 0.042 1953 0.070 1966 0.095
1941 0.043 1954 0.075 1967 0.119
1942 0.043 1955 0.072 1968 0.130
1943 0.045 1956 0.079 1969 0.119
1944 0.048 1957 0.085 1970 0.111
1945 0.045 1958 0.054 1971 0.111
1946 0.054 1959 0.052 1972 0.104
1947 0.047 1960 0.039 1973 0.123
1948 0.056 1961 0.060 1974 0.143
1949 0.055 1962 0.083 1975 0.146
1950 0.052 1963 0.095 1976
1951 0.065 1964 0.087 -80 0.158
1952 0.068 1965 0.098
The most marked feature of the estimated mean fecundability was the extremely low 
level of fecundability in China, also noticed by Coale et al. (1988:17), compared with the 
level in historical European populations, such as the German village populations studied 
by Knodel and Wilson (1981:68), where mean fecundability increased from 0.212 during 
1750-74 to 0.284 by 1875-99. Similar evidence will be discussed in the next chapter, 
which shows that the marital fertility of European " noncontraceptive" populations two 
centuries earlier was substantial and significantly higher than that of modem Chinese. 
Here, this difference may introduce two fundamental questions. First, is our estimated 
Chinese mean fecundability here appropriate and robust? Subsequently, a second 
question: if Chinese fecundability or natural fertility was really so low, then how can we 
explain the well known pattern of population growth in China?
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Figure 4 .4  Mean fecundability (three-year moving average)
by marriage cohort 1941-80: China as a whole
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To pursue the first question, we can compare our estimates of mean fecundability 
without standardizing age by Bongaarts’ model, with the average monthly conception 
rates with standardized age estimated by Coale et al. (1988:19) in Table 4.6. Although 
the difference in rural Chinese mean fecundability between the two estimates was 
growing, which was probably due to the rise of mean age at marriage, the two sets of the 
estimates are very close. As indicated by another study on fecundability in relation to age 
on 2443 married women in Taiwan in 1962 carried out by Jain (1969a:80), one year’s 
difference from age 19 at marriage could make about 0.030 more or less to estimated 
fecundability. If age at marriage rose after 1951-53, which was true in China (see Table 
4.11), then our estimates would naturally diverge from Coale’s estimates. Nevertheless, 
a very low level but an increasing trend of fecundability are clear and consistent in both 
estimates. In addition, a brief comparison also suggests that my estimates of mean
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fecundability also match that from an another method and source remarkably well: urban 
Chinese fecundability during 1963-65 is shown in Table 4.6 to be very close to that of 
Taiwanese women in Taichung City during 1962-63 as studied by Jain (1969a: 80). This 
shows that Chinese women living in Taiwan, a society slightly earlier industrialized than 
the mainland, did not enjoy much higher fecundability. The fact that the fecundability of 
modem Chinese urban women is still substantially lower than that of European 
populations two centuries earlier may well be related to variety factors, especially 
Chinese culture and customs, rather than purely to the stage of economic development.
Table 4.6 Chinese mean fecundability estimates: alternative sources
1944-46 1951-53 1963-65 1970-72
China as a whole51 0.049 0.068 0.093 0.108
Rural Chinaa 0.045 0.062 0.084 0.099
Rural China(Coale)b 0.045 0.061 0.066 0.075
Urban China8 
Taiwan(Taichung)c
0.069 0.096 0.161
0.163
0.193
(a), Period averages of mean fecundability from Table 4.5, and Table 5.7, without standardizing age. 
Data source: the 1/1000 Survey (b) Average monthly probability of conception at 0-12 duration after 
marriage and standardizing age for 18-20 at first marriage. Data source: the 1/1000 Survey, see Coale 
et al.(1988:19). (c) Mean fecundability of Taichung married women in 1962-63, estimated by Jain 
(1969a:80). Data source: 1962 Taichung (Taiwan) Intensive Fertility Survey.
Besides nutritional and biological reasons, there are four other possible reasons for 
such low levels of fecundability in China: (1) The traditional beliefs about good health 
encouraged men to restrain sexual desire: people believed that letting out sperm did 
serious harm to their health whatever coital frequency was. The lower the coital 
frequency, the better, it was always suggested. This explanation was the most popular 
view about why the Chinese had such a low level of fecundability, as suggested by 
Barclay et al. (1976:625), and Coale et al. (1988:19). This is confirmed by a recent
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survey, the first extensive account of sexual activity among married couples in China.11 
(2) Sex was supposed to be ‘dirty’ or ‘private’. Almost no sexual information was 
available in publications or education in China before the 1980s, and only very limited 
physiological knowledge was taught in secondary schools after 1950. (3) The traditional 
pattern in China was to get married according to parents’ decision and with the help of 
matchmakers. So, naturally, sexual behaviour among couples could very well be limited 
at the beginning of marriage. (4) Parental fatigue after the birth of children, given the 
fact that both parents worked and many couples were forced to sleep in the same room 
as their children.
Having established that Chinese fecundability and marital fertility was unusually, 
perhaps uniquely low, how can we explain the well known Chinese population pattern: 
such a gigantic size? Historical arguments about Chinese fertility have been fully traced 
and followed in Chapter 2. Given the fact that fertility remained ‘natural’ up to the 1960s 
but relatively lower than that of other noncontraceptive populations, there must be other 
underlying factors operating in behind this mystery. Here, I believe it was early and 
universal marriage as well as universal childbearing that played the most important roles 
in this scenario. The proposition of early and universal marriage and childbearing has 
been well proved by most studies on Chinese demography, such as Notestein and Chiao 
(1937:377), Barclay et al. (1976:610), Banister (1984:248), Coale (1984:39) and 
(1991:392), Luther et al. (1990:343), and Feeney and Wang (1993:71). This pattern 
implies that almost all Chinese got married early and did not deliberately control their
nThe survey was conducted by Geng Wenxiu and Zha Bo from late 1988 to early 1990, in a random 
sample of around 2000 urban men and women in four of China’s biggest cities and several smaller cities, 
The report of the study was published by the Australian National University’s contemporary China centre. 
A brief description of it is given by Geoff Maslen: No sex please, we’re Chinese, The Times, Higher 
Education Supplement No 1029, July 24, 1992, pi 1.
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reproduction at all before the 1970s. In a defence of the so called ‘very low’ historical 
marital fertility estimated by Barclay et al., Coale argued (1984:477) that if early 
marriage were combined with a very high level of natural fertility, the resultant very high 
overall fertility would lead to very rapid population growth, which was not in fact what 
happened in China. If it was not the case that a rapid population growth had been 
sustained in China over centuries, then any supposed high fertility must therefore be 
associated with high mortality. Indeed, an infant mortality rate of 300 and life expectancy 
only 24 years (1930s) would fairly well match the actual population, any mortality level 
higher than that seems very unlikely. So the supposed very high fertility was unrealistic 
given such a level of mortality and population growth rate. Instead, it was the regime of 
‘universal’ marriage and ‘natural’ fertility that made the Chinese population so large. In 
other words, had not the mortality been at that high level in history, this reproductive 
regime alone, without associating a high level of marital fertility and fecundability, could 
have enabled the population to grow even faster and be even larger. In fact, the Chinese 
population did not grow very quickly until the 1950s and has doubled since then. The fast 
growth after 194912, I believe, should be mainly connected with improvements in health 
and lowered mortality. Life expectation increased from about 24 years for Chinese 
farmers during 1929-31, to 57 in 1957, 66 in 1978 (Banister 1987:86) and 69 in 1982 for 
whole nation (Rong and Wang 1991:206). This and an increasing trend in fecundability 
since the 1940s jointly accounted for the size of the Chinese population today.
12See Coale (1984b:47), Banister (1984:254-255).
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Table 4.7 Mean length(months) of the first and second birth intervals by year of 
first marriage and first birth respectively 1930-87: China as a whole
Year First Second Year First Second
1930 41.1 1955 26.1 34.9
1931 38.9 33.8 1956 26.0 37.5
1932 36.5 33.5 1957 29.6 41.9
1933 34.3 34.3 1958 34.0 41.5
1934 34.4 33.8 1959 32.4 38.1
1935 34.2 35.9 1960 30.1 35.2
1936 33.6 34.4 1961 25.6 31.5
1937 34.3 35.6 1962 24.1 30.1
1938 34.1 35.2 1963 24.1 30.7
1939 34.1 35.3 1964 24.3 31.7
1940 33.5 36.1 1965 23.4 31.3
1941 33.9 35.9 1966 22.9 30.1
1942 34.0 36.3 1967 21.3 29.9
1943 33.1 35.4 1968 21.1 30.3
1944 32.7 35.1 1969 21.4 30.8
1945 31.7 34.9 1970 21.8 30.8
1946 31.0 35.0 1971 21.6 31.2
1947 31.0 34.9 1972 21.6 31.4
1948 30.2 34.2 1973 20.4 31.4
1949 29.9 34.3 1974 19.7
1950 29.4 34.4 1976-80 19.7 34.61
1951 27.0 32.7 1981-83 16.3 37.3
1952 26.5 33.1 1984-86 16.1 39.5
1953 25.7 32.7 1987 14.8 39.7
1954 26.0 33.6
Note: Information for both birth intervals from 1935 to 1974 is from the 1/1000 Survey, the first interval of 
1975-80 is based on the In-depth Survey. Information for first birth interval after 1980 and second interval 
after 1973 are periodical averages from annual estimates in Feeney and Wang (1993.13,11) based on information 
from the 2/1000 Survey. 1, for the 1974-80.
Given that Chinese fecundability was historically low, a substantial rise in it after 
1940, especially after 1950 was evident. It rose slightly from the later 1940s, when 
World War Two finished with the Japanese surrender. The national economy then 
recovered somewhat, only to worsen again with the outbreak of the civil war. During the 
mid 1940s, fecundability remained around 0.045. It then increased substantially from
0.052 for women married in 1950 to 0.085 in 1957 for China as whole. There was a 
predictable trough of 0.039 for those married during the troubles of 1958-60, with a
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steady rise after 1961. Finally, a substantial increase occurred in the later 1970s to 0.16, 
the total rise amounting to 250 percent for the whole nation over the forty years. The 
most recent evidence on first birth interval also indicates that this increasing trend still 
holds in the 1980s.
Figure 4.5 Mean length(months) of the first two birth intervals: 1930-80
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The impact of this increase on the interval between marriage and first birth can be 
seen in Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5, where the observed mean first birth interval for the 
nation is given together with the mean second birth interval. As can be seen, the observed 
mean first interval fell from around 40 to about 20 months between the 1930s marriage 
cohorts and the later 1970s ones, and to about 15 months in the middle of the 1980s, as 
indicated by Feeney and Wang (1993:77). When Coale (1989:836-837) noticed that the 
early duration marital fertility, say 0-4 and 5-9, increased from the 1950s to the 1970s, 
he suggested two possible reasons, both mainly to do with shortening interbirth intervals,
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caused by shorter duration of breastfeeding and higher monthly probability of conception. 
The suggestion seems confirmed in this study. The early birth interval for Chinese 
women shortened consistently over the decades, and similar evidence was found in other 
Asian countries where it had been partly attributed to increases in age at marriage and 
trends towards romantic marriage.13
The trend of the intervals between first and second births is also presented in Table
4.7 and Figure 4.5. To avoid the bias of data truncation, only the data for 1931-1973 are 
used to guarantee that those women who had second birth intervals as long as nine years 
could be included in the estimation. The mean second birth intervals presented in Table
4.7 are based on closed birth intervals occurring within nine years of the first birth. 
Because it is very difficult to know exactly the part of/oirth interval distribution beyond 
nine years, part of the duration beyond nine years has been cut off. Moreover, the 
proportion of women who had a second birth after nine years from first birth was less 
than 2% over the period. Compared with the first birth interval, the second interval kept 
more or less steady, though a substantial decline is still obvious in the fall from 35 
months in first birth cohorts of the middle 1940s to 30 months in the late 1960s. As 
Table 4.7 and Figure 4.5 show, a slight rise occurred in the 1970s and accelerated during 
the 1980s, probably due to the influence of the first national family planning campaign 
earlier and the ‘One Child’ policy later, as suggested by Feeney and Freedman (1993:76), 
while changes in demographic factors such as a reduction of breastfeeding and the 
diminishing of traditional practices affecting fecundability only tend to shorten intervals. 
Overall, a substantial decrease in second birth interval before the 1970s is clear and may 
also be related to a rise in fecundability, though at this stage this is conjectural.
13 See R. Rindfuss and S. P. Morgan 1983: Marriage, Sex, and the First Birth interval: The Quiet 
Revolution in Asia, Population and Development Review 9 , No. 2, pp.259-278.
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1.5 Breastfeeding
Another major component of natural fertility amenable to analysis with available data 
is the length of breastfeeding. This is widely accepted to play a major role in differences 
of the non-susceptible period which follows a birth and during which a woman is not at 
risk of conceiving. Clinical studies indicate that lactation affects a woman’s level of 
serum prolactin - frequent and intense suckling raises the prolactin in the blood - which 
in turn inhibits ovulation. Thus women who continue to breastfeed after the resumption 
of menses may have a higher incidence of anovulatory cycles stemming from an elevated 
level of serum prolactin. High levels of serum prolactin may also interfere with a 
fertilized ovum’s ability to implant in the uterus. The result of these effects is that 
prolonged, intense breastfeeding is associated with lower fecundability and thus lower 
natural fertility.
One of the disappointments of the 1/1000 Fertility Survey is its lack of information 
with which to estimate the length of breastfeeding. Although we can estimate the mean 
duration of the non-susceptible period to examine indirectly the role breastfeeding played 
in the rise of the natural fertility, by comparing the first and second birth intervals, this 
estimate is a rather crude approximation for several reasons. The most crucial is rising 
fecundability, which over time would tend to shorten the first birth interval. This 
certainly makes the comparison ambiguous. Fortunately, the 1985 In-Depth Fertility 
Survey offers some information about breastfeeding, though it is limited to only three 
regions and the most recent two decades. However, it still enables us examine the effect 
of lactation on natural fertility in a quite relevant way. In Table 4.8 we present the mean
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length of breastfeeding by year the births occurred for Hebei, Shaanxi and Shanghai 
regions as a whole, estimated from the distribution of children according to length of 
breastfeeding by years since the birth occurred.
Table 4.8 Mean length(months) of breastfeeding and proportion of children without 
breastfeeding by year the births occurred 1960s-1982: three regions as a whole
Year Mean Length No BF(%) Women
-1967 16.46 1.73 6778
1968-72 16.58 2.29 6207
1973-77 17.26 2.65 5888
1978-82 11.67 3.49 6074
Total 15.51 2.51 24945
♦based on the distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding and confined to children born at 
least three years before, and excluding children who died before age two. The means were confined to those 
weaned in the first 35 months and include those not breastfed as zero.
Table 4.9 Mean length(months) of breastfeeding and proportion of children 
without breastfeeding by mother’s current age: three regions as a whole
Mother’s Age Mean Length No BF(%) Women
< 30 11.21 2.45 11653
30-39 15.22 2.63 11155
40+ 16.63 2.29 2139
Total 15.51 2.51 24947
Apparently, the average duration of breastfeeding in the three regions as a whole 
stayed at more or less the same level of 17 months until the middle 1970s; thus it was 
somewhat higher than that of other developing countries (see Trussell 1992:301). Then 
it declined dramatically to 11.7 months, which was consistent with the patterns of natural 
fertility and fecundability shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.5 respectively, i.e. it remained more 
or less at the same level (with a slightly rising general trend) until 1977 and rose 
strikingly afterwards. Lavely (1986:430) suggested that declining length of breastfeeding
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would reduce the length of postpartum amenorrhea, which would reduce the interval 
between early births at a time when high-order births were under control, and thus 
contribute to fecundability rising. The proportion of children not breastfed is another 
indication of the importance of breastfeeding in developing countries.14 As we can see, 
the proportion of children who were never breastfed was very low but rose steadily from 
1.73% to 3.49%. The breastfeeding patterns also show marked differences between the 
three regions, which we will discuss in Chapter 6.
Figure 4.6 Children’s breastfeeding 1960s-82: three regions as a whole
I. The mean length (months) of the breastfeeding
a: By year the births occurred b: By mother’s current age
II. The proportion of children who were not breastfed (%)
c: By year the births occurred d: By mother’s current age
3.5 3.5
14 B. Ferry and D.P. Smith 1983: Breastfeeding Differentials, Comparative Studies, N o .23, (WFS)
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If the average duration of breastfeeding remained at a stable level before 1977, the 
duration differential between each cohort is much clearer. In Table 4.9 and Figure 4.6, 
we present the mean length of breastfeeding that children ever had, which is estimated 
from the distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding by current age of 
the mother. There appears to be an increase in breastfeeding duration with age, again, 
this was consistent with the findings in other developing countries.15 The more recent 
a cohort a woman belonged to, the shorter the breastfeeding she undertook, especially 
among those aged under 30 in the In-Depth Survey (1985). This might be due to the 
trend of increasing education and employment opportunities for Chinese women over 
time, and a fundamental change in the socio-economic structure and ideology after 1978. 
This evidence may support the argument that degree of modernization (urbanization) was 
negatively associated with breastfeeding duration and that reduction of that duration was 
inevitable as modernization spread.16
A very interesting phenomenon shown from Figure 4.6 is that the proportion of 
children who were not breastfed at all increased substantially according to the time the 
births occurred, while it remained quite stable by the mother’s current age. This might 
suggest that the proportions were influenced by birth cohort rather than age cohort effect. 
Possible reasons could be that changes in socio-economic factors like employment level 
and women’s social status affected mothers’ breastfeeding behaviour. Chinese people 
traditionally believed that a mother’s milk was the most nutritious food for her newborn 
baby, so to breastfeed her child was a mother’s moral obligation, no matter how old she
15 See Ferry and Smith (1983).
16 See M. M. Kent: Breastfeeding in the developing World: Current Patterns and Implications fo r  
Future Trends, (Washington, Population Reference Bureau, 1981)
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was, unless physical incapable. Thus, an age effect was reflected in the length of 
breastfeeding, but not in whether or not it began. Only the cohort effect appears to 
contribute to the proportion of children non-breastfed. However the proportion was still 
under 4%, which might be due to sample variation, or though very unlikely, due to an 
increasing number of women who were physically incapable of breastfeeding. It may also 
reflect increasing availability of improved efficient and nourishing baby food such as 
infant formula to substitute for mothers’ milk. The ultimate reasons for this proportion’s 
rise by birth cohort and its lack of change by age cohort must remain unknown.
1.6 Primary sterility
Caldwell and Srinivasan (1984:76) observed that the fraction of marriages without 
a birth during the first five years declined over time in China, which they attributed to 
a decline in arranged marriages and a decline of pathological sterility. However, to 
measure primary sterility precisely, unfortunately, detailed data are required for estimates 
to be made with certainty. This detail is only available in the rare cases of family 
reconstitution studies, for example those on French Canadians in the eighteenth century 
studied by Henripin (1954). Childlessness has been used as a proxy to measure primary 
sterility inmost studies, such as Romaniuk (1980:299-302), Knodel and Wilson (1981:63- 
66), and Vaessen (1984). These studies suggested that in any population of reasonable 
size, at least a small proportion of couples were unable to bear children because of 
physiological impairment to either or both spouses. Using childlessness as an alternative, 
although it may suffer from various kinds of bias, is rational and logical. In many 
societies infertility is no proof of sterility, but in populations not practising birth control, 
a fecund couple, given sufficient time, must have children. The study of these populations
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should permit the measurement of human fecundity.
As we know, universality is one of the major characteristics of the Chinese marriage 
pattern. Getting married upon reaching a certain age is accepted by the society as a moral 
obligation. Remaining unmarried by a certain age, say the late 20s, is seen by the public 
as abnormal, and spinsters and bachelors have never been encouraged by Chinese 
tradition. Zeng et al. (1985:734) and Feeney and Wang (1993:65) suggested that virtually 
all women in China got married by age 35. In traditional Chinese society, the family and 
the kinship circle were the most important units of organisation to serve the individual’s 
social and economic needs. Every couple should have children, in particular boys, both 
for preserving the family line and for security in old age. So the traditional attitude was 
"the more children the better" and "more sons, more prosperity" as pointed out by Whyte 
and Gu (1987:474). Thus, even nowadays virtually all Chinese women get married, as 
in the past, and voluntary childlessness among married women has been almost non­
existent. This position has been confirmed by Luther et al. (1990:343) and Coale et al. 
(1991:392), who observed that a first birth is almost universal for married couples in 
China. Under this circumstance, we can take the proportion of older married women who 
had no live birth as an approximate value of primary sterility. Before we interpret this, 
we need to assume that mortality among a given age group of women was the same, 
whether they had a live birth or not, that the change of intra-uterine mortality (foetal 
wastage) over 25 years was negligible, and that women whose marriages remained intact 
until they reached the end of the reproductive age span were not unusual.
Cy^ (]
The last assumption is more controversial ^ deserves further discussion. We know that 
divorce rates were very low in China. Traditionally, there were rigid institutional
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restrictions on divorce so as to enforce family solidarity. After 1949, the freedom of 
divorce was guaranteed in both the 1950 and the 1980 marriage laws in principle. 
However, society and cultural tradition stressed the stability of the family, and divorce 
was still looked down upon in Chinese society. Most Chinese marriages are stable, and 
couples are always expected to stay married for life. Both local kinship and government 
policies encourage such stability. When a marital dispute occurs, various attempts at 
mediation ensue, in order to get the couple back together. Only when such mediation fails 
is the case sent to a local court. Divorce is to be avoided if at all possible. The 1980 
marriage law gives more freedom of divorce and places more emphasis on the emotional 
factor in ensuring happy marriages and preserving family life. Partly as a result of that, 
the number of divorces for the whole nation increased rapidly from 113,600 in 1979 to 
427,000 in 1982.17 But, if population increase is taken into account, the divorce level 
of 1982 was similar to the average for the years between 1950 and 1981. Data from the 
1982 1/1000 Survey show that among all ever married women aged 15-49, only 0.27 per 
cent were reported as currently divorced at the national level, and the proportion was 
even lower before the 1980s. Again, information from the 1982 Census confirms that 
among all women aged 15-49, 96.2 per cent were reportedly still in a marital union, and 
89.1% of these were created by first marriage. The survey also reveals that 12.9% of 
women aged 50 and over were remarried, 19% were widowed, and less than 0.5% were 
currently divorced. These remarried women might be either previously divorced or 
widowed. All of this suggests that Chinese women are more likely to live in marriage 
than to stay single. Therefore, the changes in the number of women with no live birth 
due to interrupted marriage rather than to primary sterility can reasonably be ignored, as 
it can not in other parts of the world today.
17Li Ning 1985: How does China Deal with Divorce?, Beijing Review, 5(4 Feb. 1985), pp. 18-21.
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Table 4.10 The proportions(%) of ever-married women who never 
had a live birth by age in the two surveys: China as a whole
Age Group 1982 Survey 1987 Survey
15-19 69.298 64.645
20-24 40.321 32.050
25-29 10.404 6.974
30-34 2.359 1.807
35-39 1.758 1.244
40-44 1.875 1.243
45-49 2.206 1.434
50-54 3.215 1.844
55-59 4.726 2.848
60-64 5.406 4.467
65-67 6.263
In the present analysis our prime interest lies in changes in primary sterility over 
time, in particular in discovering whether a decline in primary sterility could be 
responsible for, or contribute to, the observed increase in natural fertility indicated by the 
rise in M. The percentage of married women who had no live birth can be taken as an 
approximate value of primary sterility among married couples. These percentages, based 
on information from the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey and the 1987 One-Percent 
Population Survey, are presented in Table 4.10, which gives the proportions of ever 
married women with no live birth by age group in the two surveys. In China, such a 
universal and early marriage society, a married women over 35 is believed to have had 
enough time to have a child, otherwise she is very likely infecund. This speculation is 
consistent with the information in Table 4.10, which shows that the proportion of women 
with no live birth decreased by age until 35-39, as more and more married women had 
enough time. There is a strong probability of their being infecund if they were over 40 
and had had no live birth yet.
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Figure 4 .7  Childless: international comparison
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This U-shape pattern has been found in other studies as well. An example is one in 
Zaire during twenty years after 1955-58 carried out by Romaniuk (1980:300), who 
observed reduction in childlessness from old age groups to young in most regions, 
particularly in the two largest cities. More convincingly, a comprehensive cross-national 
study on childlessness and infecundity based WFS and carried out by Vaessen (1984), 
suggested a closely parallel and correlated movement between having no living children 
and no pregnancy over the reproductive age span in the majority of 28 countries, a 
reduction of childlessness, thus producing a U-shape. The percentages of childless among 
Chinese women (from the 1982 1/1000 Survey) along with those of other nations in East 
Asia, cited from Vaessen (1984:30), are plotted in Figure 4.7. Vaessen’s figures were 
from women in the married state for at least five years, and thus not fully comparable 
with young age groups of childless Chinese. By moving to older groups, this problem 
diminishes and finally vanishes when age is over 35, as nearly all Chinese women were
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married by 30. Compared with other East Asian nations, Chinese women showed 
relatively a low proportion of childlessness at comparable ages. This phenomenon has 
also been noticed by Feeney and Yu (1987:81), Coale (1991:393), Feeney and Wang 
(1993:71). Misreporting of adopted children as natural offspring was generally suspected, 
although nothing can confirm this. Apart from this, the levels and particularly the U- 
shape of childlessness were similar between these nations. The South Korean women had 
the largest reduction of childless over age groups, which again, is plausible.
Figure 4.8 indicates a decline in the proportion of Chinese women with no live birth 
from the oldest age group, 65-67, to the youngest one, 35-39, in both surveys, and a 
huge drop from 50-54 to 45-49. In fact, the decline may be even larger than it appears, 
since women who had not reached the end of the reproductive age span may still have 
children, especially those in younger age groups such as 35-39 and 40-44. Thus we may 
be slightly underestimating this trend of declining primary sterility. This tendency might 
be partly due to the fact that elderly women often have great difficulty in recalling 
children who died as infants, which was suggested by Wolf’s experience during his 
retrospective survey (1984:445). But more plausibly, it resulted from a significant 
improvement of medical service and public health programmes in the 1950s to control 
and cure venereal diseases and tuberculosis, which happen to be the main causes of 
sterility. The declining trend over different age groups in the two surveys suggests not 
only that primary sterility fell substantially up to the 1970s, but also that the trend 
continued during the 1980s. In addition, as shown in Table 3.11, there was a significant 
rise in the ratios of currently married to ever-married in all age groups between 1982 and 
1987, especially among older age groups, which further implies both declining mortality 
and increasing remarrying after divorce or widowhood during the 1980s. This trend is
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also observed by Feeney and Wang (1993:71), who find that the 1988 Two-Per-1000 
Fertility Survey has significantly lower proportions of Childless than the 1982 1/1000 
Survey. They also show that period proportions per 1000 of women progressing from 
marriage to first birth in China kept growing from 1967, and this rising trend continued 
after 1981 up to 1987, the latest year the 2/1000 Survey allows.
Figure 4.8 Primary sterility: Proportions(%) of ever-married women 
who never had a live birth by age in the two surveys: China as a whole
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One important contribution to declining primary sterility by the public health 
programme is perhaps that venereal disease (VD) has been completely eradicated from 
most areas and has been completely under control throughout China since the late 1960s. 
VD virtually did not exist in China until the sixteenth century. The old western 
colonialists introduced syphilis into Guangdong province and it soon spread widely. Until 
this century, VD was very common in China; in Horn’s study (1969:83), it was 
suggested that the nationalist armies had a syphilis rate of about 20%. The incidence of
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syphilis in Chinese districts or villages was directly proportional to the size and the 
duration of stay of invading US, Japanese and nationalist armies.
One of the most harmful effects of VD is to cause sterility and then to reduce natural 
fertility. Related demographic effects are a high miscarriage rate and a large number of 
babies bom dead. All these effects would result in a woman having no live birth, which 
is our substitute measure of primary sterility here. This depopulation effect was much 
more severe in the ethnic minority regions where sex outside marriage might not be as 
restricted as among Han Chinese. In the traditional society of Han Chinese, wealthy
iA
males, soldiers, or bachelors might seek prostitutes, but seducing or having ^affair with 
a married woman, or a married woman having sex with a man other than her husband 
were great sins, and could lead to the death penalty if found out. This custom to some 
degree limited the spread of VD, while among some ethnic minority groups, where this 
custom did not exist, the spread would be quicker, and sterility would be more prevalent. 
In one example reported by Horn (1969:87), an investigation of 2334 nomadic families 
revealed that 58% were childless in the Hulunbu League in Inner Mongolia, which 
numbered 10,386 in 1933, but had fallen to 7670 in 1950.
Within a few years after 1949, when the communist government took power, VD 
was under complete)^ control and soon eradicated from most areas. Again, Horn 
(1969:87) provided the following evidence: In Xingguo and Ningdu counties in Jiangxi 
province, a follow-up study five years after the anti-syphilis campaign revealed no new 
case or recurrence. In 1960, a complete dermatological examination of the entire 
population in Chaoan county (population 746,495) in Guangdong province, and Haian 
county (population 225,305) in Jiangsu province, revealed only one case of secondary
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recurrent syphilis, and a resurvey of 50% of the population of these two counties in 1964 
showed not a single infectious case. This outcome resulted from several measures: 
eliminating prostitution, massive political campaigns against VD and a comprehensive and 
effective medical programme. In addition, women’s socio-economic status was enhanced 
substantially, and traditional customs were imposed on private life, such as advocating 
virginal marriage and disgracing or even applying a criminal penalty on sex outside 
marriage.
As far as the differences in proportion between the same age groups in the two 
surveys are concerned, on average they were over 1 % and got wider by age. These facts 
indicate a further decline in primary sterility in the 1980s, and the decline in the 
proportion between the two surveys might also be one factor to contribute to the dramatic 
rise in natural fertility in the 1980s. The overall declining trend in primary sterility could 
also be identified by examining period parity progression (PPP) ratios from marriage to 
first birth for China in the study carried out by Feeney et al. (1987:81), which indicated 
that the PPP ratios rose from 0.965 in 1955 to 0.993 in 1981, and Luther et al. 
(1990:344)’s study confirmed this rising trend up to 1987 by the same measure.
1.7 Age at first marriage
Nuptiality is an important determinant of fertility levels and trends. Marriage 
patterns, especially the age at marriage and the prevalence of marriage, are directly 
relevant to the study of natural fertility. As we know, in China the overwhelming 
majority of conceptions take place within marriage owing to Chinese custom. Thus the 
age at first marriage can be used with confidence as an indicator of the beginning of a
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Chinese woman’s exposure to the risk of childbearing. The traditional Chinese marriage 
pattern has been generalized as early and universal marriage. One question arises from 
this feature. We know that natural fertility in a woman’s whole reproductive history is 
highest when she is 20-24 years old, so when age at first marriage changes, marital 
fertility changes too. In addition, as Lavely and Freedman (1990:359) suggested, women 
who married earlier may have lower fertility at comparable ages because of reduced
intercourse with longer marriage duration. In other words, rising age at marriage leads
b
^  more women aged 20-24 at earlier duration of marriage, thus indirectly pushing up the 
marital fertility. Thus the question is, then, whether or not the increase in natural fertility 
in China was purely due to the mean age at first marriage rising from a less reproductive 
to an age of peak reproductive potential. We do find that mean age at marriage was rising 
over the past four decades in China. Table 4.11 shows that since the early 1940s the 
mean age at first marriage kept rising until the early 1980s, as noted by many studies, 
such as Banister (1987:152-165) and Coale (1989:834-837). This rise was relatively slow 
before 1970 and accelerated in the 1970s. The national level for the mean age at first 
marriage rose by 2.6 years over the 1950s and the 1960s, and by 1.6 years over the 
1970s.
Table 4.11 Mean age at first marriage(MAFM) by marriage cohort 
1940-81: China as a whole
Marriage Cohort MAFM Marriage Cohort MAFM
1940-44 17.78 1962-66 19.16
1945-49 18.06 1967-69 19.65
1950-54 18.32 1970-78 20.92
1955-58 18.65 1979-81 22.47
1959-61 19.03 1982-87 21.991
Note: MAFM in 1982-87 is periodical average from annual estimates in Feeney and Wang 
(1993:69) based on information from the 2/1000 Survey.
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We know that marital fertility rose, and at the same time the mean age at first 
marriage also rose. A sensible way to find out whether the rise in marital fertility was 
due to the rise of mean age at first marriage is to show the trend of marital fertility 
controlled for age at first marriage. Table 4.12 shows the trend of marital fertility in 
marriage duration of 13-24 months over the three decades by age at first marriage. This 
shows a consistent increasing trend over three decades. It also shows a consistent pattern 
among age groups of 15-19, 25-29, 30-34, as well as 20-24. So it appears that not only 
changes in age at first marriage but also changes in natural fertility were responsible for 
changes in marital fertility.
Table 4.12 Marital fertility in first marriage duration 13-24 months by
age at first marriage and marriage cohort 1950s-1970s: China as a whole
Age At 1st 
Marriage 1950s 1960s 1970s
15-19 310.8 350.9 406.7
20-24 419.6 488.5 530.4
25-29 404.7 493.9 562.8
30-34 421.41 396.7 499.1
l,In the 1950s, very few women in age group 30-34 had borne their children in the first year
after first marriage, thus they concentrated their births in their second year of marriage.
Table 4.13 Mean length(months) of first birth interval by age at first marriage, 
and marriage cohort 1960s-1980: the three regions as a whole
Marriage
Cohort
Age At First Marriage
Total Women<17 17-19 20-22 23-25
-1960 26 23 23 24 24 1473
1961-65 22 22 19 19 21 1349
1966-70 21 20 18 17 19 1829
1971-75 26 20 19 17 19 1831
1976-80 18 20 18 16 17 2678
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A similar question to be borne in mind is the possibility of a relationship between 
changes in nuptiality and fecundability, and birth intervals. We know that the estimate 
of fecundability or mean birth interval was biased when the proportion of women who 
married at their peak reproductive age of 20-24 increased over time. This is certainly true 
in China during 1940-81 as we noted above. Here to get rid of this nuptiality effect, we 
show the trend of the distribution of the first birth by controlling age at first marriage.
From information provided by the 1985 In-Depth Survey shown in Table 4.13, we 
can also see that the mean length of the first birth interval decreased consistently over 
time after controlling for age at first marriage. The exceptions were those married in the 
period 71-75, when the ‘Later-Longer-Less’ campaign was first launched. It is 
understandable that they tried to postpone their births, especially the younger marriage 
cohorts. Coale et al. (1988:17-20) also observed a substantial fecundability rise in rural 
China between 1944 and 1972 after controlling for age at first marriage. Given the fact 
that over 83% of the total nation was a rural population before the 1980s, and that a 
substantial fecundability rise occurred over the same time in urban areas too (see Table 
5.8), it is reasonable to believe that a substantial fecundability rise throughout China is 
not purely related to age at marriage, but rather contributed by other determinants, such 
as changes in coital frequency and duration of breastfeeding.
1.8 Summary
Our examination of evidence from the reproductive histories of couples married 
between the 1940s and the 1980s convincingly suggests that natural fertility increased 
significantly over the period in China as a whole. In the 1940s, although we lack data of
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age-specific marital fertility and are unable to estimate natural fertility, the consistent 
relation between natural fertility and duration marital fertility, and other indices such as 
TFR and fecundability suggest that natural fertility might have risen in this decade as 
well.
In seeking to measure natural fertility, the adjusted version Coale-Trussell model 
seems to give more plausible and consistent estimates, while the original version is less 
consistent, as it suggests a flat trend for natural fertility after 1979. This failure is 
believed due to the improper assumption for the China after the 1970s that younger 
married women did not limit their births at all. The adjusted model modified the control 
schedule v(a) to take into account this feature. So in circumstances such as those in China 
after 1970, M estimated from the adjusted model provides a closer estimate of the 
underlying level of natural fertility.
The estimated mean fecundability for China was extremely low, which seems to 
confirm observations from other studies such as Coale et al. (1988). Main causes are 
believed to be limited coital frequency and long durations of breastfeeding. However, 
this comparatively low level of fecundability did not prevent the Chinese population’s 
growth. It was ‘universal’ marriage and ‘natural’ fertility patterns that overcame the high 
mortality and kept the Chinese population growing slowly before 1950. The fast growth 
after 1950 was mainly connected with increased marital fertility resulting from rising 
fecundability, shortened birth intervals and duration of breastfeeding, combined with 
improvement in health and dropped mortality.
The average duration of breastfeeding in China before the 1970s was longer than that
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in other parts of the developing world, based on the 1985 In-Depth Survey. It stayed 
more or less at 17 months until the middle 1970s, then declined dramatically to 11.7 
months. This change in people’s reproductive behaviour may be associated with the 
anticipation of a further harsh birth control policy and the improvement in employment 
resulting from economic reform.
Following the conventional approach, childlessness is used as a proxy to measure 
primary sterility. Here this is more rational and robust than in many other places, given 
that marriage and childbearing are universal in China. The U-shape of proportion of 
childless is consistent with observations from other developing countries. The percentages 
of childless among Chinese women (from the 1982 1/1000 Survey) were close to those 
of neighbouring nations in East Asia, though Chinese women had relatively lower 
proportions of childless at comparable ages. This phenomenon may be partly associated 
with misreporting of adopted children as natural offspring. But more plausibly, it resulted 
from significant progress in medical services and public health programmes in the 1950s 
to control and cure venereal diseases and tuberculosis, which are major causes of 
sterility.
From the early 1940s the mean age at first marriage kept increasing until the 1980s. 
This increase was relatively slow before 1970 and accelerated over the 1970s. The 
national level for the mean age at first marriage rose by 2.6 years over the 1950s and the 
1960s, and by 1.6 years over the 1970s. However, after age at first marriage is 
controlled for, we still find that the trend of marital fertility rose at the marriage duration 
of 13-24 months over three decades from the 1950s to 1970s, and the trend of first birth 
intervals compressed after the 1960s. This makes clear that the increase in natural fertility
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was not purely due to the mean age at first marriage rising from an age of less 
reproductive potential to an age of peak reproductive potential.
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Chapter 5 Natural Fertility: Urban-Rural Differentials
LI Literature review: urban-rural differentials
The study of differential fertility is important, because its existence is a valuable key 
to determining the causes of fertility transition. As we saw above, the average number 
of births is universally higher for women living in rural areas than for those living in 
urban areas, and on the whole current residence is somewhat more important than 
childhood residence. Although the type of residence appears to be of minimal importance 
in some developed countries such as Italy and Belgium,1 where problems of definition 
might be responsible, the urban-rural differentials tend to be much larger in developing 
countries, in so far as the definitions can be taken at face value. In fact, an urban-rural 
differential in fertility is very common in developing countries today.
Similar differentials exist according to the level of education: the average number of 
births is generally less for women having more education than for those with less, though 
type of residence and level of education are usually not independent of one another. A 
similar connection appears between type of residence and occupation, perhaps social class 
as well. However, many studies which have standardized other variables, such as 
education or occupation, suggest that urban-rural variation at least partly accounts for 
differentials in fertility. Therefore, an interesting question here is whether an urban-rural 
differential in natural fertility exists in China as well.
1 Elise F. Jones 1982: Socio-Economic Differentials in Achieved Fertility, Comparative Studies, No. 
21 (WFS).
The 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey produced separate estimates of fertility for China’s 
urban and rural areas. In this survey, the "urban" population was narrowly defined as 
those persons living in cities and towns who were consuming commercial grain rations 
as of the survey date and therefore were called "non-agricultural". In 1982 this "non- 
agricultural" proportion comprised only 14.5% (see Table 8.3) of China’s total 
population, a point worth keeping in mind when analysing urban-rural differentials. The 
1/1000 Fertility Survey provides annual data on fertility and nuptiality for the rural and 
urban populations. This information makes it possible to examine urban-rural differentials 
in both levels and trends in natural fertility, and more illustratively, in fecundability, birth 
intervals, and primary sterility. A first discussion of urban-rural differentials in 
breastfeeding practices has become possible with information from the 1985 In-Depth 
Fertility Survey. It is also possible to assess the impact of the dramatic social and 
economic changes of the 1980s on natural fertility with fertility data from the 1987 One- 
Percent Population Survey.
1.2 A brief introduction to urban-rural differentials in socio-economic aspects 
in China
The central feature of urbanisation in China is that the process has been controlled 
to a large extent by the state and its bureaucracy. This was made possible by policies 
adopted soon after 1949, which included the nationalisation of urban land and large 
industries. The state or local agents also took control of urban housing, along with larger 
retail and service establishments. More significant were the rationing systems for essential 
goods and the permit system for place of residence. Overall, Chinese urban residents 
have many advantages over their rural counterparts.
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Table 5.1 Some socio-economic annual indices of urban and rural China
1952-85 (per capita)
Consumption Grain Meat(pork)
Year yuan1 k.g. k.g.
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
1952 148 62 240 191 8.9 5.5
1957 205 79 196 204 9.0 4.3
1960 111 65 193 156 2.7 1.2
1962 226 88 184 160 3.8 1.9
1965 237 100 210 177 10.3 5.4
1970 261 114 202 184 10.3 4.8
1975 324 124 209 187 14.9 5.9
1978 383 132 205 193 13.7 6.3
1981 487 194 215 220 17.0 9.7
1985 754 324 239 258 19.7 12.6
Sugar Eating Oil Hospital Beds
Year k.g. k.g. (per 10,000f
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
1952 3.0 0.6 5.7 1.7 14.63 0.79
1957 3.6 1.1 5.1 1.8 20.78 1.37
1960 3.6 1.5
1962 3.5 1.2 2.4 0.8 38.77 4.52
1965 3.5 1.1 4.8 1.1 37.75 5.10
1970 4.5 1.5 4.2 1.1 41.76 8.46
1975 5.8 1.5 4.6 1.0 46.10 12.30
1978 8.1 2.4 4.1 1.6 48.76 14.07
1981 9.1 2.9 6.9 2.0 47.33 14.69
1985 11.8 4.2 12.3 3.4 46.64 15.10
Source: China Social Statistical Materials 1987, p70-73; Chen (1987) Chinese People’s Consumption 
in 2000, p31. 1, portion of gross consumption in the national income divided by the population, without 
eliminating inflation factor. 2, number of beds per 10,000 population
Apart from employment, education, medical services and social welfare, food supply 
is another strong factor, which affects nutritional status and thus is crucial in determining 
the natural fertility level. In 1953 the Chinese government took complete control of grain 
production and consumption, and a rationing system was introduced.2 Under this system, 
grain consumption for the majority rural population was dependent on local grain
2 See Vaclav Smil 1981: China’s food: Availability, Requirement, Composition, Prospects, Food 
Policy, Vol 6, No. 2, pp.69-77.
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production and government grain procurement which consists of agricultural tax, central 
purchase and optional sales.
In some circumstances, such as natural disasters, or during irrigation construction, the 
state did provide some subsidiary grain, but this was very limited. To feed themselves 
was their own responsibility, so the grain consumption of the rural population varied by 
area and time. In contrast, the main source of grain for the non-agricultural population, 
mostly urban residents, was and still is the government supply. They receive grain in the 
form of a fixed ration at a fixed price. This means that they can always rely on the state, 
no matter what the quality of the last harvest, e.g. during the great famine, the average 
annual fall in per capita food grain consumption in urban areas was only 1.7 percent, but 
in rural areas it was 23.5 percent(see Table 5.1). Basic food availability for the urban 
population is usually guaranteed and on average better provided.
1.3 Differentials in general fertility
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 provide us with TFR and TDMFR from 1945 to 1981 for 
the urban and rural populations separately. Comparing Table 5.2 with Table 4.1, 
although there was some minor difference of fertility level between the rural population 
and the whole nation, the fertility trend was virtually identical. This is not surprising, 
since the majority of Chinese live in the rural areas. The urban fertility trends showed 
some differences, though they were broadly similar, as can be seen from Figure 5.1. 
Generally speaking, the urban TFRs were always lower than rural ones. The urban-rural 
differential in fertility before 1945 is not so clear. TFRs of around 4.8 and 5.2 were
roughly estimated for urban and rural areas respectively in the 1940s using China’s 
fertility survey data. As we know, since the 1950s, the pattern of urban-rural differentials 
has changed, from almost no difference to a large divergence. Total fertility rates in 1950 
were 5.3 and 5.29 for urban and rural areas respectively, but 1.5 and 2.8 in 1982.
First two periods: 1950-54 and 1955-58. Both urban and rural fertility during these 
two periods rose steadily to a level around 6.^Likely reason/for the increase, apart from A
those mentioned before, are that the land reform of 1950-51 redistributed land to previous^
\
landless peasants and tenant farmers, thus they needed more family labour to work it and 
subsequently to inherit that land, and they would be able to feed more children from their 
newly acquired land, as suggested by Kane (1987:154). In these two periods, the urban 
fertility was virtually as high as the rural, and there were only minor differences. The 
high urban fertility level was certainly affected by rapid urban expansion in these two 
periods, as the overwhelming majority of the new immigrants to the towns and cities 
were young adults who included the most fertile age groups of the female population. 
Such a high urban fertility could also be affected by the government’s pronatalist policy 
in this period, therefore, urban fertility was mainly a natural pattern. Although birth 
control was promoted in some urban areas, as Lavely and Freedman’s study (1990:366) 
also found the evidence suggests that urban residents started to limit family size, and this 
was initiated by rising level of health and education, but with little help from the 
government. After all, the propaganda was mainly oriented towards women and 
children’s health concerns, thus the effects on urban fertility were negligible.
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Table 5.2 Total fertility rates(TFR) and total duration marital fertility 
rates(TDMFR) 1945-86: Urban and rural China
Year
Urban Rural
TFR TDMFR TFR TDMFR
1945 4.439 4.947 4.842 5.190
1946 4.786 5.379 5.043 5.405
1947 4.952 5.540 5.250 5.617
1948 4.801 5.335 4.928 5.259
1949 5.512 6.059 5.543 5.874
1950 5.300 5.762 5.290 5.560
1951 5.136 5.588 5.289 5.549
1952 5.683 6.228 6.038 6.342
1953 5.510 6.044 5.705 6.016
1954 6.041 6.631 5.935 6.280
1955 5.670 6.242 6.048 6.403
1956 5.403 5.987 5.651 5.996
1957 6.165 6.824 6.213 6.623
1958 5.452 6.053 5.506 5.897
1959 4.360 4.910 4.204 4.530
1960 4.195 4.760 3.940 4.266
1961 3.130 3.593 3.313 3.591
1962 4.911 5.642 6.200 6.669
1963 6.341 7.241 7.645 8.176
1964 4.416 5.151 6.496 6.969
1965 3.779 4.485 6.526 7.057
1966 3.101 3.785 6.905 7.544
1967 2.899 3.635 5.776 6.378
1968 3.797 4.764 6.938 7.669
1969 3.301 4.060 6.196 6.843
1970 3.216 3.966 6.313 6.989
1971 2.831 3.500 5.963 6.649
1972 2.589 3.294 5.430 6.144
1973 2.362 3.132 4.975 5.776
1974 1.944 2.762 4.623 5.506
1975 1.759 2.610 3.966 4.833
1976 1.604 2.385 3.605 4.481
1977 1.571 2.301 3.143 3.977
1978 1.575 2.275 3.001 3.848
1979 1.401 1.952 3.100 3.934
1980 1.196 1.523 2.563 3.111
1981 1.474 1.630 2.988 3.413
1982 1.500 1.478 2.860 3.299
1986 1.925 2.606
During the 1959-196l^This period was characterised by a huge drop in both urban
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and rural fertility. The pattern of fertility decline among the urban population was similar 
to the rural one and indicates that both rural and urban populations were affected by the 
‘Great Leap Forward’ and national famine at that time. Because food consumption for 
the urban population was usually guaranteed, they suffered somewhat less food from 
shortage during this period. As a consequence, urban fertility, though generally lower 
than rural, dropped only moderately to a trough in 1961. The drop in rural fertility, 
however, was dramatic.
Figure 5.1 Total fertility rates(TFR) and total duration marital 
fertility rates(TDMFR) 1945-86: Urban and rural China
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During 1962-66, socio-economic development returned to normal, with consumption 
levels improving, and the TFR rose to peak values of 6.3 and 7.6 for urban and rural 
areas respectively in 1963, the highest for both since 1949. The urban population suffered 
relatively less in the early period of the disturbance, but the rural population recovered 
much earlier and more rapidly. The government started to implement a birth control
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programme focused on the urban population in this period. The response to it was such 
that the urban TFR experienced a sharp reduction from 4.4 to 3.1 in three years from 
1964 to 1966. Caldwell and Srinivasan (1984:75) believed that apart from the government 
policy, the timing of urban fertility decline here was also explained by socio-economic 
change and owed much to the increasing availability to women of jobs and incomes 
outside the home. But this was much less true in the rural areas. It was from this period 
that a substantial difference between urban and rural fertility emerged and urban fertility 
transition began.
Urban-rural fertility differentials became wider in the period of 1967-69. The rural 
TFR declined slightly from the peak level of previous years, which can be regarded as 
a ‘catch-up’ offset for the 1959-61 crisis, to return to a normal and relatively high stable 
level. In urban areas existing networks for manufacturing and distributing contraceptives 
were disrupted by the ‘Cultural Revolution’. However, because some urban residents 
might continue their birth control practice privately and normal family life suffered severe 
disturbance as a consequence of most urban people taking part in this highly disruptive 
movement, urban fertility kept declining in this period.
During the period of 1970-78, a significant fertility decline was mainly contributed 
by birth control practices in rural areas. Although both urban and rural living conditions 
saw virtually no improvement, and they may even have worsened in many rural areas, 
the nationwide family planning programme went into effect in rural areas from 1971 and 
resumed in urban areas. The fertility declined from 3.2 to 1.5 and from 6.3 to 3.0 for 
urban and rural women respectively in this period. In addition, a large number of urban 
youths, almost all of the students who graduated from middle schools in urban areas
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during the 1969-75, about 17 million in total, were sent to the countryside,3 which led 
to postponement of marriage among urban youths, another cause of decline in fertility.
The TFR in both urban and rural areas declined to another two troughs of 1.2 and 
2.5 in 1980 after the ‘One Child’ campaign was launched. However, a difference between 
these two divisions may reflect not only timing factors, but also a different degree of 
difficulty in the implementation of the policy, (Croll et al. 1985:34, Kane 1987:193-203, 
Feeney et al. 1989:298). After the 1980 economic reform, overall consumption levels 
rose dramatically in both urban and rural areas. The TFR also showed an unexpected 
increase in urban areas and a much less than expected decrease in rural areas, given that 
the ‘One Child’ policy was still being carried on officially. Besides major nationwide 
factors for both areas, such as a marriage boom and a relaxation of birth control efforts 
and controls on age at first marriage in 1981, a change in the definition and measurement 
of "urban” also contributed to inflation of urban TFR estimates. As a consequence of this 
change, a large proportion of previously rural residents was counted as urban population. 
This is shown in an implausible statistic: according to the official definitions, the 
proportion of urban population rose from 20.2% in 1981 to 41.4% in 1986.4
Demographic transitions began in the urban section first, creating a gap which 
diminished as urban behaviour diffused into rural areas. Whyte and Parish (1984:159- 
166) stress that education, shortage of housing, and work involvement of wives played 
powerful roles in urban fertility decline, as in rural areas without such powerful 
programmes. Whyte and Gu (1987:479) also suggested that urban China presented an
3Zhao Weigang and Yu Huilin 1983: Changes of Women’s Age at First Marriage since the Liberation, 
in the special issue of Population and Economy, Beijing.
4State Statistical Bureau 1989: 1988 China Statistical Yearbook, Beijing, p97.
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environment decidedly favourable to low fertility. In addition, there is mounting evidence 
that China’s most recent de facto fertility policy permits only one child in urban areas but 
two in rural. If this policy continues, it will produce different demographic structures for 
rural and urban populations. The urban-rural differential in the age pattern of fertility 
seems unlikely to diminish as long as current policies continue.
1.4 Differentials in marital fertility
Estimated marital fertility rates in 1950-54 for urban and rural China, along with 
other marital fertility schedules for Chinese farmers, Taiwan, Japan, Canada, and 
England, are shown in Table 5.3. Women of Taiwan Hai-shan, a native region, where 
more than three-fourths of the surveyed population were tenant farmers, seems to have 
enjoyed slightly higher fertility than their mainland counterparts, particularly for age 
group 15-19. The substantial higher marital fertility at 15-19 among Hai-shan women 
could have resulted from their earlier marriage pattern and entering into reproductive age 
earlier than mainland women. The practice termed ‘minor marriage’ by Wolf, in which 
the bride was adopted at an early age and reared by her future husband’s family, was 
counted at more than 50% before 1931-35 in the survey, while it was much less popular 
on the mainland. The prevalent minor marriage pattern implies an earlier marriage 
pattern among the Hai-shan at that time. The data in Wolf’s study (1984:453-457) show 
that marital fertility at 15-19 for Hai-shan women was above 0.245 before 1920, and 
above 0.310 between 1920 and 1945. When Coale (1984b:474) compared fertility data 
for Hai-shan with adjusted fertility rates of Chinese farmers in 1929-31, he suggested that 
such a very high fertility at 15-19 was not ordinarily found in a very early marrying 
population, thus it could be the result of somewhat higher incidence of adolescent
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subfecundity among the Chinese farmers, or some form of minor bias in the Taiwan data. 
The extended comparison here, after adding fertility schedules from the 1/1000 survey 
and Wolf’s survey, further confirms Coale’s suggestion that such a high fertility at 15-19 
was exceptional among Chinese.
Table 5.3 Marital fertility rates in selected noncontracepting populations
Urban1 Rural2 Farmer3 Wolf’s4 Taiwan5 Canada6 England7 Japan8
Age 1950-54 1950-54 1929-31 1920s-60s 1931-35 1700-30 1560-1629 1925
15-19 0.243 0.215 0.174 0.255 0.336 0.493 0.412 0.325
20-24 0.311 0.305 0.287 0.309 0.311 0.509 0.467 0.340
25-29 0.282 0.292 0.272 0.308 0.291 0.495 0.403 0.297
30-34 0.225 0.258 0.233 0.264 0.259 0.484 0.369 0.253
35-39 0.148 0.201 0.171 0.189 0.188 0.410 0.302 0.196
40-44 0.063 0.103 0.086 0.076 0.096 0.231 0.174 0.088
1-2, China urban and rural marital fertility rates in 1950-54, estimated by dividing ever-married fertility rates 
by average ratios of current married to ever married women in 1929-31 and 1982 (see Table 3.12). 3, Adjusted 
farmer’ marital fertility from the Farm Survey in 1929-31, from Barclay et al. (1976:614). 4, China rural 
marital fertility, from Wolfs retrospective fertility survey in 1981, see Wolf(1984:459). 5, Marital fertility rates 
for Hai-shan women, Taiwan, from Wolf (1984:455). 6-7, Marital fertility for Canada(1700-1930) and 
England(Colyton, marriage 1670-1769), from Leridon(1977:107-108). 8, Marital fertility rates for Japan in 
1925, from Kobayashi et al.(1963:22).
Mainland farmers’ fertility in 1929-31, even after adjustment by Barclay et al., still
shows as lowest of all. At that time they were in a relatively peaceful and stable period
V
in the/history, but civil wars between warlords, and between communists and nationalists , 
still took place locally, short-term events like floods and droughts occurred from place 
to place when the farmer survey was carried out. Urban marital fertility of young age 
groups in 1950-54 was understandably slightly higher, but not for the older age groups, 
which may be the consequence of some older urban women having started practising birth 
control already. Wolf’s (1984:457) survey respondents also had relative high marital 
fertility; those women were bom between 1896 and 1927, but 82% after 1910, and 47% 
after 1920. Although their childbearing years were cross-cut by the Japanese War, the 
civil war, even the crisis of Great Leap Forward, the major part was during the peaceful
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period after 1949, and thus could have a slightly higher level of fertility. More important, 
information from this kind of retrospective survey may suffer a selectivity bias, as these 
elderly women were survivors who were probably healthier and stronger as young women 
than their deceased peers, and thus may not be fully representative of their cohort. In 
general, the pattern and level of 1950-54 marital fertility, as constructed from the 1/1000 
Fertility Survey here, were astonishingly close to those derived from the other sources, 
as was demonstrated in Figure 5.2(a). The underlying similarity of marital fertility 
between data constructed from the 1/1000 Survey in this study and that from the other 
sources, such as accurately recorded data from Taiwan’s and Wolf’s surveys, again 
confirms that constructed ever married fertility from truncated information (before 1964) 
of the 1/1000 Survey is rather robust.
Figure 5.2 Chinese urban and rural marital fertility 1950-54
a: Comparing historically b: Comparing internationally
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In contrast, the marital fertility differences between noncontracepting Chinese
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populations in this century and noncontracepting European populations in earlier centuries 
were substantial and significant. The difference was even greater when compared with 
Canada’s population in the eighteenth century, which was originally from Europe (see 
Figure 5.2(b)). The possibilities leading to this differential have already been discussed 
in the last chapter. Meanwhile, note that the age structure of the different marital fertility 
schedules is comparable from age 15 to age 44, with the implication that all of these 
populations were essentially subject to ‘natural’ fertility and not characterized by a high 
degree of voluntary control through the practice of contraception or abortion. Such a low 
level of Chinese ‘natural’ fertility was also found by Coale et al. (1979:108-110), who 
indicated that marital fertility in Central Asia of the Soviet Union in the early part of this 
century was very low and very close to that of Chinese farmers in 1929-31 and Koreans 
in 1930. Here, again, the Japanese fertility schedule in 1925 was also close to Chinese 
fertility, although the fertility level of young age groups was higher. The shape of age 
structure of the Japanese fertility after age 20-24 also showed a little steeper than that of 
others and dropped slightly to a level almost identical to that of rural Chinese in 1950-54 
(see Figure 5.3b). This may imply a minor proportion of practising birth control among 
the older Japanese women similar to the situation in urban China during 1950-54. Thus 
the age patterns of these two fertility schedules were closest, although the level of 
Japanese fertility was consistently higher over all age groups than that of urban Chinese, 
and the underlying similarity is again evident.
According to Peng’s estimate (1991:145), during the period 1954-1981, the urban 
Total Marital Fertility Rate (TMFR) declined by 56%, against 41% in the rural areas. 
The general trends of fertility within marriage were similar to those of total fertility. 
There were minor urban-rural differences in the TDMFR in the 1950s (see Table 5.2),
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but during the period of 1959-66, the fluctuation of TDMFR in the rural population was 
more severe. Urban marital fertility started to decline in the mid-1960s and suffered a 
setback in the early phase of the ‘Cultural Revolution’. Since the early 1970s a sustained 
fertility decline has occurred in both urban and rural areas.
Figure 5.3 Age specific ever-married fertility rates 1950-1986
a: Urban China b: Rural China
Legend: m 15-19; + 20-24; ♦ 25-29; * 30-34; x 35-39; ▼ 40 -4 4 .
Age specific marital fertility experienced a substantial increase among all age groups 
in both areas, especially among younger married cohorts before the period of 1962-66 
(see Figure 5.3). During the periods of demographic disturbances in 1959-61 and 1962- 
66, the fluctuation of marital fertility among the whole urban population and older groups 
of rural population was less severe. Historical evidence shows that famine-induced 
separation and divorce rates rose sharply in some rural areas during the crisis period,5 
Moreover, separation must have happened with one partner moving away to find a job 
and food for the family. Grain supplies for the urban population also declined in this
5 See X. Peng 1987: Demographic Consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China’s Provinces, 
Population and Development Review 13, No. 4, pp.639-670.
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period, especially in 1961. But per capita grain availability for urban residents never 
reached the same low level as for the rural population. Food shortage was much more 
severe in the rural than in the urban areas.
Total marital fertility started to decline around 1967-1969 and 1970-78 for urban and 
rural respectively. Before the 1967-69 period a general move towards higher fertility 
among younger urban married women was evident, while a similar rise was found among 
almost all rural age groups. The propaganda of family planning began ten years earlier 
in urban (1960s) than in rural areas (1970s), and in some metropolitan cities such as 
Shanghai as early as the 1950s. The data show that the trend towards lower fertility in 
urban areas among older women(age 40-44) before 1970 was mainly due to those women 
practising birth control and thus the trend of fertility of this age group was towards a 
substantially lower level.
A sharp increase in marital fertility among age group 15-19 occurred in both areas 
from 1979-1981 to 1986. General consensus on the causes of this rising marital fertility, 
particularly in the middle of the 1980s, such as studies by Zeng et al. (1991:436-437) and 
Feeney et al. (1993:74), were a marriage boom with a relaxation of restrictions on both 
age at first marriage and the one child policy, and perhaps an increase in pre-marital 
conceptions. Particularly, the one-child policy was relatively strict in urban areas and 
more relaxed in rural areas (Feeney et al. 1989:298). In addition, economic incentives 
to have more children, and the weakening of the local administrator’s authority to enforce 
family planning policy following the economic reforms, have also been advanced as 
contributory factors in rural areas, suggested by many studies, such as Croll et al. 
(1985:57-61), Whyte and Gu (1987:472), and Kaufman et al. (1989:727).
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1.5 Differentials in natural fertility
It is a common approach to the description of a demographic phenomenon to 
consider its level and its trend over some time dimension. Such an approach can usefully 
be applied to the study of natural fertility. Here, we have the indices of M and m 
estimated from original Coale-Trussell’s model and its adjusted version: they are 
presented in Table 5.4 and 5.5 for marriage cohorts of 33 years for urban and rural 
China respectively. The estimated results from the two versions of the model are quite 
consistent, and in both versions an increasing trend is evident in all periods before the 
1970s, except for the crisis period of 1959-61. For the periods of 1940-44 and 1945-49, 
again, when we plot the duration marital fertility rates (DMFR) of 0-4 years marriage 
from 1940 to 1978 with M in Figure 5.4, it shows good consistency in changes in DMFR 
and M in all periods before 1962-66, when China’s fertility was mainly a natural pattern. 
It certainly raises the possibility that the underlying level of natural fertility, M, rose in 
both populations substantially in the 1940s, although the real level of M in this period 
remains unknown.
The general increases in marital fertility among younger married women in both areas 
are reflected in the substantial increase in M in successive marriage cohorts before the 
1970s in both versions of the model. Similarly, Figure 5.3 shows a shift in the age 
pattern of marital fertility towards a decline with age during the periods 1967-69 and 
1970-78 for urban and rural respectively, indicating of a difference in the timing of the 
beginning of family limitation. After 1970 the national family planning campaigns took 
place, rural marital fertility, following decline in the urban areas, began to drop as well.
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This reduction in fertility also included the younger age groups. However, urban young 
married women still showed more controlled fertility schedules. This feature, as we 
discussed in Chapter 4, is not captured by Coale and Trussed’s original model. Naturally 
the estimates of underlying level of natural fertility, M, by the original model can be 
considerably underestimated. Thus they are unable to reflect the facts fully, leading to 
unrealistic results in Tables 5.5 and 5.6: values of M were much lower in urban areas 
than in rural, and it dropped in urban areas after 1979. In fact, actual income level, 
nutritional status from food supply, accommodation conditions, medical service, and 
social welfare are much better in urban areas, and were substantially improved after 1979 
due to socio-economic development and cultural change in both areas. All of these 
changes are likely to result in a higher level in natural fertility in urban areas over time, 
but a rise in natural fertility rather than a decline in the both areas after 1979.
Figure 5.4 Duration (0-4 years of first marriage) marital fertility rates 
(multiplied by 2.5) and index of the underlying level of natural fertility 
M(v2) 1940-81: Urban and rural China
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Table 5.4 Index of underlying level of natural fertility(M), and index of fertility 
control(m) by marriage cohort and by adjusted Coale-Trussell’s model (v2)
1950-86, and Lavely’s estimates 1951-81: Urban and rural China
Marriage
Cohort
Urban Rural
M m M m
50-54 0.762 0.504 0.685 0.145
55-58 0.829 0.497 0.708 0.154
59-61 0.680 0.783 0.473 0.170
62-66 0.825 0.645 0.819 0.140
67-69 0.827 1.502 0.799 0.180
70-78 0.914 1.776 0.757 0.510
79-81 1.018 2.955 0.864 1.495
1986 1.035 2.879 0.960 2.012
Lavely’s estimate
51-55 0.76 0.38 0.68 0.03
59-61 0.60 0.52 0.49 0.17
62-66 0.82 0.71 0.84 0.14
71-75 1.01 2.10 0.78 0.49
76-78 1.32 3.28 0.76 1.25
79-81 1.54 4.23 0.89 1.94
* Five-year age groups of marital fertility from 20-24 to 40-44 are used in the estimation, suggested by Coale 
and Trussell (1978:204). Lavely’s estimates are from Lavely (1986:425). * The goodness of fit by adjusted 
model are present in Table 5.5, because they are the same as those from the original CT model
Table 5.5 Index of underlying level of fertility(M), by marriage cohort and by
original Coale-Trussell’s model(vl) 1950-86: Urban and rural China
Marriage
Cohort
underlying level of fertility(M) Goodness of fit(R2)
Urban Rural Urban Rural
50-54 0.710 0.685 0.960 0.921
55-58 0.773 0.708 0.953 0.956
59-61 0.609 0.473 0.955 0.839
62-66 0.754 0.819 0.998 0.878
67-69 0.715 0.799 0.976 0.927
70-78 0.713 0.757 0.979 0.976
79-81 0.766 0.864 0.954 0.953
1986 0.693 0.960 0.998 0.985
Restriction: the five-year age groups from 20-24 to 40-44 are used in the estimation. * The estimates of m by 
original model are present in Table 5.4, because they are the same as those from the adjusted CT model.
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Comparing Lavely’s estimates, the two sets of M are very close until 1962-66 for the 
urban and 1971-75 for the rural. The divergence started to grow during the 1970s, and 
accelerated in the 1980s, particular by for the urban section. As I pointed out in Chapter 
2, using the age range 23-40 of ASMFR to estimate M, as Lavely’s study did, will 
systematically feed through an upward bias, and this bias is minor when the degree of 
birth control m is relatively insignificant, such as in his rural estimates, but it will 
become severe for his urban estimates after the 1970s. However, the upward bias in 
Lavely’s study has been minimised, as it applied the original v(a) schedule without 
adjustment, which assumes no birth control among ages 20 to 24. As we demonstrated 
before, this would result in a downward bias in estimating M, and thus offset the upward 
bias. For his rural estimates, the upward bias was minor due to a relatively small m and 
therefore offset more by the downward bias. For his urban estimates, the upward bias 
had been diminished by the downward bias but is still substantial. As a consequence, the 
urban M estimates for 1971-75 were significantly greater than that from all European 
historical populations and modem Asian populations selected and estimated by Knodel 
(1977:228), and Barclay et al. (1976:615).
Table 5.6 Change in index of underlying level of natural fertility (M)
by marriage cohort 1950-86: Urban and mral China
Marriage Cohort
Adjusted Model Original Model
Urban Rural Urban Rural
1950-54/1955-58 0.067 0.023 0.063 0.022
1955-58/1959-61 -0.149 -0.235 -0.164 -0.231
1959-61/1962-66 0.145 0.346 0.145 0.341
1962-66/1967-70 0.002 -0.020 -0.039 0.023
1967-70/1971-78 0.087 -0.042 -0.002 -0.075
1971-78/1979-81 0.104 0.107 0.053 -0.004
1979-81/1986 0.017 0.096 -0.073 0.023
1950-54/1986 0.273 0.275 -0.017 0.053
As we mentioned before, pre-nuptial pregnancies leading to post-nuptial births could 
artificially inflate marital fertility at ages where newly-weds make up a large proportion 
of married women. Then the inflated marital fertility leads to M being overestimated. 
Table 5.7 again reflects the fact that extremely low proportions of women engaged in pre­
nuptial sexual activities. Less than three percent of urban Chinese brides were pregnant 
on the day of the wedding, and less than two percent in mral areas. On average, urban 
areas had a slightly higher level with a more rapid rise than mral areas. This suggests 
that sexual activity outside marriage as a cultural taboo might be slightly less restricted 
in the urban environment. Despite lack of statistical data, there was growing evidence of 
premarital sexual behaviour in both areas from the later 1970s and perhaps much more 
in the 1980s, especially in urban areas. However, the absolute proportion of pregnant 
brides in both areas was well below 5%— a much lower level than in many other 
countries. Thus the influence on M value contributed by the pre-marital pregnancies is 
negligible (see Chapter 4).
Table 5.7 Proportion(%) of births occurring in 0-7 and 8-11 months of 
first marriage by marriage cohort 1950-75: Urban and mral China
Marriage
Cohort
Urban Rural
0-7 8-11 0-7 8-11
50-54 1.02 20.31 1.16 12.41
55-58 1.59 23.49 0.92 13.33
59-61 1.31 20.51 0.72 8.52
62-66 1.49 31.28 1.14 17.09
67-69 1.90 37.47 1.33 22.93
70-75 2.67 37.70 1.46 23.22
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1.6 Differentials in fecundabilitv
In Table 5.7, the proportion of first births occurring within eight to eleven months 
of first marriage increased both in urban and rural areas significantly and dramatically. 
Again, these proportions allow us to apply the Bongaarts’ model, as adjusted by Knodel 
and Wilson, to estimate the fecundability levels(FB) for the urban and rural areas from 
1940 to 1975. After 1975 they remain unknown, as the published data from the 1986 In- 
Depth Fertility Survey fail to provide information on birth intervals by urban and rural 
divisions. In Table 5.8 we present mean fecundability from 1940 to 1975 based on 
Bongaarts’ model for urban and rural China respectively, and plot the three-year moving 
average trend in Figure 5.5,
The level of fecundability in rural China was extremely low, as confirmed by Coale 
et al. (1988:18). There was also a wider and growing difference in level of mean 
fecundability between urban and rural areas, as a result of urban fecundability rising 
faster than rural. Similar evidence was found from Taiwan in 1962, that women from 
non-farmer families had a substantially higher fecundability than those from farmer 
families. Besides nutritional and socio-economic reasons, there are three other possible 
reasons for such low levels of fecundability in rural areas: (1) The traditional arranged 
marriage pattern was much more popular in rural areas than in urban, thus sexual 
behaviour among couples could be expected to be more limited at the beginning of 
marriage in the rural areas (See Chapter 8). (2) The mean age at first marriage was about 
two years younger for the rural population than that for the urban population (see Table 
5.13), which means that rural brides were often in a lower reproductive status than their
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urban counterparts. On the other hand, rural women, who on average married earlier, 
may have low fertility at comparable ages because of reduced coitus frequency with 
longer marriage duration and loss of reproductive capacity with higher parity, as 
suggested by Lavely and Freedman (1990:359). (3) Something may also be related to the 
practice called "delayed transfer marriage" in rural areas like Huian county in Fujian 
province, suggested by some studies such as Coale et al.(1988:20). In such marriages, 
the bride returns to her parental home after one night with the groom. Visits occur only 
on special occasions for a year, or longer. After the woman becomes pregnant, or 
certainly after the birth of the first child, the couple live together. To the author’s best 
knowledge, this form of marriage does exist in a few areas, such as in Huian county, but 
is very limited, and is now close to being extinct. The reasons discussed above may 
account for some urban-rural difference in fecundability, but more fundamental, I 
believe, are the differences in coital frequency and length of breastfeeding.
Table 5.8 Mean fecundability (FB) by marriage cohorts 1940-75: Urban and rural China
Marriage
Cohort
Urban Rural Marriage
Cohort
Urban Rural
1940 0.054 0.040 1958 0.102 0.044
1941 0.064 0.039 1959 0.103 0.041
1942 0.045 0.043 1960 0.083 0.031
1943 0.067 0.041 1961 0.108 0.052
1944 0.068 0.044 1962 0.142 0.073
1945 0.056 0.043 1963 0.171 0.084
1946 0.083 0.049 1964 0.161 0.077
1947 0.075 0.042 1965 0.152 0.090
1948 0.072 0.052 1966 0.187 0.084
1949 0.084 0.049 1967 0.205 0.106
1950 0.087 0.045 1968 0.211 0.118
1951 0.092 0.060 1969 0.195 0.108
1952 0.087 0.064 1970 0.191 0.101
1953 0.108 0.061 1971 0.191 0.103
1954 0.110 0.067 1972 0.196 0.094
1955 0.109 0.064 1973 0.191 0.114
1956 0.110 0.072 1974 0.256 0.128
1957 0.133 0.074 1975 0.203 0.138
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In any event, a substantial rise in both areas after the 1940 marriage cohorts, 
especially after 1960, is evident. Fecundability rose slightly during the mid-1940s, just 
after the Japanese War ended, then worsened again with the outbreak of the Civil War. 
Among the mid-1940s cohorts, the urban-rural differential in mean fecundability was 
minor around 0.02-0.03. It then increased substantially from 0.03 for women married in 
1950 to 0.06 in 1957, which indicates that fecundability rose more quickly in urban than 
in rural areas. There was a predictable trough for those married during the crisis of 1958- 
60 in both areas, while fecundability suffered more severe and longer damage in rural 
areas. Finally, a substantial increase occurred in both areas during the 1970s. The total 
rise amounted to 300 and 200 percent for the urban and rural areas respectively during 
the thirty-five years, and the difference also reached its highest level among the 1970s 
cohorts.
Figure 5.5 Mean fecundability (three-year moving average) by 
marriage cohort 1941-75: Urban and rural China
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The growing gap between urban and rural fecundability over time may be due to 
differences in marriage and breastfeeding practices. Freer mate selection and courtship, 
typical of the urban population, could shorten the interval between marriage and first 
birth by increasing coitus frequency after marriage. For later births, Lavely suggested 
(1986:430), apart from marriage, breastfeeding durations in urban areas might also 
matter, as they were probably much shorter in urban areas, where powdered milk was 
available earlier and more women were employed. This suggestion is confirmed by this 
study later. Three months more of urban-rural difference in breastfeeding duration have 
remained since the 1960s. However, breastfeeding could not affect the time taken to 
conceive for the first time.
The impact of the increase in fecundability on the interval between marriage and first 
birth can be seen in Table 5.9 and Figure 5.6a, where the observed mean first intervals 
for the urban and rural areas are given together with mean second birth interval. The 
observed mean length of first interval fell from 31 and 34 months to 16 and 20 months 
for the urban and rural areas respectively between the 1940 cohort and the later 1970s 
cohorts, and the difference in mean first birth interval between urban and rural 
populations was growing wider after the 1930s and reached a peak during the crisis 
period of 1959-61. The shortening trend of early birth intervals continued until the later 
1980s in rural areas, but only up to the early 1980s in urban areas and even reversed to 
rise instead slightly afterwards, which led to not much difference in the first birth interval 
according to types of residence during 1981-87. This convergence is due to a reversing 
trend on the urban side and seems more likely to suggest that urban birth control 
behaviour spread from after to before the first birth in the middle of the 1980s, rather 
than a convergence of relevant behaviour and/or conditions between urban and rural
174
areas, as suggested by Feeney and Wang (1993:74).
Table 5.9 Mean length(months) of the first and second birth intervals by year of first 
marriage and first birth respectively 1935-87: Urban and rural China
Year
Urban Rural
1st 2nd 1st 2nd
1935 30.86 37.25 34.77 35.68
1936 30.73 33.80 34.01 34.54
1937 31.68 37.41 34.72 35.32
1938 30.69 34.93 34.62 35.23
1939 31.26 34.40 34.55 35.47
1940 30.96 35.72 33.98 36.14
1941 30.42 36.17 34.52 35.81
1942 31.07 34.32 34.49 36.58
1943 30.11 35.54 33.66 35.36
1944 29.25 33.36 33.41 35.42
1945 28.11 34.23 32.45 35.02
1946 28.26 34.48 31.55 35.12
1947 26.96 33.64 31.77 35.15
1948 26.51 33.28 30.92 34.36
1949 26.10 32.69 30.72 34.59
1950 25.67 33.93 30.22 34.50
1951 24.62 32.23 27.53 32.84
1952 23.78 31.96 27.15 33.29
1953 22.49 29.86 26.50 33.33
1954 23.39 31.29 26.65 34.15
1955 21.76 31.05 27.08 35.76
1956 21.70 33.08 27.06 38.48
1957 23.31 34.45 31.25 43.66
1958 26.23 36.39 35.76 42.92
1959 25.21 36.28 34.05 38.59
1960 24.61 34.34 31.20 35.49
1961 21.67 31.89 26.32 31.37
1962 20.36 32.36 24.82 29.69
1963 20.71 32.99 24.74 30.29
1964 19.68 33.92 25.03 31.31
1965 20.29 33.56 23.90 30.99
1966 19.51 29.92 23.37 30.17
1967 17.56 30.63 21.94 29.78
1968 17.61 31.60 21.72 30.05
1969 18.47 33.78 21.82 30.36
1970 18.16 34.44 22.32 30.24
1971 17.90 35.40 22.12 30.66
1972 17.11 35.79 22.22 30.88
1973 17.60 36.94 20.83 30.71
1974 15.88 20.36
1975-80 16.00 44.161 20.00 33.361
1981-83 15.72 50.04 16.72 36.12
1984-87 16.68 53.43 15.84 38.40
Note: Information for both birth intervals from 1935 to 1974 are from the 1/1000 Survey, first interval of the 1975-80 is 
based on the In-depth Survey. Information for first birth interval after 1980 and second interval after 1973 is periodical 
average from annual estimates in Feeney and Wang(1993:73,77) based on information from the 2/1000 Survey. 1, 1974-80.
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The trend of the interval between first and second births is presented in Table 5.9 
and Figure 5.6, and to avoid bias due to data truncation, only the data from the 1/1000 
Survey for 1935-73 are used to guarantee that those women who had second birth 
intervals as long as nine years could be included in the estimation. Compared with the 
first birth interval, the second kept more steady, though a substantial decline is still 
obvious in both areas, with falls from about 36 months in the 1940 first birth cohort to 
30 months at the middle of 1960s cohorts in both areas. After that, it rose steadily in the 
1970s and accelerated in the 1980s in the urban areas, while in the rural areas it remained 
unchanged in the early 1970s and picked up afterwards. The observed lengthening of 
birth intervals is likely to reflect mainly the influence of the ‘Later-Longer-Less’ policy 
rather than conditions being less favourable to fecundability.
Figure 5.6 Mean length(months) of the first two birth intervals by year of first 
marriage and first birth respectively 1930-80/74: Urban and rural China
a: First birth interval (1930-1980) b: Second birth interval (1930-1974)
A most noticeable feature is a minor difference in mean length of second birth 
interval between the urban and the rural areas before the 1970s. (See Figure 5.6b) 
However, the mean length of second interval of the urban population is only about one
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month shorter in the 1940s and three months shorter in the 1950s, but two months longer 
in the 1960s. This is because of a dramatic rise in second interval among the urban 
population, probably due to the much earlier urban family planning campaigns of the 
1960s, almost one decade ahead of mral China. Another measure proposed by G. Feeney 
and J. Yu (1987:82-83), period parity progression for urban China, shows similar trends. 
Progression ratios from first to second birth began to decline in 1963 in urban areas, 
whereas they remained quite stable in rural China until 1979. Taken altogether, a 
substantial decrease in second birth interval occurred in both areas and may be affected 
by a rise in fecundability.
1.7 Differentials in breastfeeding
From the overall results provided by the analysis of the WFS,6 with a few 
exceptions, it was clear that urban women breastfed for shorter durations than their rural 
counterparts, a situation which occurred in nearly every country. In Table 5.10 we 
present the mean length of breastfeeding by year the birth occurred and by urban-rural 
divisions from the information of the 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey, which is estimated 
from the distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding by the year the 
births occurred and the mother’s current age. Apparently, the average duration of 
breastfeeding in the two areas stayed more or less same as before, at 14 and 17.6 months 
respectively, until the middle of the 1970s, then declined dramatically to 8.5 and 12.6 
months respectively. Compared with other countries based on the WFS and DHS 
(Demographic and Health Survey), the pre-1970s pattern here shared similarity with other 
developing countries in Asia, the Pacific and Africa, which showed about 14 months, and
6 Benoit Ferry and David P. Smith 1983: Breastfeeding Differentials, Comparative Studies, No. 23, 
(WFS).
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18 months for urban and rural respectively in retrospective data, while the European 
population (Portugal) only had 1.4 and 1.8 months of duration for urban and rural areas 
separately. More details are available in studies by Trussell et al. (1992:300).
Table 5.10 Mean length (months) of breastfeeding and proportion of children 
without breastfeeding by year the births occurred 1960s-1982: Urban and 
rural areas (three regions as a whole)
Year Mean length No BF(%) Women
Urban
-1967 14.20 4.36 2063
1968-72 13.60 6.16 1444
1973-77 14.30 6.99 1158
1978-82 8.50 10.15 1330
Rural
-1967 17.50 0.56 4755
1968-72 17.50 1.11 4759
1973-77 18.00 1.59 4730
1978-82 12.60 1.62 4744
♦based on the distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding and confined to children 
born at least three years before, and excluding children who died before age two.
Table 5.11 Mean length(months) of breastfeeding and proportion of 
children without breastfeeding by mother’s current age: Urban and 
rural areas (three regions as a whole)
Mother’s Age Mean Length No BF(%) Women
Urban
< 30 7.60 7.64 301
30-39 11.80 7.04 2315
40+ 14.00 6.18 3379
Rural
< 30 11.90 1.41 1838
30-39 16.10 1.47 8840
40+ 17.80 0.92 8274
♦based on the distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding and confined to 
children born at least three years before, and excluding children who died before age two.
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Figure 5.7 Children’s breastfeeding 1960s-82: Urban and rural areas
(three regions as a whole)
I. The mean length (months) of breastfeeding
a: By year the births occurred b: By mother’s current age
The proportion of children who were not breastfed (%)
By year the births occurred d: By mother’s current age
Meanwhile the proportion of children who were never breastfed rose steadily from 
4.36% and 0.56% to 10.15% and 1.62% for the two areas respectively, though this 
proportion was always very low in rural areas. The urban-rural differentials in the mean 
length of breastfeeding and the proportion of non-breastfed children are very significant. 
A four month differential in the mean length of breastfeeding was consistent over time, 
while the differential in the proportion of non-breastfed children widened from less than 
4% to over 8%. This might be due to an urban-rural differential in the momentum of
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improving education and employment opportunities for women, and an earlier 
fundamental change in the socio-economic structure and ideology in urban China after 
1978.
1.8 Differentials in primary sterility
Marriage of women remains essentially universal and voluntary childlessness has been 
virtually non-existent in China, the differences by type of residence are negligible. This 
statement is confirmed up to most recent times by Feeney and Wang (1993:68-71). In 
these circumstances, the proportion of married women who had no live birth can be taken 
as an approximate value of primary sterility. The assumptions on intra-uterine mortality 
and marriage stability are the same as before. Data from the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey 
show that in 1982 the proportion of women aged 35-49 remaining in marital unions 
created by first marriage was 92.5 and 88.3 for urban and rural populations respectively. 
The higher proportion in urban areas may reflect the fact that the life expectancy of the 
urban population is higher than that of their rural counterparts. Among ever married 
women aged 15-49, only 0.73% and 0.19% were reportedly currently divorced for urban 
and rural populations respectively. This suggests that rural women are more likely to stay 
in marriage than urban females.
The data from the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey and the 1987 One-Percent Population 
Survey presented in Table 5.12 are the proportions of ever married women with no live 
birth by age group and type of residence in the two surveys. A fecund woman should 
have children when she has sufficient time in marriage. The proportions of married 
women with no live birth in Table 5.12 reached a trough at age groups 40-44 and 35-39
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for urban and rural respectively. It is very likely that married women were generally 
infecund when they never had a live birth by age 44 for urban women or 39 for rural 
wives in China such a universal and early marriage society.
Table 5.12 Proportions(%) of ever-married women who never had a live 
birth by age in the two surveys: Urban and rural China
Age
group
1982 Survey 1987 Survey
Urban Rural Urban Rural
15-19 58.33 69.49 64.74 64.65
20-24 62.75 37.92 36.63 29.74
25-29 23.15 8.12 9.38 5.21
30-34 5.32 1.81 2.37 1.42
35-39 2.36 1.65 1.42 1.13
40-44 1.83 1.89 1.24 1.24
45-49 2.70 2.08 1.37 1.48
50-54 4.74 2.87 1.78 1.89
55-59 7.23 4.22 2.87 2.84
60-64 8.46 4.80 4.89 4.22
65-67 11.27 5.34
In Figure 5.8, information from the two surveys indicates a decline in the proportions 
of married women with no live birth from the older age groups(65-67 or 60-64) to 
younger ones(35-39) in both urban and rural China, and a large drop from 50-54 to 45-49 
which might be partly due to a significant improvement of medical services and public 
health programme in the 1950s, especially in urban areas. This trend over different age 
groups in the two surveys suggests that declines in primary sterility contributed somewhat 
to the natural fertility rise in both areas over time. Similar trends can be found from 
Feeney and Yu’s study (1987:83-84), which indicated that PPP ratios from marriage to 
first birth had been rising from 0.956 and 0.966 in 1955 to 0.986 and 0.993 in 1981 for 
urban and rural areas respectively. As far as the differences of the proportion between 
same age groups in the two surveys are concerned, on average these differences were
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over 3% and 1 % for urban and rural respectively and they widened by age in both areas. 
These facts indicate an overwhelming decline in primary sterility in urban and a modest 
decline in rural areas in the 1980s. Such a decline in the proportion in both areas over 
the two surveys’ same age groups might also be one of the reasons contributing to the 
dramatic rise in natural fertility in the 1980s.
Figure 5.8 Primary sterility: Proportions(%) of ever-married women who never had 
a live birth by age in the two surveys: Urban and rural China
a: 1982 Survey b: 1987 Survey
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A very unexpected phenomenon shown in Figure 5.8 is that the proportions of ever- 
married women who never had a live birth were consistently higher over age groups in 
urban areas than in rural areas, especially in the 1982 survey. As discussed earlier, 
natural fertility was consistently higher in the urban than in the rural areas over time, and 
this is also reflected in the proximate determinants such as fecundability, birth intervals 
and breastfeeding. But for primary sterility, it seems this might not be true. However, 
as we take the proportion of no live birth women as a proxy for primary sterility, this 
unexpected urban-rural differential could possibly be due to something else. As Feeney 
and Wang (1993:72) show, period progressing proportions from marriage to first birth
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are consistently higher for urban than for rural areas since 1967.
As we know, an ever-married woman without live birth is not necessarily definitely 
infecund. For example, it could be because of her husband’s infecundity. It was 
especially true in China where the divorce rate was extremely low and sexual 
relationships outside marriage scarcely existed. Although divorce was never encouraged 
in China, widowers or widows were allowed to marry again when they were young and 
particularly if childless. Thus we come to another possibility. There has been a higher 
level of mortality in rural China over time and thus a higher remarriage rate of rural 
widows, who then had more chance to switch from an unreproductive to a reproductive 
marriage, finally contributing to the lower percentages of primary sterility. As we saw 
in Table 3.12 in Chapter 3, there was only a very slight difference in the ratios of 
currently married to ever-married women in the rural population in 1930 and the whole 
nation in 1982, despite the very substantial difference in mortality. This implies that the 
higher incidence of rural widowhood at the earlier date must have been offset by a high 
rate of remarriage of widows. Obviously, a higher remarriage rate in rural China could 
provide new chances of motherhood for widows who were physically normal but whose 
ex-husbands were infecund, thus contributing to a lower proportion of women without 
children in the rural areas. Another possible reason for this lower proportion could be a 
higher rate of reporting error in rural China where some adopted children were 
deliberately misreported as natural children, to conceal the truth from adopted children 
and thus prevent them from going back to their natural parents when they grew up, as 
suggested by Wolf (1980:207-209) from evidence in Taiwan villages. Similar reporting 
errors but generated by women’s own appreciation of their fecundity status were found
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many other countries in the world fertility survey.7 A further possible reason is that 
urban spouses were more likely to have been separated by occupational assignments, as 
suggested by Lavely and Freedman (1990:366). Although this was not an unusual 
phenomenon in urban China, it seems unlikely, to be a big factor.
Another possible reason for this unexpected urban-rural differential for elderly 
cohorts could be due to the higher incidence rate of VD in urban areas before 1949. As 
the main VD carriers, such as prostitutes, sailors, and invading soldiers, were mainly 
living in urban areas, except when those with the nationalist armies might stay in rural 
areas during battles and when moving. According to Horn’s (1969:86) estimate, in the 
urban areas, the incidence was about 5% and between 1% and 3% in rural areas on 
average. This estimate, at least, gave a consistent explanation, although the urban-rural 
difference of no live birth rates was not as large as that of VD incidence rate. However, 
VD was not the only disease to cause sterility then, others such as tuberculosis were also 
very common in China before 1949, and they could also lead to sterility. Urban residents 
might stand a greater chance of cure, as medical facilities were much better in urban than 
rural areas then and particularly after 1949. The achievement of control of VD in urban 
areas was also more marked and earlier than in rural areas. In a paper by another western 
doctor, Ma (1966:21), at a conference on dermatology and VD in 1956, specialists from 
eight major cities which used to have high infection rates reported that a total of only 28 
cases of infectious syphilis had been discovered in their areas in the four years 1952-55. 
And an investigation of infectious syphilis in seven major cities during the 1960-64 
showed that the early syphilis rate was less than 20 cases per 100 million population per 
year.
7 Martin Vaessen 1984: Childlessness and Infecundity, Comparative Studies, No. 31, (WFS), p25.
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We might also mention that these differences almost vanished in the information from 
the 1987 survey, which shows that the proportion of urban women without child 
decreased in each age group compared with data from the 1982 survey, while it decreased 
much less for the rural population. A possible reason, again shown in Table 3.12, is an 
enormous rise in the ratio of currently married to ever-married in all age groups from 
1982 to 1987, especially among older age groups, which could be produced by mortality 
decline and/or rebuilding families after divorce in rural areas. While urban areas were 
mainly due to an increase in the number of marriages as a consequence of rising divorce 
rather than a decline in mortality in the 1980s.
1.9 Age at first marriage
The question here, again, is whether or not the increase in marital fertility in both 
urban and rural China was significantly influenced by the mean age at first marriage 
rising from an age of less reproductive potential to an age of peak potential. A similar 
question is, again, whether or not the urban-rural differential in natural fertility was 
principally created by the differential in mean age at first marriage which is an indication 
of different levels of reproductive potential. We find in Table 5.13 that the mean age at 
marriage has been rising over the past four decades in both areas. This increase was 
relatively slow before 1970 and accelerated during the 1970s. The mean age at first 
marriage increased by 3.3 over the 1950s and 1.4 years over the 1960s. For the 1970s, 
when the rise of natural fertility was strikingly marked, the mean age at first marriage 
increased by 2.5 and 2.7 years for the urban and rural populations respectively, the 
difference in the increasing mean age at first marriage between the two areas was thus 
trivial.
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Table 5.13 Mean age at first marriage by marriage cohort 
1940-81: Urban and rural China
Marriage Cohort Urban Rural
1940-44 18.46 17.65
1945-49 18.78 17.91
1950-54 19.17 18.13
1955-58 19.96 18.33
1959-61 20.65 18.71
1962-66 21.59 18.77
1967-69 22.06 19.24
1970-78 23.28 20.56
1979-81 24.55 21.97
♦Source: the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey
Table 5.14 Marital fertility in first marriage duration 13-24 months by age 
at first marriage and marriage cohort 1950s-1970s: Urban and rural China
Age at 1st 1950s 1960s 1970s
Marriage
Urban
15-19 419.8 475.6 569.2
20-24 495.9 562.0 595.4
25-29 418.5 510.9 589.4
30-34 482.4 394.0 460.8
Rural
15-19 292.5 343.5 402.4
20-24 386.4 461.9 520.1
25-29 393.8 476.1 532.1
30-34 387.5 377.6 500.8
♦Source: the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey
In Table 5.14, marital fertility rates during the second year of marriage by age at 
first marriage in the two areas are presented. They show a consistent increasing trend 
over three decades in both urban and rural areas. That also shows a consistent pattern 
among age groups of 15-19, 25-29, as well as 20-24, but a slightly different pattern for 
the age group 30-34. The reason for this exception is that very few women in age group 
30-34 had borne their children in the first year duration of first marriage, possibly due
to lower fecundability/that age, thus they concentrated their births in their second year
f\
of marriage duration. Again, the urban-rural differential in duration of marital fertility 
is significant after controlling for age at first marriage. All these points suggest that not 
only changes in age at first marriage but also changes in natural fertility were responsible 
for changes in marital fertility in the two types of area. Secondly, not only differences 
in age at first marriage but also in other fertility determinants were responsible for urban- 
rural differential in natural fertility.
Table 5.15 Average monthly probability of conception (per 1000) leading to 
a live birth in marriage duration of 6-12 months in rural China in 1944-72
Marriage
Cohort
Age At First Marriage
<18 18-20 >20
1944-46 24 40 46
1951-53 42 58 62
1963-65 47 59 67
1970-72 52 66 75
Change
1944-46/1970-72 +28 +26 +29
Source: the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey, selected from Coale et al.(1988:19).
In terms of rising fecundability and mean age at first marriage, we show the trend 
of the distribution of first birth by controlling age at first marriage. From Table 5.15, we 
can see a substantial fecundability rise in rural China between 1951 and 1972, after 
controlling for age at first marriage. Although similar data for the urban population are 
not available, it is reasonable to believe that a substantial fecundability rise occurred in 
both urban and rural China during the period 1944-72, even after controlling for age at 
first marriage.
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Table 5.16 Mean length(months) of first birth interval by age at first marriage 
and marriage cohort 1950s-1980: Urban and rural areas(three regions as a whole)
Marriage
Cohort
Age At First Marriage
Average<17 17-19 20-22 23-25 Women
Urban
-1960 24 20 20 22 21 474
1961-65 17 20 17 19 19 356
1966-70 15 16 16 15 16 506
1971-75 20 16 16 15 16 463
1976-80 — 18 17 16 16 763
Rural
-1960 26 25 25 27 26 999
1961-65 24 23 20 19 22 993
1966-70 22 21 19 18 20 1323
1971-75 21 20 20 18 20 1368
1976-80 18 20 19 17 18 1915
♦Source: 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey
From the 1985 In-Depth Survey shown in Table 5.16, we can also see that the mean 
length of first birth interval reduced consistently over time after controlling for age at 
first marriage. The exceptions were intervals in the period 1971-75 in both areas, when 
the national birth control campaign stressing later marriage and childbearing was 
launched, thus it is understandable if people postponed their births, thereby stopping the 
reduction in the length of birth intervals in the rural areas. In the urban areas, the 
declining trend in the length of birth intervals was reversed after 1971-75, especially for 
those who married before age 20, almost certainly for similar reasons.
1.10 Summary
The pattern and level of marital fertility in 1950-54, estimated from the 1/1000 
Fertility Survey, were very close to those derived from other sources. This underlying
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similarity, again, confirms that estimated marital fertility from truncated information 
(before 1964) of the 1/1000 Survey is rather robust. In contrast, the marital fertility 
differences between the noncontracepting Chinese population in this century and 
noncontracepting European populations in earlier centuries were substantial and 
significant. This provides support to the argument that Chinese ‘natural’ marital fertility 
was low. However, the evidence from the three surveys also strongly suggests that 
natural fertility increased significantly/the 1940s and the 1980s in both urban and rural 
China, though natural fertility was generally lower among rural women than urban. There 
were only slightly more pre-marital conceptions in urban areas, not sufficient to fully 
account for the urban-rural differential in underlying fertility.
The estimated mean fecundability for rural China was extremely low. The main 
causes are believed to be the longer duration of breastfeeding and the limited coitus 
frequency owing to arranged marriage and young age of entering the union. Reform 
towards free-marriage and rising age at marriage, and reduction in breastfeeding were 
possible factors to promote fecundability in both urban and rural areas. As a 
consequence, birth intervals, in particular the first interval, reduced dramatically after the 
1930s, although this compressing trend for the second interval was less obvious after the 
1960s, when reproductive behaviour was mixed with birth control practice.
The average duration of breastfeeding in China before the 1970s was longer in rural 
areas than in urban. Corresponding to this, the proportions of urban women who 
breastfed their children were consistently higher than rural. One possibility to explain this 
could be the increasing job prospects and availability of effective baby food for women 
in urban areas, but much less so in rural areas. An interesting phenomenon is that these
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proportions of the non-breastfed were mainly influenced by birth cohort effects rather 
than age effects, particularly in urban areas. While duration of breastfeeding was mainly 
influenced by the mother’s age.
Childlessness is seen to drop over the age span in both urban and rural areas, but 
unexpectedly to be higher in urban areas. Possible explanations are, that higher 
remarriage rates resulted from worse mortality in rural areas and may indirectly act as 
a reducing factor to childlessness, and a higher rate of reporting error in rural China, 
where some adopted children were deliberately misreported as natural children, and that 
urban areas may have had higher incidence of venereal disease before 1949, and finally 
that urban spouses were more likely to have been separated by occupational assignments.
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Chapter 6 Natural Fertility; Regional Variations
1.1 Literature review: regional variations
The study of natural fertility involves the consideration of nuptiality, fecundability 
and primary sterility both individually and in combination. How these determinants 
change, and how they are spatially distributed over various of socio-economic, 
environments, are other fundamental questions. In China, apart from regional or 
geographic differences in socio-economic development, the situation was also quite 
different in each region regarding the cultural characteristics, such as diet, marriage 
pattern, social customs, and religion, which naturally affected proximate determinants 
such as age at first marriage, breastfeeding, coital frequency, birth interval and so on.
Information from the 1/1000 Fertility Sample Survey in 1982 and the In-Depth 
Fertility Survey in 1985 provides an opportunity to study the first marriage distribution, 
age specific fertility rates, birth intervals in some particular years, and parity distribution 
in 28 regions, which include twenty provinces, three municipality cities and five ethnic 
minority autonomous regions (both are equivalent to provinces in administration), that is, 
coming directly under the national government (Tibet is the only region in mainland 
China where work was carried out by neither survey). Thus natural fertility, birth 
intervals and primary sterility in each region can be estimated from these data. 
Unfortunately, regional variation in fecundability could not be assessed as no regional 
information about distributions of first birth interval is available.
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As far as the regional variation of natural fertility level is concerned, it seems that the 
cross-regional differential in levels of natural fertility is more interesting than the time 
trends in each individual region which closely corresponded with the national trend. Thus 
28 regions’ differentials in natural fertility over time can present a quite illustrative 
picture of regional variations of natural fertility, though the pattern of variation before 
1940 remains unknown. However, the most salient features of the different fertility or 
indices of proximate determinants mentioned in the main body of the paper will be 
introduced into discussion. Because the degree of comparability that could be achieved 
was inevitably limited, the discussion focuses more on the patterns of association rather 
than on the specific levels shown for any particular region.
1.2 A brief introduction to regional background
Regional variations in China can be seen as indicators of inherited inequalities. This 
is well illustrated by the distribution of modem industry. Virtually all industrial activities 
in 1949, when the communists took power, were located in two areas, both now 
considered to be part of the eastern coastal region. (See Figure 6.1) There were, first, 
the highly localized developments in cities - most of them ex-treaty ports(e.g.. Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Qingdao) - on the coastal fringe. Second, that in the northeast provinces, where 
Russian and later Japanese colonisation and exploitation led to the development of raw 
material resources and heavy industry, much of it originally serving the needs of their 
economies. The rest of the country was virtually devoid of modem industry. After 1952, 
many new industrial cities were developed, such as Taiyuan (Shanxi Province), Wuhan 
(Hubei Province). Nevertheless, regional variations in every aspect still exist and may 
even have widened.
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Table 6.1 Proportions of urban and ethnic minority population, and Gross 
Industrial and Agricultural Product (GIAP) in 1964, 1982: 28 regions
Region
Urban population(%) Ethnic minority (%) GIAP1
1965 1982 1964 1982 1982
Beijing 65.08 64.85 3.80 3.50 47.50
Tianjin 68.38 2.10 2.10 2.12 52.36
Hebei 9.34 13.82 1.50 1.60 11.92
Shanxi 16.40 21.25 0.30 0.30 13.54
Inner Mongolia 25.46 29.12 13.00 15.50 10.57
Liaoning 40.31 42.01 6.90 8.10 27.59
Jilin 35.33 39.59 8.60 8.10 15.85
Heilongjiang 38.75 39.90 5.40 4.90 19.41
Shanghai 63.80 58.93 0.40 0.40 100.00
Jiangsu 14.88 15.67 0.20 0.20 21.17
Zhejiang 14.31 25.48 0.40 0.40 16.41
Anhui 11.81 14.37 0.50 0.50 9.42
Fujian 20.28 21.04 0.90 1.00 10.07
Jiangxi 16.84 19.21 0.05 0.10 9.63
Shangdong 11.59 19.16 0.50 0.50 13.85
Henan 10.99 13.63 1.00 1.10 8.99
Hubei 13.84 17.68 0.60 3.70 14.92
Hunan 10.41 15.00 3.40 4.10 10.88
Guangdong 16.95 18.49 1.40 1.80 12.12
Guangxi 9.86 12.24 37.70 38.30 8.25
Sichuan 12.11 14.13 2.60 3.70 9.33
Yunnan 12.36 18.85 23.40 26.00 6.20
Guizhou 12.04 12.52 31.30 31.70 7.72
Shaanxi 15.58 18.87 0.50 0.50 10.61
Gansu 15.82 15.85 7.50 7.90 9.98
Qinghai 18.70 20.36 38.60 39.40 10.19
Ningxia 18.06 22.39 30.80 31.90 9.74
Xinjiang 18.88 28.50 68.10 59.60 11.07
mean
s.d.
21.10
14.70
25.76
15.50
10.41
16.27
10.60
15.41
18.19
19.00
^IAP: Gross Industrial and Agricultural Product per capita, set Shanghai’s GIAP per capita as 100.
Table 6.1 shows some socio-economic features of the 28 regions which are relevant 
to demographic patterns. As we can see, the three municipality cities Beijing, Tianjin, 
and Shanghai, have a majority urban population, a very small proportion of ethnic 
minority population, and the highest GIAP per capita. Similar features could be found 
in coastal provinces like Liaoning, Jilin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shangdong, and Guangdong. 
In general, inland regions (Central Region and Western Region) are areas with lower
proportions o f urban population and GIAP per capita.
Figure 6.1 China’s province-level administrative divisions
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Among the inland regions, the western regions (see Table 6.1) with their higher 
proportions of ethnic minority populations are those with the lowest GIAP per capita. 
However, they are not necessarily those with the lowest proportion of urban population, 
because there are very sparse populations in those rural areas, so that a larger proportion 
lives in urban areas. Areas such as Inner Mongolia, Qinghai and Xinjiang, are mostly 
pasture land or even desert. In addition to urbanization and economic development, 
different ethnic minority regions with different custom and religions show diverse 
demographic patterns. For example, if we consider information from the 1982 Census 
about two neighbouring provinces Ningxia and Qinghai, Ningxia had 31.7% Moslem
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population, and showed a quite high level of fertility; while Qinghai province had 19% 
Tibetan population, who were Tibetan Buddhists with a high proportion of monks, and 
showed a very low level of fertility.
1.3 Variations in general fertility
Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 provide us with the TFR from 1945 to 1981 for the 28 
regions separately. One can see from the figures that all regions experienced a great 
fertility decline over four decades or so. However, such a transition was by no means 
homogeneous. There were substantial regional differences in the original level of fertility, 
the timing, and the path of the decline. The regional variation in fertility before 1945 is 
not so clear. However, using data from China’s fertility surveys, a TFR of around 4.5 
was estimated for the 1940s for those less developed, mainly inland, regions, and 5.5 for 
the more developed provinces or regions, mainly coastal one like Shanghai and Jiangsu. 
As we can see from Table 6.2, since 1950, the fertility levels of all regions consistently 
rose until the 1970s, while geographic differentials in TFR were getting wider. The 
standard deviation (s.d.) of the TFR rose from 0.558 in 1945-49 to 1.124 in 1970-78, 
before dropping in the 1980s.
All regions’ fertility during the 1950s (which here refers to 1950-1958) rose steadily 
from a level of about 5 in the 1945-49 to around 6, a high fertility which was a national 
phenomenon. The only exception was Shanghai, where a birth control campaign began 
to be launched in the late 1950s. The regional differences in the TFR were relatively 
small compared with those in later years. There was no clear-cut geographic pattern, but 
the TFRs in three northeastern provinces, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, were among
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the highest.
Figure 6.2 Total fertility rates(TFR) and total duration marital fertility 
rates(TDMFR) 1945-1981: 28 regions
Hebei
Liaoning Heiongjlong
Jiangsu Z h e j l o n g
Shangdong
Guangdong GuangxI
Qinghai
Xinjiang
Legend: H  TFR; -I- TDMFR
X Axis: 45-49; 50-54; 55-58; 59-61; 62-66, 67-69; 70-78; 79-81.
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Table 6 .2  Total fertility rates(TFR) 1945-81: 28 regions
Region 45-49 50-54 55-58 59-61 62-66 67-69 70-78 79-81
Beijing 5.10 5.69 5.69 3.87 4.68 3.31 2.09 1.55
Tianjin 5.67 6.53 7.42 4.84 5.07 3.21 2.30 1.43
Hebei 4.80 5.42 5.65 3.76 5.83 4.99 3.49 2.60
Shanxi 4.39 5.03 5.34 4.50 6.04 5.82 4.13 2.22
In. Mongolia 4.73 5.51 6.28 5.03 6.55 5.86 4.04 2.52
Liaoning 5.16 6.06 6.58 4.52 6.23 4.75 2.89 1.95
Jilin 6.09 6.93 6.94 5.74 6.90 6.00 3.81 2.20
Heilongjiang 5.50 6.40 6.68 5.84 6.51 5.84 4.04 2.45
Shanghai 5.38 5.65 5.20 3.06 3.09 2.35 1.47 1.10
Jiangsu 5.33 5.60 5.62 3.64 5.68 4.66 2.80 1.79
Zhejiang 5.53 5.80 6.09 4.25 6.69 5.33 3.14 2.13
Anhui 4.82 5.40 5.04 2.25 6.74 6.49 4.51 3.11
Fujian 4.97 5.75 6.12 4.49 6.93 6.21 4.87 2.56
Jiangxi 5.12 5.68 5.88 4.46 6.87 7.00 6.06 3.46
Shangdong 4.87 5.27 5.63 3.59 5.88 5.04 3.62 2.14
Henan 4.72 5.41 5.21 3.16 6.54 6.34 4.52 2.81
Hubei 5.45 5.89 6.26 4.27 6.96 6.31 3.97 2.56
Hunan 5.57 6.14 5.98 3.50 7.13 6.54 4.28 2.65
Guangdong 4.30 5.08 5.37 4.07 5.94 5.58 4.44 3.69
Guangxi 5.05 5.34 5.90 4.46 6.87 6.01 4.99 3.90
Sichuan 5.22 5.89 6.08 3.01 6.41 6.36 4.60 2.08
Yunnan 5.56 5.92 6.30 3.79 6.88 7.00 5.97 4.13
Guizhou 5.61 6.01 6.16 4.22 6.92 6.22 5.39 3.65
Shaanxi 5.25 5.72 6.07 4.64 6.26 5.67 4.06 2.52
Gansu 5.91 6.03 6.06 3.60 7.13 6.64 4.76 2.98
Qinghai 3.84 4.11 4.29 2.16 5.50 6.02 5.51 4.68
Ningxia 6.36 6.60 6.96 3.58 7.13 6.70 5.42 4.31
Xinjiang 4.28 5.02 5.61 4.69 6.45 6.37 5.21 3.52
mean
s.d.
5.16
0.558
5.71
0.554
5.94
0.639
4.04
0.854
6.28
0.871
5.67
1.122
4.16
1.124
2.74
0.885
The high fertility level was certainly affected by rapid economic recovery, but also 
could be attributed to the government’s pronatalist policy in this period. Even in those 
provinces with a higher proportion of urban population, such as Beijing, Tianjin, Jilin, 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shangdong and Hebei, the fertility was mainly natural. Tien (Croll et 
al. 1985:121-122) suggested that, given a background of continuing high fertility, 
population growth was more pronounced in coastal areas and municipalities, probably due
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to controlling diseases and improving living conditions which resulted in an earlier 
decline in mortality in these provinces than in the inland regions.
The massive fertility crisis in the later 1950s hit all regions. However, there were 
great regional diversities. Fertility suffered a catastrophic fall in inner regions like Anhui, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Henan, Hubei, Gansu, Qinghai, and Ningxia, and even in those areas 
with higher proportions of urban population like Tianjin, or Shangdong. Less severe falls 
were seen in northern regions like Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, and 
some southern ones like Guangdong and Guangxi. On the other hand, the crisis in both 
Jiangsu and Zhejiang was moderate. Overall, fertility in 1960 in all regions dropped to 
its lowest point in modem history.
Most regions recovered from the crisis in 1962 and their fertility returned to the pre­
crisis level in 1963. In fact, the TFR in the most regions rose to its peak in 1963, the 
highest since 1949. Recovery was much less marked in those regions which suffered least 
damage, such as the three municipality cities and provinces like Jilin and Heilongjiang. 
Then the Chinese government launched its first effective birth control programme in the 
urban areas. The response to this programme was such that in those regions with majority 
urban populations like the three municipality cities, fertility experienced a sharp reduction 
from the pre-transition levels by 1962-66. It was from this period that regional 
differentials began getting wider, and fertility transition in some regions-mainly in three 
municipality cities-began.
By 1967-69, a third of the regions had experienced substantial fertility decline, four 
of them, including Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Shanghai and had more than 25%, and
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Jiangsu had 17% fertility reduction. Regional variations in fertility became wider in this 
period. By contrast, the TFR in Anhui, Henan, Hunan, Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and 
Qinghai, showed big rises from the pre-crisis level in 1955-58, although in most regions 
the TFR in this period declined slightly, compared with the peak level in 1962-66 (which 
can be regarded as a ‘catch-up’ era after the 1959-61 crisis), and returned to a normal 
and relatively stable high level. The exceptional regions, where TFR continued to rise 
from 1962-66, were those where a harsher fertility crisis took place during 1959-61, thus 
it is understandable that the fertility compensation period lasted longer.
During t h / 1967-69, regional fertility showed another major fluctuation. This was 
clearly related to the process of the ‘Cultural Revolution’. Fertility successively declining 
in some regions may reflect continuation of the downward trend that started several years 
before. Such was the case in the three municipality cities and some provinces like 
Liaoning and Jiangsu. This might be explained by the fact that these regions had 
relatively high proportions of urban population, and some of them might have continued 
their birth control practice privately; it might also result from the chaotic events of the 
‘Cultural Revolution’. As virtually no family planning programme was carried on during 
this period, TFR in some regions, like Jiangxi, Yunnan, and Qinghai, kept rising to 
further peaks. The rest of the regions kept TFR at a quite high level between 5 and 6.
The ‘Later-Longer-Less’ programme was launched officially in 1971. This 
programme, unlike the previous one, penetrated the vast rural areas. Although fertility 
decline occurred in almost all regions, the speed and extent of the reduction varied 
greatly. More developed regions, mainly coastal provinces such as Liaoning, Jilin, 
Shangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Hubei and the three municipality cities experienced
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dramatic fertility declines, while fertility fell moderately in the less developed regions, 
especially those with a high proportion of ethnic minority, such as Inner Mongolia, 
Guangxi, Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai, where birth control policies were more 
relaxed. Thus it pushed regional differentials in TFR to their highest level (s.d. = 1.124) 
in recent history. Although the level of socio-economic development varied greatly from 
region to region, the overall consumption level showed no substantial improvement, 
especially in inland and ethnic minority regions, yet a nationwide family planning 
programme went into effect in most regions, as the mean TFR of the 28 regions fell from 
5.67 to 4.16 in this period.
The downward trend of fertility continued throughout the second half of the 1970s. 
By 1979 there was no province with TFR above 5, which was the lowest value in the 
previous two decades. However, the momentum of decline slowed down in the early 
1980s, when only a marginal further reduction occurred, even though a much more 
vigorous birth-control policy, the ‘One Child’ policy came into effect in 1979. The mean 
TFR of these regions dropped to a second trough of 2.74 in this period. However, a still 
quite large degree of regional variation (s.d. = 0.885) of TFR may reflect not only timing 
factors, but also different degrees of difficulty in the implementation of the policy. 
Kaufman et al. (1989:726) also pointed out that although a strong normative and 
putatively compulsory family planning policy existed in rural China, wide variations 
occurred in its interpretation and enforcement by provinces, and even within provinces 
by local officials. TFR in those more developed provinces like Liaoning and Jiangsu as 
well as in the three municipality cities dropped to below 2, while it was over 2 but below 
3 in most other regions, and over 4 in some ethnic minority regions. Jowett (Cannon & 
Jenkins 1990:109) also suggested that lower levels of socio-economic development and
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concentration of the ethnic minorities in these regions explained their higher levels of 
fertility.
1.4 Variations in marital Fertility
The total duration marital fertility rates for the 28 regions are presented in Table 6.3. 
The trends of the observed age-specific ever married fertility rates for 28 regions are 
plotted in Figure 6.3 for couples married between 1950 and 1981. And the Total 
Duration Marital Fertility Rates (TDMFR), for 28 regions are shown in Table 6.3 and 
plotted with TFR in Figure 6.2. The general trend of marital fertility was similar to that 
of overall fertility. However, regional differences seem more considerable. During the 
1950s, TDMFR experienced a substantial increase in most regions. As Table 6.3 and 
Figure 6.2 show, there were relatively minor regional variations in the TDMFR from 
1945 to 1958. During the periods of demographic disturbances in 1959-61 and 1962-66, 
it can be seen that regional variability rose steadily. Marital fertility in Anhui, Sichuan, 
Qinghai, and Ningxia dropped by as much as 50% of the level under normal conditions 
at that time. However, northern regions such as Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, 
Xinjiang, and Shanxi witnessed only about 15% decline from previous levels. The rest 
of the regions varied from 20% to 40% decline in marital fertility. Peng (1987:639-670) 
found that famine-induced separation and divorce rates rose sharply in some regions, 
notably Anhui.
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Table 6 .3  Total duration marital fertility rate(TDMFR) 1945-81: 28 regions
Region 45-49 50-54 55-58 59-61 62-66 67-69 70-78 79-81
Beijing 5.25 5.93 6.34 4.48 5.70 4.44 2.91 1.89
Tianjin 5.28 6.19 7.35 5.25 6.07 4.45 3.35 1.88
Hebei 4.88 5.63 6.06 4.06 6.55 5.83 4.34 3.10
Shanxi 4.40 5.27 5.75 4.84 6.69 6.57 4.92 2.98
In. Mongolia 5.49 5.91 7.09 6.81 7.07 6.66 5.18 3.36
Liaoning 5.79 6.64 7.28 5.15 7.13 5.69 3.78 2.35
Jilin 5.97 6.88 7.10 6.15 7.69 7.01 4.61 2.67
Heilongjiang 5,85 6.66 6.97 6.20 7.12 6.56 4.77 3.00
Shanghai 6.08 6.32 5.89 3.63 3.75 3.12 2.05 1.56
Jiangsu 5.57 5.82 5.92 3.95 6.29 5.45 3.51 2.09
Zhejiang 5.96 6.20 6.50 4.58 7.19 5.79 3.86 2.76
Anhui 5.32 5.70 5.32 2.41 7.08 6.91 5.24 3.71
Fujian 5.48 6.04 6.33 4.62 7.26 6.65 5.56 3.27
Jiangxi 5.66 5.98 6.22 4.71 7.24 7.42 6.71 4.11
Shangdong 5.09 5.62 6.14 3.99 6.60 5.91 4.49 2.63
Henan 5.01 5.67 5.57 3.42 7.12 7.15 5.47 3.58
Hubei 5.69 6.05 6.49 4.49 7.53 7.15 5.02 3.10
Hunan 6.14 6.49 6.38 3.81 7.62 7.12 5.19 3.19
Guangdong 4.72 5.53 5.88 4.55 6.56 6.23 5.19 4.36
Guangxi 5.25 5.51 6.06 4.77 7.37 6.68 5.90 4.70
Sichuan 6.06 6.33 6.54 3.29 6.84 6.86 5.27 2.52
Yunnan 5.84 6.07 6.52 3.99 7.12 7.27 6.55 4.88
Guizhou 6.15 6.46 6.63 4.55 7.40 6.8 6.04 4.31
Shaanxi 5.43 5.86 6.38 4.95 6.82 6.42 4.91 3.31
Gansu 5.85 6.03 6.27 3.79 7.58 7.16 5.47 3.81
Qinghai 4.07 4.59 5.06 2.53 6.31 6.5 5.67 4.85
Ningxia 6.35 6.83 7.52 3.83 8.05 7.74 6.51 5.15
Xinjiang 4.34 5.12 5.80 4.87 7.15 6.99 5.77 4.23
mean
s.d.
5.46
0.577
5.98
0.511
6.33
0.591
4.42
0.971
6.89
0.793
6.38
1.004
4.94
1.088
3.33
0.962
The transition process continued throughout the 1970s in all regions, yet its regional 
variations were getting wider. By 1970-78, TDMFR declined over 40% in Beijing, 
Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin, Shanghai, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, but less than 20% decline 
occurred in Guangxi, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Yunnan, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang. The 
other regions had moderate reductions in marital fertility.
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Figure 6.3 Age specific ever-married fertility rates (Part I) 1950-81: 28 regions
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Legend: ■  15-19; +20-24; 4 25-29; *30-34; x 35-39; ▼ 40-44.
X Axis: 50-54; 55-58; 59-61; 62-66; 67-69; 70-78; 79-81.
Y Axis: 0; 0.05; 0.1; 0.15; 0.2; 0.25; 0.3; 0.35; 0.4.
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Figure 6.3 Age specific ever-married fertility rates (Part II) 1950-81: 28 regions
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X Axis: 50-54, 55-58, 59-61, 62-66, 67-69, 70-78, 79-81.
Y Axis: 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4.
Y Axis: (Ningxia) 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4, 0.45
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Table 6 .4  M ean age at first marriage by marriage cohort 1945-81: 28 regions
Region 45-49 50-54 55-58 59-61 62-66 67-69 70-78 79-81
Beijing 17.5 18.5 19.3 21.2 21.0 21.6 23.5 24.5
Tianjin 18.3 18.9 19.3 19.9 21.1 21.8 24.2 25.1
Hebei 17.7 18.3 18.7 19.3 19.3 20.1 21.6 22.9
Shanxi 16.3 17.2 17.5 17.3 17.6 18.3 19.5 21.3
In. Mongolia 16.9 17.5 18.6 19.1 19.5 19.9 20.4 22.3
Liaoning 18.1 18.7 19.0 19.5 20.1 20.8 22.1 23.6
Jilin 17.5 17.9 18.4 18.7 19.1 19.8 21.0 22.5
Heilongjiang 17.6 18.0 18.2 18.6 18.8 19.2 20.4 21.9
Shanghai 20.1 19.9 21.4 22.8 22.8 23.1 24.0 25.3
Jiangsu 18.6 18.9 19.1 19.7 20.1 20.3 21.9 23.2
Zhejiang 17.6 18.0 18.1 18.7 18.2 18.7 20.2 21.8
Anhui 18.5 18.2 18.6 19.1 19.0 19.2 20.6 22.0
Fujian 18.2 18.0 18.0 18.3 18.1 18.3 19.5 21.1
Jiangxi 17.7 17.5 17.8 17.7 17.7 18.1 19.1 20.4
Shangdong 17.8 18.7 19.2 19.3 19.8 20.5 21.8 23.3
Henan 17.9 18.0 18.5 19.0 19.0 19.7 21.1 22.9
Hubei 18.1 18.0 18.1 18.5 19.0 19.7 21.2 22.4
Hunan 18.1 18.0 18.2 18.5 18.6 19.1 20.7 21.9
Guangdong 18.9 19.2 19.8 19.9 20.1 20.2 21.2 22.3
Guangxi 18.7 19.0 19.5 19.7 19.9 20.2 21.3 22.6
Sichuan 18.7 18.6 18.9 19.3 19.3 19.7 20.9 22.7
Yunnan 18.9 18.9 19.0 19.6 19.5 19.4 20.4 21.7
Guizhou 18.2 18.7 18.9 19.0 19.3 19.4 20.2 21.5
Shaanxi 17.1 17.3 17.6 17.9 18.3 18.6 20.2 21.9
Gansu 16.4 16.5 17.2 17.6 17.3 17.5 19.0 20.3
Qinghai 17.4 18.9 18.7 19.9 19.3 19.2 19.3 18.8
Ningxia 16.5 17.0 17.3 17.6 19.0 19.2 20.3 21.1
Xinjiang 16.0 16.9 17.2 17.8 18.1 18.5 18.6 20.1
mean
s.d.
17.8
0.88
18.2
0.77
18.6
0.88
19.1
1.13
19.2
1.13
19.7
1.19
20.9
1.37
22.2
1.42
Under the influence of the ‘Later-Longer-Less’ campaign, marriage was widely 
postponed and birth consequently delayed (see Table 6.4). This nuptiality effect and 
marital fertility worked together in the same direction to create relatively large 
differences in overall fertility. Peng (1991:264) noticed that by the early 1980s marital 
fertility had declined by about 50% in almost half of all provinces during the previous 
one and a half decades. The regional differential narrowed a little but remained marked. 
In places such as in Shanghai, Tianjin, and Jilin, the reduction was more than 60%. In
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contrast, the decline in some provinces was very moderate. Guangdong and Guangxi were 
the two with the smallest decline, having less than half of the national average.
The uneven progress of the regional family-planning programme and local 
institutional settings were major sources of the regional variation. Although the declining 
trend continued in the 1980s, as a result of differences in local government’s 
interpretation of the recent modification of population policies, and in the degree of 
relaxation of control over marriage and reproduction, the regional diversity remained 
considerable. Zeng et al. (1991:443-444) found that the greatest increases in crude birth 
rates were attributable to the declining age at marriage that occurred in the well 
developed regions such as the three municipality cities and two coastal provinces 
(Shangdong and Liaoning), while this was much less obvious in the less developed 
regions such as Qinghai, Xinjiang, Ningxia, and Gansu. The offered explanation is, that 
in the advanced regions more strict controls over age at first marriage were imposed but 
after the New Marriage Law took effect, age at first marriage fell, leading to a surge of 
births.
One point worth mentioning is that birth control policies were implemented in most 
regions, except among those ethnic minority populations, so as expected (see Figure 6.3), 
in those regions with high proportions of ethnic minority population, such as Yunnan, 
Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang, the decline in age specific marital fertility was 
comparatively less significant. Whyte and Gu (1987:471-492) also found that women 
from the well developed areas were more likely to prefer two children, but three and 
more were favoured in less developed, and hilly or ethnic minority areas.
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1.5 Variations in natural fertility
Now we come to the discussion of natural fertility by considering both its level and 
its spatial distribution. Here, we have the indices of M and m estimated by original 
Coale-Trussell’s model and its adjusted version for each region respectively. They are 
presented in Tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7 for 32 years’ marriage cohorts. The estimated 
results from the two versions of the model are quite consistent in most regions before the 
1980s, and suggest that, apart from the crisis period of 1959-61, a trend towards increase 
is evident in all regions and periods before 1978, except for a few developed regions, 
such as Shanghai where birth control practice was undertaken earlier, thus the both 
versions of the model, or even adjusted version, may underestimate the underlying level 
of natural fertility M. For the periods of 1940-44 and 1945-49, again, we plot the 
duration marital fertility rates (DMFR) from 1940 to 1978 with M estimated by adjusted 
model in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4 shows a pattern of M consistent with DMFR in all regions, until 1962-66, 
when China’s fertility was mainly a natural pattern. The noteworthy exception is 
Shanghai, again, for the well known reason: it was the earliest region to practise birth 
control, thus the DMFR was no longer that of a natural pattern. As DMFR(0-4) rose 
substantially in all regions during 1940-1949, this, again, leads to the possibility that the 
underlying level of natural fertility, M, during 1940-49 rose substantially for all regions 
as well. The general increase in marital fertility among younger married women in all 
regions is reflected in the substantial increases in M in successive marriage cohorts before 
the 1970s in both versions of the model. The increase in the standard deviation of the
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mean of the birth control index, m, during the period from 1967 to 1981 in Table 6.6, 
is indicative of differences in timing of the beginning of the practice of family limitation.
Table 6.5 Index of underlying level of natural fertility(M) by marriage cohort
1950-81 and by adjusted Coale-Trussell’s model (v2): 28 regions
Region 50-54 55-58 59-61 62-66 67-69 70-78 79-81
Beijing 0.603 0.651 0.578 0.651 0.800 0.881 1.426
Tianjin 0.743 0.845 0.705 0.810 0.798 0.935 1.151
Hebei 0.680 0.735 0.536 0.808 0.753 0.733 1.054
Shanxi 0.599 0.658 0.586 0.750 0.803 0.760 0.864
In. Mongolia 0.693 0.788 0.670 0.794 0.802 0.773 0.895
Liaoning 0.741 0.810 0.593 0.849 0.759 0.851 1.406
Jilin 0.731 0.771 0.671 0.783 0.758 0.765 0.965
Heilongjiang 0.672 0.746 0.676 0.755 0.803 0.817 0.984
Shanghai 1.074 1.072 0.902 0.959 0.987 1.096 1.181
Jiangsu 0.686 0.714 0.497 0.797 0.826 0.742 0.984
Zhejiang 0.731 0.770 0.563 0.883 0.805 0.682 0.893
Anhui 0.716 0.662 0.281 0.882 0.831 0.777 1.047
Fujian 0.732 0.738 0.549 0.832 0.846 0.843 0.733
Jiangxi 0.714 0.722 0.559 0.821 0.820 0.807 0.805
Shangdong 0.680 0.739 0.503 0.813 0.807 0.795 0.977
Henan 0.627 0.600 0.374 0.756 0.747 0.729 0.970
Hubei 0.726 0.799 0.561 0.893 0.843 0.805 1.069
Hunan 0.769 0.736 0.461 0.886 0.837 0.792 0.975
Guangdong 0.639 0.686 0.528 0.772 0.764 0.783 0.971
Guangxi 0.655 0.715 0.519 0.851 0.771 0.799 1.006
Sichuan 0.743 0.742 0.348 0.781 0.772 0.742 0.791
Yunnan 0.696 0.746 0.459 0.807 0.759 0.788 0.896
Guizhou 0.714 0.744 0.506 0.820 0.777 0.800 0.722
Shaanxi 0.667 0.724 0.561 0.794 0.783 0.737 0.874
Gansu 0.673 0.691 0.446 0.819 0.771 0.693 0.877
Qinghai 0.522 0.557 0.353 0.672 0.702 0.664 0.618
Ningxia 0.815 0.861 0.426 0.928 0.967 0.787 0.784
Xinjiang 0.566 0.578 0.526 0.681 0.745 0.746 0.804
mean 0.700 0.740 0.530 0.810 0.800 0.790 0.950
s.d. 0.095 0.095 0.128 0.070 0.059 0.084 0.180
Apart from the three municipality cities, fertility in all regions remained more or less 
a natural pattern until 1966. Among these three cities, fertility in Beijing and Tianjin 
followed a natural pattern until 1958. In Shanghai, however, birth control already existed 
before 1949. The colonized city, with high prostitution, was under the influence of
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Western countries, where contraception was popular as early as last century.
Figure 6.4 Duration(0-4 years of first marriage) marital fertility rates (multiplied by 
2.5) and Index of underlying level of natural fertility 1940-78: 28 regions
Liaoning
Inner tlongol:
Jiangsu
Shanghai
Jiangxi
Guangdong Guangxi
Ning: Xinjiang
Legend: H  M; +  (0-4) years DMFR(multiplied by 2.5);
X Axis: 40-44; 45-49; 50-54; 55-58; 59-61; 62-66; 67-69; 70-78.
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Table 6 .6 A  Index o f  fertility control(m) by marriage cohort 1950-81
and by Coale-Trussell’s model: 28 regions
Region 50-54 55-58 59-61 62-66 67-69 70-78 79-81
Beijing 0.189 0.227 0.505 0.265 0.922 1.949 3.173
Tianjin 0.182 0.190 0.602 0.463 0.975 1.650 3.128
Hebei 0.328 0.358 0.538 0.365 0.414 0.799 2.015
Shanxi 0.281 0.297 0.421 0.305 0.401 0.607 2.147
In. Mongolia 0.160 0.149 0.222 0.128 0.296 0.755 1.793
Liaoning 0.145 0.148 0.185 0.244 0.417 1.278 3.094
Jilin 0.089 0.143 0.167 0.040 0.142 0.799 2.400
Heilongjiang -0.034 0.017 0.209 0.073 0.328 0.876 2.274
Shanghai 1.080 1.082 1.558 1.427 1.846 2.637 3.108
Jiangsu 0.243 0.253 0.316 0.275 0.581 1.160 2.678
Zhejiang 0.284 0.264 0.294 0.290 0.520 1.088 2.403
Anhui 0.252 0.302 0.130 0.287 0.219 0.570 1.714
Fujian 0.229 0.191 0.254 0.195 0.342 0.677 1.580
Jiangxi 0.200 0.200 0.206 0.160 0.139 0.284 1.240
Shangdong 0.342 0.316 0.413 0.295 0.447 0.843 2.217
Henan 0.051 0.050 0.049 0.030 0.038 0.307 1.238
Hubei 0.269 0.279 0.238 0.244 0.237 0.756 2.118
Hunan 0.189 0.175 0.236 0.170 0.207 0.676 2.028
Guangdong 0.145 0.154 0.161 0.161 0.217 0.519 1.088
Guangxi 0.189 0.163 0.061 0.143 0.137 0.374 1.105
Sichuan 0.096 0.085 -0.030 0.093 0.090 0.443 1.985
Yunnan 0.129 0.108 0.002 0.048 -0.054 0.171 0.844
Guizhou 0.107 0.124 0.061 0.109 0.140 0.350 0.720
Shaanxi 0.169 0.221 -0.060 0.287 0.353 0.706 1.825
Gansu 0.207 0.152 0.250 0.115 0.159 0.447 1.732
Qinghai 0.124 0.116 0.125 0.114 0.096 0.141 0.213
Ningxia 0.332 0.315 0.116 0.360 0.419 0.357 0.693
Xinjiang -0.077 -0.106 0.082 0.003 0.209 0.470 1.182
mean1
s.d.
0.210
0.189
0.220
0.186
0.270
0.293
0.240
0.255
0.370
0.362
0.770
0.546
1.850
0.782
Note: estimates of m are the same for both versions of CT models. 1 computed from absolute values of m.
As discussed in the earlier chapters, the original CT model tends to underestimate 
M. So in particular, for those regions with a higher proportion of urban population and 
a comparatively good standard of living, such as Shanghai, Tianjin, Jilin, Shangdong, 
Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, the figures estimated from the original model were more seriously 
underestimated than for less developed regions and thus unrealistically much lower than
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those of less developed regions, although their residents were in a much better socio­
economic condition. Again, the adjusted model seems to be a more sensitive way to 
interpret underlying level of natural fertility in both the cross sectional differentials and 
dynamic trends (see Table 6.8).
Table 6.6B Goodness of fit (R2) in both versions of the Coale-Trussell’s model:
28 regions
Region 50-55 55-58 59-61 62-66 67-69 70-78 79-81
Anhui 0.77 0.88 0.22 0.84 0.78 0.97 0.97
Henan 0.95 0.95 0.25 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.58
Tianjin 0.62 0.66 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.89
Hebei 0.80 0.86 0.97 0.84 0.83 0.98 0.97
Mongolia 0.81 0.80 0.84 0.79 0.89 0.96 0.97
Beijing 0.52 0.72 0.98 0.84 0.94 0.95 0.97
Fujian 0.98 0.89 0.72 0.91 0.97 0.99 0.92
Gansu 0.72 0.56 0.78 0.54 0.61 0.92 0.95
Guangdong 0.72 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.84 0.96 0.98
Guangxi 0.95 0.85 0.37 0.90 0.66 0.95 0.97
Guizhou 0.82 0.67 0.32 0.34 0.22 0.92 0.99
Hubei 0.94 0.96 0.71 0.92 0.91 0.96 0.98
Hunan 0.93 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.94 0.95
Jiangsu 0.98 0.99 0.86 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.97
Jiangxi 0.89 0.89 0.80 0.76 0.56 0.99 0.94
Liaoning 0.91 0.92 0.96 0.99 0.93 0.98 0.99
Jilin 0.35 0.57 0.49 0.13 0.50 0.92 0.95
Heilongjiang 0.89 0.07 0.91 0.57 0.87 0.98 0.94
Shanghai 0.85 0.85 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.99 0.96
Zhejiang 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.96
Shaanxi 0.90 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.96
Shanxi 0.98 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.82 0.96 1.00
Shangdong 0.94 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.96 0.98 0.93
Sichuan 0.84 0.77 0.14 0.85 0.61 0.95 0.93
Yunnan 0.91 0.98 0.93 0.75 0.91 0.98 0.89
Qinghai 0.68 0.52 0.56 0.51 0.58 0.61 0.26
Ningxia 0.94 0.91 0.28 0.98 0.95 0.73 0.61
Xinjiang 0.22 0.36 0.16 0.01 0.50 0.89 0.98
Note: Goodness of fit (R2) are the same for both versions of CT models.
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Table 6 .7  Index o f  underlying level o f  fertility(M ) by marriage cohort 1950-81
and by original Coale-Trussell’s m odel(v l): 28 regions
Region 50-54 55-58 59-61 62-66 67-69 70-78 79-81
Beijing 0.588 0.631 0.538 0.627 0.703 0.672 0.916
Tianjin 0.724 0.823 0.648 0.759 0.696 0.743 0.744
Hebei 0.649 0.699 0.497 0.768 0.711 0.656 0.796
Shanxi 0.576 0.631 0.552 0.718 0.759 0.621 0.640
In. Mongolia 0.678 0.772 0.650 0.780 0.769 0.696 0.697
Liaoning 0.726 0.794 0.578 0.820 0.716 0.712 0.913
Jilin 0.722 0.755 0.655 0.778 0.743 0.684 0.691
Heilongjiang 0.675 0.744 0.656 0.747 0.768 0.723 0.716
Shanghai 0.923 0.922 0.726 0.786 0.763 0.759 0.766
Jiangsu 0.663 0.689 0.475 0.768 0.762 0.632 0.677
Zhejiang 0.702 0.743 0.540 0.848 0.749 0.639 0.586
Anhui 0.692 0.635 0.276 0.847 0.806 0.717 0.825
Fujian 0.709 0.719 0.530 0.808 0.807 0.767 0.588
Jiangxi 0.694 0.702 0.543 0.803 0.805 0.775 0.677
Shangdong 0.649 0.708 0.475 0.780 0.758 0.707 0.717
Henan 0.623 0.596 0.372 0.753 0.743 0.699 0.816
Hubei 0.699 0.769 0.542 0.863 0.815 0.724 0.795
Hunan 0.749 0.718 0.446 0.865 0.813 0.721 0.737
Guangdong 0.626 0.671 0.516 0.755 0.741 0.728 0.834
Guangxi 0.638 0.699 0.515 0.834 0.756 0.758 0.862
Sichuan 0.733 0.733 0.350 0.771 0.763 0.698 0.600
Yunnan 0.684 0.735 0.459 0.802 0.765 0.769 0.796
Guizhou 0.703 0.731 0.502 0.807 0.763 0.762 0.653
Shaanxi 0.652 0.702 0.565 0.763 0.745 0.668 0.677
Gansu 0.654 0.676 0.431 0.806 0.755 0.651 0.689
Qinghai 0.513 0.548 0.347 0.661 0.692 0.651 0.600
Ningxia 0.778 0.824 0.420 0.882 0.912 0.749 0.712
Xinjiang 0.572 0.587 0.520 0.681 0.723 0.698 0.681
mean
s.d.
0.680
0.074
0.710
0.077
0.510
0.107
0.780
0.059
0.760
0.044
0.710
0.044
0.730
0.091
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Table 6.8 Change in index of underlying level of fertility(M) by marriage cohort
1950-81 and by adjusted Coale-Trussell’s model(v2): 28 regions
Region
50-54/
55-58
55-58/
59-61
59-61/
62-66
62-66/
67-69
67-69/
70-78
70-78/
79-81
50-54/
79-81
Beijing 0.05 -0.07 0.07 0.15 0.08 0.54 0.82
Tianjin 0.10 -0.14 0.10 -0.01 0.14 0.22 0.41
Hebei 0.06 -0.20 0.27 -0.06 -0.02 0.32 0.37
Shanxi 0.06 -0.07 0.16 0.05 -0.13 0.19 0.26
In. Mongolia 0.10 -0.12 0.12 0.01 -0.03 0.12 0.20
Liaoning 0.07 -0.22 0.26 -0.09 0.09 0.56 0.67
Jilin 0.04 -0.10 0.11 -0.03 0.01 0.20 0.23
Heilongjiang 0.07 -0.07 0.08 0.05 0.01 0.17 0.31
Shanghai 0.00 -0.17 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.11
Jiangsu 0.03 -0.22 0.30 0.03 -0.08 0.24 0.30
Zhejiang 0.04 -0.21 0.32 -0.08 -0.12 0.21 0.16
Anhui -0.05 -0.38 0.60 -0.05 -0.05 0.27 0.33
Fujian 0.01 -0.19 0.28 0.01 0.00 -0.11 0.01
Jiangxi 0.01 -0.16 0.26 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.09
Shangdong 0.06 -0.24 0.31 -0.01 -0.01 0.18 0.30
Henan -0.03 -0.23 0.38 -0.01 -0.02 0.24 0.34
Hubei 0.07 -0.24 0.33 -0.05 -0.04 0.26 0.34
Hunan -0.03 -0.28 0.42 -0.05 -0.04 0.18 0.21
Guangdong 0.05 -0.16 0.24 -0.01 0.02 0.19 0.33
Guangxi 0.06 -0.20 0.33 -0.08 0.03 0.21 0.35
Sichuan 0.00 -0.39 0.43 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.05
Yunnan 0.05 -0.29 0.35 -0.05 0.03 0.11 0.20
Guizhou 0.03 -0.24 0.31 -0.04 0.02 -0.08 0.01
Shaanxi 0.06 -0.16 0.23 -0.01 -0.05 0.14 0.21
Gansu 0.02 -0.24 0.37 -0.05 -0.08 0.18 0.20
Qinghai 0.04 -0.28 0.39 0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.10
Ningxia 0.05 -0.43 0.50 0.04 -0.18 0.00 -0.03
Xinjiang 0.01 -0.05 0.15 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.24
mean 0.04 -0.21 0.28 -0.01 -0.01 0.17 0.25
* Values without any sign indicate positive change or increase.
1.6 Variations in birth intervals
Because of the lack of regional information on the proportions of first births 
occurring within eight to eleven months of first marriage, it is impossible to apply the 
Bongaarts’ model to estimate the mean fecundability for each region. As we found in 
earlier chapters, the impact of the increase in fecundability on the first two birth intervals
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at the national level was that the observed mean first interval fell substantially between 
the 1940 cohort and the end of 1970s cohorts. Similar findings were made by Lavely and 
Freedman (1990:365), who pointed to a mean first birth interval decline from 1952-55 
to 1973-76 for the Upper Yangzi regions (Sichuan and a few counties in neighbouring 
provinces) and North China regions (Beijing, Tianjin, Hubei, Shangdong, Henan, most 
of Shanxi, the northern parts of Jiangsu and Anhui, and small parts of Shaanxi and Inner 
Mongolia). Thus we have reason to speculate that the birth intervals in most regions fell 
substantially as well.
Table 6.9 Median(years) of first two birth intervals by 1957, 1964 and 1970 marriage/first
birth cohorts: 28 regions
Region
First Interval 
(Years)
Second Interval 
(Years)
% of Births Occurred Four-Years After
First Marriage First Birth
1957 1964 1970 1957 1964 1970 1957 1964 1970 1957 1964 1970
Beijing 2.40 2.61 1.58 3.07 2.94 2.77 33 17 0 24 27 13
Tianjin 1.83 1.62 1.89 2.61 2.44 2.23 4 0 4 17 4 15
Hebei 2.43 2.16 2.08 3.42 2.62 2.54 20 13 9 36 13 14
Shanxi 2.28 2.25 1.94 3.39 2.67 2.63 17 19 10 37 24 26
In. Mongolia 2.03 1.91 1.91 2.71 2.62 2.39 14 3 5 25 19 10
Liaoning 1.85 1.77 1.63 2.66 2.61 2.55 11 7 3 20 13 13
Jilin 1.95 1.85 1.74 2.40 2.33 2.28 13 3 5 14 14 9
Heilongjiang 2.11 1.86 1.81 2.54 2.43 2.37 16 9 8 22 16 8
Shanghai 1.85 1.60 1.48 2.39 2.47 3.50 10 6 3 18 12 16
Jiangsu 2.46 1.82 1.59 3.27 2.45 2.40 27 12 5 35 12 10
Zhejiang 2.56 1.93 1.73 3.08 2.47 2.48 26 8 6 27 8 12
Anhui 3.31 2.33 1.98 4.22 2.45 2.45 41 16 7 58 8 11
Fujian 2.36 2.28 1.87 3.00 2.68 2.61 26 14 9 34 12 12
Jiangxi 3.00 2.42 2.25 3.12 2.41 2.49 34 20 15 38 7 11
Shangdong 2.36 2.36 1.92 3.84 2.70 2.40 25 12 8 42 14 10
Henan 3.25 2.38 1.99 4.08 2.62 2.53 35 15 11 54 15 12
Hubei 2.34 1.92 1.75 2.97 2.47 2.35 32 11 6 35 8 9
Hunan 3.30 2.30 1.96 3.81 2.54 2.52 40 16 11 46 10 12
Guangdong 2.57 2.17 2.07 2.84 2.47 2.38 29 16 11 31 9 8
Guangxi 2.44 2.19 1.93 3.22 2.57 2.45 30 14 11 35 16 10
Sichuan 2.41 2.15 1.95 3.65 2.54 2.50 33 16 9 43 13 11
Yunnan 1.95 2.16 1.90 3.33 2.43 2.35 20 14 8 39 13 7
Guizhou 2.59 2.55 2.41 3.10 2.56 2.42 33 25 21 35 14 15
Shaanxi 2.18 2.24 2.12 3.09 2.81 2.65 21 17 9 26 18 17
Gansu 3.50 2.88 2.41 3.45 2.53 2.54 43 20 15 40 11 16
Qinghai 2.67 2.73 2.50 4.22 2.91 2.57 36 33 22 41 26 18
Ningxia 1.81 2.29 2.06 4.17 2.58 2.58 23 0 7 53 14 0
Xinjiang 2.43 2.50 2.25 2.75 2.65 2.35 29 24 18 24 14 11
mean 2.44 2.19 1.95 3.23 2.57 2.51 26 14 9 34 14 12
s.d. 0.47 0.32 0.25 0.54 0.15 0.23 10 8 5 11 5 4
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Here we are fortunately able to show median intervals between first marriage and 
first birth, and between first and second births for some selected marriages and first birth 
cohorts as this information is available from the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey. As only 
information for the cohorts of 1957, 1964 and 1970 was available to the author, analysis 
and interpretation of these results should be more cautious. The behaviour of the cohorts 
of 1957 was markedly affected by the nationwide economic depression and famine; 
conditions for the cohorts of 1964 and 1970 were more favourable, though their 
reproductive behaviour might have been disturbed by the ‘Cultural Revolution’.
It may be seen from Table 6.9 that median intervals by the first marriage and first 
birth cohorts declined generally: the national averages of first birth intervals were 2.44, 
2.19 and 1.95 years for 1957, 1964 and 1970 marriage cohorts respectively; the national 
averages of median intervals to second births were 3.23, 2.57 and 2.51 years for the 
three first birth cohorts respectively. First birth intervals for the 1964 marriage cohort 
in all regions were shorter than for the 1957 cohort, except in Ningxia, Yunnan, Beijing, 
Shaanxi, Xinjiang and Qinghai. As five of these six exceptions were border and ethnic 
minority regions, which suffered much less severely from the famine, this leads to the 
possibility that the falling trend was due to the influence of famine in prolonging intervals 
for the 1957 cohort in most regions rather than to rising fecundability and falling intervals 
between 1957 and 1964. But as the first birth intervals of the 1970 cohort in all regions 
(except Tianjin and Inter Mongolia) were also shorter than those for the 1964 cohort, a 
general trend of falling first intervals does indeed seem to be confirmed.
Compared with the first birth interval, the second kept more or less steady, though 
a decline is still apparent in most regions; The mean fell only slightly from 2.57 to 2.51
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years from 1964 to 1970. This apparently was because of family planning campaigns in 
the urban areas in the 1960s, and nationwide in the 1970s. In general, a substantial 
decrease in second birth intervals occurred in most regions and may be due to a rise in 
fecundability. The consistency of these two birth intervals being compressed over time 
in most regions suggests that, apart from a postponement of births by the 1957 first 
marriage and first birth cohorts as a common reaction to the disturbances of the famine 
during 1959-61, fecundability in most areas did rise over time. The fact that the standard 
deviations of regional median birth intervals were getting smaller also suggests that a 
nationwide trend of falling mean birth intervals did occur.
We have also made additional comparisons of births by duration since marriage, and 
the first birth for the cohorts of 1957, 1964 and 1970. The proportions of births which 
occurred over four years after first marriage and after first birth for these three cohorts 
in each region are also presented in Table 6.9. Throughout China (except Tianjin), the 
proportion of first births which occurred over four years after first marriage declined 
between the 1957 cohorts to the 1970 cohorts: the differences of these proportions over 
the three cohorts are particularly striking in some regions: Liaoning, Ningxia, Beijing, 
Hebei, Henan, Sichuan, Shangdong, Anhui, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Hunan, 
and Hubei, which are mostly more developed regions. This trend remained true for the 
proportions of second births.
1.7 Variations in breastfeeding
The 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey offers some information about children’s 
breastfeeding in the three regions: Shanghai, Hebei, and Shaanxi. In Table 6.10 we
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present the mean length of breastfeeding by year and region, which is estimated from the 
distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding by years since the birth 
occurred and the mother’s current age. The overall trend of the three regions has been 
presented in Chapter 4, the average duration of breastfeeding in the three regions kept 
level more or less until the middle 1970s, then contracted dramatically to 12.6, 13.4 and
11.1 months for the three regions respectively.
Table 6.10 Mean length(months) of breastfeeding by year the births 
occurred 1960s-1982 and mother’s current age: Hebei, Shaanxi, Shanghai
Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai Total
By year the births occurred
-1967 17.2 17.7 13.5 16.46
1968-72 17.4 18.1 11.5 16.58
1973-77 18.4 18.5 11.8 17.26
1978-82 12.6 13.4 7.1 11.67
Total 16.3 17.1 11.1 15.51
By mother’s current age
40+ 17.5 18.0 12.6 16.63
30-39 16.1 17.0 10.4 15.22
<30 11.6 13.4 4.9 11.21
Total 16.3 17.1 11.1 15.51
♦based on the distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding and confined to
children born at least three years before, and excluding children who died before age two.
As far as regional variation is concerned, a huge differential in the duration of 
breastfeeding existed between Shanghai and the other two regions, with almost no 
difference between Hebei and Shaanxi. A difference of four to five months in the mean 
length of breastfeeding between Shanghai and the other two was consistent over time. 
This might be due to differentials in original socio-economic conditions and in the 
momentum of improving education and employment opportunities for women, or in part
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to an earlier fundamental change in the socio-economic structure and ideology in some 
regions like Shanghai, which was an ex-treaty port open to the West much earlier than 
the other two. For Hebei and Shaanxi, we can see from Table 6.1, there were almost no 
substantial differences in the GIAP per capita or the proportion of urban population 
between them.
Table 6.11 Proportion(%) of children without breastfeeding by year the births 
occurred 1960s-1982 and mother’s current age: Hebei, Shaanxi, Shanghai
Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai Total
By year the births occurred
-1967 0.815 1.756 2.991 1.73
1968-72 1.202 1.906 5.350 2.29
1973-77 1.518 2.526 5.742 2.65
1978-82 1.496 2.769 8.815 3.49
Total 1.267 2.201 5.528 2.51
By mother’s current age
40+ 1.160 2.288 5.037 2.45
30-39 1.380 2.127 6.045 2.63
<30 1.197 2.083 5.618 2.29
Total 1.267 2.201 5.528 2.51
*based on the distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding and confined 
to children born at least three years before, and excluding children who died before age two.
Meanwhile the proportion of children who were never breastfed by year the births 
occurred rose steadily from 0.82%, 1.8 and 3% to 1.5%, 2.8% and 8.8% for the three 
regions respectively. This widening regional differential was mainly contributed by a 
dramatic rise in the proportion of non-breastfed children in Shanghai. Although the 
marked regional differential remained when the proportions of non-breastfed children 
were presented by the mother’s current age, it shows a more or less stable regional 
pattern over time, compared with the trends by year the births occurred(see Figure 6.6
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c and d).
Figure 6.6 Children’s breastfeeding 1960s-1982: 
Hebei, Shaanxi, Shanghai
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1.8 Variations in primary sterility
We can see from Table 6.12 that the proportions of women with no live birth 
reached a trough at age 35-39 in most regions, but at age 40-44 in some more developed 
regions such as Beijing, Tianjin, Shangdong, Guangdong and some ethnic minority 
regions such as Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, and Fujian. For these developed regions,
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this might be due to a later-age at marriage pattern, thus requiring a longer duration and 
later age for all married women to have sufficient time for childbearing. For the ethnic 
minority regions, it might be due to lower fecundability level thus also taking a longer 
marriage duration to reach the minimum level of no live birth. In general, it was very 
unlikely that married women were fecund but never had a live birth before their later 
forties. As we mentioned before, the decline may be even larger than it appears, since 
women who had not reached the end of the reproductive age span might still have 
children, especially those in relative younger age groups such as 35-39 and 40-44. Thus 
we may be slightly underestimating this declining trend of primary sterility.
Table 6.12 The proportions(%) of ever-married women who never had a live birth 
by age in the 1982 1/1000 Survey: 28 regions
Region 65-67 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19
Beijing 8.00 6.93 7.74 3.98 4.93 2.73 3.03 4.44 23.19 67.19 100.00
Tianjin 20.93 9.22 3.21 3.51 1.21 2.56 3.08 8.25 31.85 78.90
Hebei 2.83 5.32 5.21 3.18 2.27 2.33 2.54 2.42 11.86 53.57 72.27
Shanxi 10.84 7.37 5.74 5.27 2.94 3.65 1.31 1.67 8.16 41.46 64.29
In. Mongolia 4.40 3.35 3.56 1.45 1.12 1.13 1.08 2.21 10.31 38.26 63.33
Liaoning 4.48 5.51 4.52 3.01 0.94 1.71 1.16 2.71 13.44 45.43 75.00
Jilin 5.56 4.00 3.61 2.75 1.29 1.21 0.56 2.03 9.33 38.04 79.41
Heilongjiang 9.30 5.70 4.88 4.05 1.97 2.01 2.92 2.91 9.60 35.50 60.95
Shanghai 10.22 8.70 5.63 4.34 4.71 4.69 3.36 8.93 31.40 53.10
Jiangsu 6.05 6.85 5.91 4.00 2.25 2.15 2.05 2.37 11.96 46.28 67.24
Zhejiang 4.38 3.53 4.65 3.34 1.55 1.49 1.04 1.85 5.90 35.16 64.35
Anhui 4.58 4.76 4.85 3.34 2.55 2.45 1.64 1.54 7.83 36.64 54.19
Fujian 8.09 4.78 3.97 2.68 1.61 1.27 2.39 2.13 5.87 32.86 66.93
Jiangxi 5.05 8.03 4.50 2.84 1.98 2.21 1.76 2.54 4.46 22.49 61.31
Shangdong 6.31 6.93 4.26 2.56 2.28 1.47 2.14 2.59 8.94 46.04 75.50
Henan 7.40 4.02 4.90 3.36 1.95 1.86 1.69 1.67 13.74 51.41 79.67
Hubei 6.33 6.11 5.50 3.79 1.89 1.63 1.25 2.21 8.96 38.65 58.70
Hunan 7.49 5.60 5.86 3.03 2.54 1.70 1.36 1.93 7.84 32.70 75.62
Guangdong 7.07 5.23 3.47 2.48 1.69 1.57 1.64 2.18 10.40 30.45 75.85
Guangxi 5.80 4.64 3.66 1.89 2.59 0.69 1.09 1.99 11.95 37.17 75.29
Sichuan 4.32 4.36 4.36 3.35 2.15 1.31 1.29 1.87 66.02 43.29 75.00
Yunnan 3.03 4.92 4.28 1.53 0.78 0.74 2.28 2.40 8.33 34.15 75.68
Guizhou 4.50 2.55 2.37 2.03 2.00 1.79 2.54 2.33 7.20 35.01 70.49
Shaanxi 4.76 5.58 4.23 2.58 2.76 2.66 2.18 1.88 6.02 43.87 79.31
Gansu 9.68 3.20 3.41 3.06 3.87 2.64 1.32 2.67 5.36 33.56 68.98
Qinghai 30.77 10.20 13.19 12.96 11.20 5.71 1.88 4.94 6.62 29.55 72.37
Ningxia 20.00 7.14 4.35 4.76 4.55 4.00 0.00 1.30 5.61 29.63 68.00
Xinjiang 13.70 8.13 9.26 8.40 4.15 2.41 2.67 3.65 10.30 27.04 64.74
mean
s.d.
8.42
6.10
5.81
1.89
5.04
2.07
3.70
2.21
2.70
1.97
2.21
1.13
1.83
0.79
2.84
1.78
12.94
12.24
40.62
11.83
70.93
8.89
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In Figure 6.7, information from the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey indicates a 
consistent decline in the proportion of women with no live birth from elder age groups 
65-67 or 60-64 to younger ones, 35-39 or 40-44, in all regions, and a huge drop from 
50-54 to 45-49, which was mainly contributed by a dramatic improvement of medical 
services and public health programmes in the 1950s, especially in the coastal regions. An 
exception was Hebei province where this percentage was lower at age group 65-67 than 
55-59 and 60-64. This might be because of sample variation, as there were only a 
relatively small number of women in this group. A similar possibility exists for Tianjin 
where this percentage was implausibly high.
The pattern of regional variation seems familiar. Those developed coastal regions 
such as Heilongjiang, Beijing, Shangdong, Shanghai, and Guangdong, which opened to 
western influences earlier, and some ethnic minority regions, particularly nomadic areas 
such as Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang had relatively high proportions of childless. Some less 
developed areas, such as Inner Mongolia, Anhui, Jiangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan, 
had comparatively low levels of childlessness. This phenomenon, again, could be 
contributed by a higher rate of misreporting adopted children as live births by women in 
less developed regions, thus deflating the percentages. On the other hand, it could also 
be produced a lower level of mortality and thus a lower remarriage rate of widows in 
those well developed regions, and thus less chance to switch from an unreproductive to 
a reproductive marriage, finally producing the higher percentages of primary sterility. 
Another possibility is to try to explain it from the angle of VD. The higher childless rate 
regions were mainly of two sorts: coastal regions and some ethnic minority regions, the 
former were more or earlier opened to the outside, but the later perhaps had less
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restricting of extra-marital sex and widow-remarriage and more poverty. One exception 
was Inner Mongolia, where a high rate of VD incidence was reported in Horn (1969:87), 
though it did not have a very high rate of childlessness presented here. This indicates that 
VD was not the only mechanism to determine childlessness here. The real reasons seem 
to be beyond discovery as regional mortality information is not available for analysis in 
detail.
The other regions showed a quite normal pattern: more developed regions like Jilin, 
Liaoning, Jiangsu, Hubei, and Shaanxi had a lower level of primary sterility, and less 
developed regions like Henan, Fujian, and Gansu had a higher level. Another extremely 
high case was Qinghai: apart from reasons mentioned above, it also could be due to the 
high proportion there of Tibetans, who had the highest proportion of monks and the 
lowest fertility in China. In general, the facts indicate a significant decline over time in 
all regions in primary sterility though the exact reasons for some particular regions 
remain unidentified. Similar evidence can also be found in Feeney and Wang’s study 
(1993:86-91); all four regions in their discussion, Jilin, Shaanxi, Jiangsu, and 
Guangdong, showed period progression ratios from marriage to first birth rising from the 
1960s onwards.
1.9 Summary
The regional variations in socio-economic conditions still exist and may even have 
widened since 1949, particular between coastal and inner regions. In general, the coastal 
regions, including the three municipality cities, have a large urban population, very
smalle^ ethnic minority populations, and higher GDP per capita. These features
/
contributed to regional variation in fertility regimes.
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General fertility and marital fertility in all regions rose from the 1940s to the 1950s, 
when fertility was basically uncontrolled. Exceptions were Shanghai and Beijing where 
contraception practice started among the elder age groups and the fertility was more 
likely to be controlled already. During the Great Famine, fertility suffered catastrophic 
falls in most regions, although less severe falls were seen in some northern regions and 
some southern ones. After the middle of the 1960s, the government started to carry out 
a birth control programme focused on the urban population: as a consequence, in those 
regions with higher proportions of urban population, fertility experienced a sharp 
reduction. However, a massive fertility reduction in most regions started in the early 
1970s, when the national family planning campaigns were launched. Fertility reductions 
in all regions were gathering momentum after the ‘Later-Longer-Less’ and ‘One Child’ 
campaign, although these policies were more relaxed in the ethnic minority regions.
All the regional evidence also confirms the national trend of a rise in natural fertility 
after the 1940s. The regional trends of increase were not homogeneous; generally, they 
were more significant in coastal areas and municipality cities. One exception was 
Shanghai, where the increase of natural fertility was not as remarkable as in the two 
counterpart cities. The possible reason was a more controlled marital fertility of women 
aged 20-24 in Shanghai than in the other regions, thus even the adjusted model may not 
be ‘adjusted’ adequately to fit this reality, and leads to an underestimate of natural 
fertility. Between the regions, the level of natural fertility was also not clear-cut, as it 
was generally lower in inner provinces or ethnic minority areas. Nevertheless, what is 
striking, is the remarkable similarity of regional trends.
Corresponding to this pattern, similar evidence on birth intervals and breastfeeding
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can be found from a regional division. The birth intervals of early parities particularly 
the first birth interval in most regions shortened. The evidence on the second birth 
intervals is less clear from a few well developed regions such as Tianjin, Heilongjiang, 
Jilin, and Shanghai where control behaviour might play a role in this scenario. For 
breastfeeding, mothers in Shanghai generally offered about four months less breastfeeding 
to their children than mothers from less developed regions. Similarly, the proportion of 
non-breastfed children was substantially higher in well developed regions such as 
Shanghai.
Childlessness dropped substantially over age spans in most areas, though again, 
coastal regions were generally more significant and their levels were generally lower. 
Exceptions do exist, such as the three municipality cities which had the highest 
proportions of childlessness historically, which might be contributed by severe venereal 
diseases in those areas. As in earlier findings, a lower proportion of childlessness was 
located in some inland and less developed regions such as Yunnan, Guizhou, and Inner 
Mongolia.
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Chapter 7 Natural Fertility: Educational Differentials
LI Literature review: educational differentials
It is generally believed that countries display a strong association between the level 
of education achieved, on the one hand, and a range of demographic behaviour, on the 
other. Most scholars interested in this topic have concentrated on the mechanisms through 
which mass education produces decline in fertility and mortality, or alters the propensity 
for migration. Almost no one has ever talked about the relationship between natural 
fertility and education. As we know, despite a tradition of seeing education as producer 
of progress and a received wisdom about the educational contribution to fertility 
behaviour, the empirical results and the explanatory formulation are less than entirely 
satisfactory. Although education has an effect independent of urbanization, education 
levels may serve as proxies for other community-level factors. Higher proportions of 
better educated women are associated with large cities, which have better health services 
and stricter family planning programmes. Even in rural areas, the better educated are 
likely to live in areas of high incomes and proximity to cities or towns, where again the 
conditions may favour underlying fertility. Thus we have few clear guidelines as to what 
to expect in examining the ‘pure’ relationship between education and natural fertility.
Andorka (1978:259-265) suggested that any special direct impact of education on 
fertility does not seem to be demonstrated by themselves. Fertility differentials by 
education seem to be similar in nature to those by socio-economic status. It is generally 
true that education is closely associated with occupation, and thus with income and social
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status, which are key factors in the level of consumption. Consumption, especially food 
consumption, is one of the main influences on the level of nutrition and thus natural 
fertility. Therefore, in a developing country like China, where people have to spend over 
60% of their income on food, education and occupation contribute indirectly to the level 
of natural fertility. Besides income and nutrition, education also changes people’s 
reproductive behaviour. As already mentioned, in traditional Chinese society, the attitude 
towards frequency of intercourse was "the less, the better for health.". Breastfeeding as 
an obligation for mothers was also universal behaviour. A very interesting question, 
therefore, would be, whether the changes in people’s education level have changed their 
reproductive behaviour, such as sexual behaviour and so on, and therefore have some 
impact on natural fertility.
One of the main benefits of the 1/1000 Fertility Survey is that it provides information 
on fertility and nuptiality by women’s education levels achieved throughout the period 
1950-1981, as well as information on birth intervals between different parities by year 
the births occurred and mothers’ education (1930-1980), and the age distribution of 
married women by different parities and education (15-64). The In-Depth Fertility Survey 
also provides information on mean duration of breastfeeding by mother’s education. 
These data allow us to explore the link between education and natural fertility which can 
contribute not only to our knowledge of the demographic past in China, but also to a 
general understanding of the demographic situation in the world today.
1.2 A brief introduction to educational differentials in socio-economic status
After 1949, the Chinese education system more or less followed the Russian. There
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are five main education levels in this system: no schooling: illiteracy; then primary school 
education taking 5-6 years. Middle (secondary) school education is divided into two 
levels: junior middle school and senior middle school, each of which takes about 2-3 
years schooling. Finally, university and college education take about four years to 
complete an undergraduate (bachelor degree) study. (A master’s degree study takes about 
2-3 years and a Ph.D takes again 2-3 years extra after a master’s degree). Here we can 
effectively group these five levels into two clusters: the less educated, which includes 
illiterate women or those educated in only primary school; and the better educated, which 
includes women educated secondary school and above, such as junior middle school, 
senior middle school, and finally university and college (including both undergraduate and 
postgraduate studies).
Table 7.1 Chinese people’s occupations by education level in 1987
Worker Peasant Official Intellectual
Illiteracy 5.5 10.5 1.9 —
Primary 11.0 30.8 1.9 0.8
Junior 37.7 43.6 15.4 3.0
Senior 41.7 14.9 38.9 18.3
University 4.1 0.0 41.9 77.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Education differentials in socio-economic status in China contain aspects of inherited 
inequalities. Before 1949 when the communists took power, a professor could earn more 
than a hundred time as much as a shop assistant. It was always generally assumed in 
China that the longer you were educated, the better socio-economic position you would 
obtain. Although, after 1950 a sense of equality was introduced and the status of the 
working classes rose, education was never discouraged, except during the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ in 1966-75. Social mobility in China is difficult but possible, e.g. a peasant’s
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son could migrate into an urban area as a resident if he could pass the national 
examination for university admission and then he would be provided with a job in an 
urban institution after he graduated from a university or college.
Table 7.2 Consumption of the non-peasant population in 1958*
Industries Service Teacher1 Government
Worker Engineer Worker Functionary
Food consumption (k.g.)
Grain 167.8 161.5 158.4 160.6 161.9
Vegetable 116.8 125.9 113.9 119.7 121.6
Meat 8.6 10.4 8.9 10.4 10.8
Oil 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.0 4.4
Sugar 1.6 1.7 1.7 2.0 2.0
Clothing(meter) and medical expenses(yna/i)
Clothing 9.6 9.8 6.7 7.3 7.5
Medical 4.2 5.5 3.8 5.0 4.5
* China State Statistical Bureau: A survey o f workers and staffs* family budget in 195619571958 .
1, Primary and secondary school’ teachers.
There is a strong positive relation between length of education and socio-economic 
status of occupation. A special survey on intellectuals’ situation was carried out in Beijing 
and its rural suburbs in 1987.2 The sample size was 1700 with a 95.9% response rate.3 
The published results presenting the relationship between education levels ever achieved 
and current occupations are shown in Table 7.1. The results, although with some 
variation, indicate that the less educated are mainly manual workers and peasants, while 
the better educated are employed mainly as professionals, or teachers and government
1 Lin Baipeng 1987: China Consumption Structure Study, Economic Science Press, Beijing.
2 In China, the definition of intellectuals was set by the government as people who are either 
government functionaries with education of above technical secondary school and polytechnic, or 
professionals and teachers in all educational institutions.
3 Zhang Ming and Hu Jiafeng 1989: A analysis of intellectuals’ survey in Zhou Fengliang (ed) A Study 
o f Intellectuals* Economic Policies: Difficulties and Solutions, Spring and Autumn Press, Beijing .
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functionaries.
As in other countries, differentials in occupation are always related to income 
divergence, and thus naturally related to differentials in consumption. Although a 
rationing system for main consumption goods, such as grain, cooking oil, sugar, and 
clothing, was implemented from the 1950s, thus the diminishing the effect of differential 
income on consumption, the differential in level and structure of consumption from 
occupation is still clear in Tables 7.2 and 7.3.
Table 7.3 Income and consumption by occupation in 1987*
Rural Urban Junior Engineer1 Senior
Peasant Resident Officer Engineer2
Income and Living Expenses(yMfl/?)
Income 462.5 1012.2 1078.9 1203.8 1561.2
Expense 398.3 884.4 928.4 931.8 1294.6
Food Consumed(A:.g.)
Grain 211.0 133.9 138.2 135.0 134.6
Vegetable 130.0 142.6 134.9 139.0 147.6
Meat 12.8 25.3 25.0 26.4 36.2
Oil 4.7 6.4 6.4 6.6 7.7
Sugar 1.7 2.5 2.6 2.8 4.8
* Source: China State Statistical Bureau 1989: 1988 Statistical Yearbook. 1, Including those who 
have professional titles of equivalent level to lecturer, or editor and so on. 2, Including those who 
have professional titles of equivalent level to professor, senior editor and so on.
As shown in Table 7.2, due to the rationing system, there was no substantial 
difference in consumption of grain, sugar, and cooking oil by people with different 
occupations, (some differences in main food were set by the government, e.g. manual 
workers had a larger ration of grain than others), but for those goods and services beyond 
the rationing system such as meat, vegetables, and medical services, differentials by 
occupation did exist. Government functionaries, professionals and teachers were in much 
better positions for consumption of food and other relevant services than other
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occupations. A similar pattern existed in 1987, (see Table 7.3), when the economic 
reforms were being carried on successfully and the income level of peasants and workers 
had greatly improved.
1.3 Differentials in general fertility
Table 7.4 and Figure 7.1 show the TFR from 1950 to 1986 for cohorts of the five 
education levels separately. The educational differentials in the level of fertility before 
the 1950s are not so clear. After 1950, the fertility pattern of educational variation was 
quite consistent over time: on average, the longer education a woman undertook, the 
fewer children she bore. A similar view is maintained by Lavely and Freedman 
(1990:358) that there was lower marital fertility among the better educated, both before 
and after the intensive family planning programme in China. However, it is also clear 
here that the educational differentials in general fertility rose over time until the middle 
of the 1970s, then narrowed down afterwards. Total fertility rates in 1950 were about 4 
and 5.2 for the better educated and the less educated women respectively, while they 
were about 1.5 and 2.8 in 1982. Generally speaking, the TFR of the less educated was 
always higher than that of their counterparts.
In the early 1950s, all cohorts’ fertility at different education levels rose steadily. By 
1954, the fertility had increased significantly among the less educated cohorts to a level 
of 6, with only relatively minor increases among the better educated. From the middle 
of the 1950s, TFR stayed at high levels among the less educated, but dropped a little 
among the better educated, which could be due to improvement in employment so that 
educated women were more prompted to go out to work, and thus postpone or reduce
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their childbearing. Especially, before 1958 when the premature industrialization campaign 
"Great Leap Forward" was launched, restrictions on contraceptive use were lifted, and 
abortion and sterilization were legalized, which were greatly welcomed by those better 
educated and working women such as government functionaries.
Table 7.4 Total fertility rates(TFR) 1950-86: five education levels
Year Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
1950 5.494 5.129 4.898 3.874 2.418
1951 5.458 5.003 4.515 4.705 2.528
1952 6.410 5.346 4.544 4.466 2.988
1953 5.972 5.059 4.494 3.975 2.381
1954 6.213 5.631 5.128 4.071 3.805
1955 6.233 5.484 4.850 4.418 2.416
1956 5.842 5.170 4.423 3.634 2.553
1957 6.413 6.037 4.574 3.796 3.638
1958 5.682 5.336 4.191 3.401 2.844
1959 4.359 4.157 3.575 2.966 2.010
1960 4.068 3.944 3.058 2.646 1.874
1961 3.341 3.251 2.904 2.555 1.658
1962 6.214 5.350 4.627 3.221 3.231
1963 7.741 7.162 5.435 4.439 3.860
1964 6.412 5.620 4.223 2.836 2.167
1965 6.502 5.199 3.768 2.207 1.897
1966 6.842 5.206 3.668 2.537 1.466
1967 5.776 4.467 3.344 2.183 2.415
1968 6.960 5.658 4.206 3.502 2.591
1969 6.247 4.945 3.870 3.010 2.887
1970 6.352 5.046 3.805 3.021 2.374
1971 6.001 4.861 3.545 2.736 2.749
1972 5.516 4.430 3.184 2.513 2.092
1973 5.107 4.142 2.903 2.467 2.219
1974 4.809 3.816 2.561 2.075 1.639
1975 . 4.133 3.386 2.329 1.830 1.331
1976 3.827 3.088 2.061 1.691 1.325
1977 3.352 2.732 2.064 1.761 1.434
1978 3.258 2.663 2.047 1.883 1.556
1979 3.426 2.732 2.027 1.870 1.692
1980 2.805 2.298 1.776 1.722 1.229
1981 3.372 2.674 2.109 2.027 1.549
1986 2.948 2.482 2.130 1.814 1.116
Source: 1950-81 fertility rates were estimated by the truncated age-specific fertility by education 
from China Population Information Centre(1988), 1986 fertility rates by education were directly 
available from China State Statistical Bureau, Department of Population Statistics (1988),
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1959-1961 was, again, the period of a nationwide famine typified by a consistent and 
huge drop in the fertility of all cohorts of five education levels, but the differential is 
clear: the less educated a group was, the deeper the trough of fertility was. 
Comparatively the better educated women suffered much less food shortage during this 
period, because most of them were either originally from urban areas (hence living in 
urban areas), or were recruited into the non-agriculture sector, thus migrating into urban 
areas, where food was better supplied and usually guaranteed. In consequence, the 
fertility of the better educated women, although generally lower than that of their 
counterparts, dropped less than that of less educated cohorts in 1959-61.
Figure 7.1 Total fertility rates(TFR) 1950-81: five education levels
legend: ■  Illiteracy', + Primary; ♦ Junior, * Senior, x University.
1
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The TFRs recovered during the 1962-66 and rose to their peak values for the cohorts
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of all education levels in 1963, the highest since 1949. Illiterate women had a TFR of 
7.74 and primary school educated women had a very close level: 7.162. These was no 
exception for the better educated women, such as those with university education level, 
whose TFR also reached the highest level, of 3.86, in its post-1949 history. A dramatic 
fertility decline of the better educated cohorts began immediately after the fertility surge 
in 1963, and dropped in 1966 to levels lower than in the mid-1950s. In contrast, less 
educated cohorts’ fertility in 1966 returned to the same level as in the mid-1950s, even 
with a slight increase among illiterate women, which is believed to be a lagged and larger 
effect of the fertility compensation after the more severe fertility drop than in other better 
educated cohorts in the previous years. It was in this period that educational differentials 
in fertility reached their peak and fertility transition among better educated cohorts began 
with a small fluctuation in the late 1960s.
During 1967-1969, average levels of fertility for most cohorts were lower than in the 
preceding period, and reached a trough in 1967. This may reflect the continuation of a 
downward trend that started after 1963, though this was also clearly related to the chaotic 
events of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, when virtually no family planning programme was 
carried on. Perhaps some of the better educated women might have continued their birth 
control practices spontaneously, or perhaps normal family life suffered severe disturbance 
as a consequence of all the better educated people being involved in mass activity, thus 
fertility did not rise much among them. For less educated women, fertility remained at 
a high level in the late 1960s.
The 1970-78 period is well-known for its significant fertility decline which was 
brought about by birth control practices among all differently educated cohorts. The
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fertility trends also suggest that the effect of education on fertility may increase over 
time. Compared with the 1950s and 1960s, the reductions of fertility from 1969 to 1975, 
were 35%, 31%, 41%, 40%, and 55% for the cohorts from those with no education to 
those with the highest. The effect of education on changes of TFR is clear: the decline 
was positively related to length of education. Caldwell and Srinivasan (1984:76) also 
suggested that fertility was higher among those least susceptible to government pressure 
(mostly illiterate women) who were more likely to find their children productive assets. 
From 1975 to 1978, fertility kept declining among the less educated women, another 20% 
for both illiterate and primary school educated women, and 15% for junior middle school 
educated women. For the two longest educated cohorts, TFR had a slight rise from 1977, 
which is possibly due to the ending of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, and the highly educated 
‘intellectuals’ regaining an honourable socio-economic status, thus prompting and 
recovering their fertility from the harsh ‘Cultural Revolution’, when most of them were 
publicly and outrageously criticised, when many of their families were broken or 
separated, and when most of them lost their jobs and were sent to the countryside to be 
"re-educated" by peasants.
After 1978, government intervention in childbearing was much stronger than ever 
before. Intensive mass education and propaganda campaigns were conducted, by which 
the younger, and better educated were certain to be more affected. In a preferred family 
size survey carried out in Hongan and Zigui counties, Hubei Province, in 1983, Whyte 
and Gu (1987:481-483) found a clear relationship between the education level of the 
women interviewed and their preferred family sizes: women who had at least senior high 
school education were more likely to prefer one child, and much less likely to prefer 
three children or more, than were other women. The TFR of all education levels declined
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to their troughs in 1980. However, after 1980, fertility rose again in 1981, particularly 
among the less educated women, as a new marriage law was declared in 1980 entailing 
a relaxation of controls on age at first marriage. Meanwhile, the success of economic 
reform and decentralizing agriculture production led to relaxation of pressure on birth 
control in rural areas, where most less educated women were living. Generally speaking, 
fertility differentials narrowed in this period. Yet the differentials in fertility among the 
five cohorts still exist but are diminishing; this tendency may be caused by the progress 
of family-planning programmes. This supports a cross-national study’s finding, that 
educational differentials tend to be smaller in places with an effective birth control 
programme4.
The TFR of all five cohorts kept declining as the ‘One Child’ policy was still being 
carried on and implemented more widely after 1982. The three better educated cohorts’ 
TFR was recorded below the replacement level in 1986. From 1981 to 1986, the fertility 
of two extreme cohorts, the illiterate and university level educated groups, had the largest 
reductions, 13% and 29% respectively. Illiterate women were the only cohort keeping 
their TFR over 3 until the early 1980s, and thus under the pressure of the ‘One Child’ 
policy in the mid-1980s, the family planning programme played a key part in this big 
reduction. For university educated women, the 29% reduction largely is due to volitional 
exercise, reflecting an ideology transition among these newly and highly educated women 
who entered universities after the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and were under the influences of 
both economic reform and western culture. The minor changes in TFR among other 
cohorts after 1981 obviously showed different degrees of difficulty in the implementation
4United Nations Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, Relationships between 
fertility and education: A comparative Analysis o f World Fertility Survey Data fo r  Twenty-Two 
Developing Countries, ST/ESA/SER.R/48.
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o f  the policy.
1.4 Differentials in marital fertility
The trends in the observed age-specific ever-married fertility rates for the cohorts 
of the five education levels are plotted in Figure 7.2 for couples married between 1950 
and 1986. The effect of education on marital fertility is clear: the number of children 
ever bom to married women declined consistently with increasing education. The ever 
married fertility rates show it to be a general pattern that the highest fertility is for 
women with no education, while women with longest education bear the smallest number 
of children. In terms of time trend, in 1950-86, except for the crisis period of 1959-61, 
age specific marital fertility experienced a substantial increase among younger age groups 
of all education cohorts before 1967-69. Evidence of extremely low fertility among old 
but better educated cohorts also indicates that birth control practice was already quite 
prevalent among the better educated cohorts before the national campaigns in the 1970s.
During the periods of demographic disturbance in 1959-61 and 1962-66, the crisis 
of marital fertility showed a familiar pattern: the better educated a population was, the 
less severe were the fluctuations of marital fertility. Within each education level cohort, 
the marital fertility of younger age cohorts displays a deeper trough than that of old age 
cohorts, possibly indicating that malnutrition affected young cohorts’ fecundability more 
than older ones, no matter what the level of education achieved. However, younger but 
better educated women displayed a less steep fertility trough than their counterparts of 
less educated women.
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79-81
Figure 7.2 Age specific ever-married fertility rates 1950-86: five education 
levels
a: Illiteracy b: Primary school
c: Junior middle school d: Senior middle school
e: University and college f: China as a whole
legend: H 15-19; + 20-24; ♦ 25-29; a 30-34; x 35-39; ▼ 40-44.
After 1967-69, a dramatic decline in marital fertility among all age groups of married 
women took place consistently over all education cohorts, except for age group 15-19 of 
illiterate women. The trend undoubtedly reflected the overwhelming increase in the 
practice of family planning. The marital fertility decline was less significant among the
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better educated women, which was obviously due to the fact that these women practised 
birth control much earlier and thus had a lower level of marital fertility even before the 
birth control campaigns. So, comparatively speaking, the birth control campaigns in the 
1970s altered the better educated women’s reproductive behaviour less than that of the 
less educated.
A sharp increase is evident in marital fertility among the age group 20-24 consistently 
in all five cohorts from 1979-81 to 1986. Apart from the reasons already noted, such as 
a large marriage boom with a relaxation of restrictions on both age at first marriage and 
birth control, others that could be noted are perhaps an increase of pre-marital 
conceptions, and a nationwide rise in natural fertility, as an result of economic reform 
and consumption conditions dramatically improving. On balance, these latter factors were 
probably the more crucial. In contrast to age group 20-24, the older age groups reduced 
their marital fertility consistently over this period, particularly among the better educated 
cohorts, which was certainly assisted by both the influences of ‘One Child’ policy, 
economic reform and ideology changes.
1.5 Differentials in natural fertility
Again, we have the indices of M and m estimated from Coale and Trussell’s original 
model and its adjusted version: they are presented in Table 7.5 for 33 years’ marriage 
cohorts of five education levels separately. The estimated results of the two versions of 
the model in Table 7.5 are quite consistent, which reflects the fact that the trend of 
increase was evident in all periods before the 1970s, except during the crisis period of 
1959-61.
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Again, as data of the duration marital fertility rates (DMFR) on 0-4 years marriage 
from 1940 to 1981 are plotted with M in Figure 7.3, they show quite consistent changes 
with M in all periods before 1962-66, when China’s fertility was mainly a natural pattern, 
although this consistency is less clear for the university educated population. The 
DMFR(0-4) rose substantially in all five cohorts during 1940-1949, especially for the less 
educated group. This certainly leads to the possibility that the underlying level of natural 
fertility, M, during 1940-49 rose substantially for all five cohorts, though the actual 
changes and levels of M before 1950 remain unknown.
The general increases in marital fertility among the less educated married women 
were reflected in the substantial rises in M in successive marriage cohorts before the 
1970s shown in Table 7.5, while decreases in the marital fertility of better educated 
cohorts due to practising birth control, a trend of increase in underlying fertility is still 
interpreted by the model as the substantial rises in both M and m since 1950. Similarly 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show the shift in the age pattern of marital fertility towards a decline 
with age after the period 1967-69 for the less educated cohorts as well, indicative of a 
difference in the timing of the beginning of family limitation. So far as the differentials 
are concerned, the pattern is clear and consistent, in both models: the better educated a 
cohort is, the higher the level of natural fertility. The same evidence was found in the 
early years of the century, when the population was fully noncontraceptive, by Griffing 
and Lamson,5 who showed that literate women with literate husbands bore more children 
than illiterate women with illiterate husbands.
5This literature was reviewed in Herbert D. Lambson, ‘Differential reproduction in China’, Quarterly 
Review in Biology 10, (September) 1935, pp.308-321.
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Figure 7.3 Duration (0-4 years of first marriage) marital fertility rates 
(multiplied by 2.5) and Index of underlying level of natural fertility M(v2) 
1940-69: five education levels
a: Illiteracy b: Primary school
2
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0 o
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O.S
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c: Junior middle school d: Senior middle school
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g: University and college f: China as a whole
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Legend: H  M; + (0-4) DMFR (multiplied by 2.5)
This phenomenon, I believe, is closely related to income and status of wealth, 
wealthy families normally suffered less starvation, illness, separation from husbands 
leaving home to find job or food, and disturbance from natural disasters, or war and
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bandits. When society was pronatalist, the people with advantages would naturally have 
more children. The Chinese Farm Survey in 1929-31 showed that fertility of families 
with large farms was somewhat higher than that of families with small farms in the study 
of Notestein and Chiao (1937:385-386). Wolf (1984:466) also found a clear positive 
relationship between fertility and status of wealth, and that wealth could stimulate higher 
fertility, when he analysed data of 1906-45 Taiwan Hai-shan women.
Table 7.5 Index of underlying level of natural fertility(M) by marriage cohorts 
1950-86, and by original Coale-Trussell’s model and its adjusted version:
five education levels
Marriage Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
Cohort
Adjusted Model (v2)
50-54 0.696 0.741 0.829 1.140 1.250
55-58 0.724 0.779 0.811 1.137 1.150
59-61 0.480 0.593 0.702 0.895 0.886
62-66 0.829 0.872 0.867 1.171 1.060
67-69 0.821 0.881 0.933 1.202 1.201
70-78 0.779 0.912 0.954 1.154 0.793
79-81 0.831 0.988 1.127 1.277 1.000
1986 0.904 1.055 1.168 1.460 1.272
Original Model (vl)
50-54 0.677 0.700 0.766 0.926 0.947
55-58 0.705 0.737 0.750 0.922 0.883
59-61 0.467 0.548 0.614 0.698 0.685
62-66 0.808 0.813 0.773 0.910 0.818
67-69 0.793 0.799 0.798 0.921 0.935
70-78 0.721 0.776 0.769 0.872 0.636
79-81 0.685 0.738 0.796 1.019 0.690
1986 0.693 0.751 0.787 0.915 0.790
After 1970 when the national family planning campaigns took place, age specific 
marital fertility of all age groups for the all five cohorts began or accelerated its decline, 
(except that of age group 15-19 which is not included in the estimation of M). This 
feature, as was discussed in Chapter 4, is not well captured by original Coale and
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Trussell’s model. Naturally, the estimates of underlying level of natural fertility, M, by 
the original model show two unrealistic results in Table 7.5: (1), there are no substantial 
differences of M values between the less educated women and the better educated groups 
and (2), M for all five cohorts contracted substantially after 1967-69, a similar 
underestimate as made for the nation as a whole by the original model.
Table 7.6 Index of fertility control (m) and goodness of fit by marriage 
cohort 1950-86 and Coale-Trussell’s model: five education levels
Marriage
Cohort
Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
m
50-54 0.200 0.405 0.570 1.491 1.989
55-58 0.194 0.401 0.559 1.503 1.900
59-61 0.203 0.563 0.964 1.780 1.839
62-66 0.184 0.496 0.825 1.805 1.859
67-69 0.248 0.706 1.116 1.906 1.792
70-78 0.557 1.160 1.545 2.011 1.581
79-81 1.384 2.093 2.493 3.236 2.659
1986 1.890 2.414 2.818 3.333 3.398
R2
50-54 0.965 0.950 0.929 0.846 0.864
55-58 0.953 0.944 0.918 0.853 0.834
59-61 0.810 0.959 0.972 0.877 0.832
62-66 0.913 0.986 0.997 0.927 0.813
67-69 0.945 0.978 0.979 0.904 0.820
70-78 0.994 0.991 0.972 0.973 0.833
79-81 0.972 0.991 0.967 0.940 0.837
1986 0.985 0.994 0.998 0.977 0.890
So in circumstances such as in China after 1970, or for the better educated population 
even earlier, the fertility schedule has a quite different picture from the assumption of 
Coale and Trussell’s model. In this circumstance, the underlying level of natural fertility 
for the whole population after 1978, or for the university educated population even after 
the 1950s, estimated from the original model, can be considerably underestimated and 
thus unrealistically show only minor differentials in natural fertility among the five
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cohorts, especially after the 1970s. Particularly after 1979, when socio-economic 
conditions came to favour natural fertility, this feature is captured much better by the 
adjusted model. However, in Table 7.7, when compared with the other cohorts, the 
university level educated population had only a trivial increase in natural fertility even 
by the adjusted model. As Table 7.5 shows, it had the highest level of natural fertility 
in all cohorts until the 1960s. But after 1970, it dropped to the second highest position 
below that of the senior middle school educated. In fact, on average, the university 
educated women has a much better socio-economic status than the senior middle school 
educated, in terms of either actual income level, or medical services and other social 
welfare. Thus, they should have the highest level of natural fertility. This leads to the 
possibility of a similar problem existing in estimating M even in the adjusted model.
In Coale and Trussed’s original model, they assumed that married women at age 20- 
24 have no birth control practice, while in the adjusted model the assumption is made that 
on average half of them begin to practise birth control (see Chapter 3). In addition, Table
7.6 presents the birth control index m by education, compared with the same measure in 
Lavely and Freedman’s study (1990:363). Although there are minor differences in the 
levels of m for the two studies, the increasing trend and pattern of positive relationship 
between m with education match well. All of this indicates that the university educated 
women might have a more controlled fertility schedule. As Table 7.16 shows, mean age 
at first marriage rose to over 26 for university educated population after 1970, and those 
who married at age 20 to 24 were more likely to practise birth control after the ‘Later- 
Longer-Less’ campaign was launched in the middle of 1970s. Because they were the 
highest educated population in China, we could either suppose that they accepted the 
government’s policy more quickly than others, or that they tended to postpone their
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childbearing by spacing behaviour for their own reasons. If either or both are true—that 
they practised birth control stronger and sooner after marriage than even the adjusted 
model assumed, then even this adjusted model could underestimate their natural fertility 
(M). In other words, the adjusted model may not be modified enough to display the real 
underlying level of natural fertility for this particular cohort in China. Although making 
a further adjusted model for them would be possible, it does not seem necessary as long 
as we are aware of this possibility of underestimation.
Table 7.7 Change in index of underlying level of natural fertility(M) by 
marriage cohort 1950-86: five education levels
Marriage Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
Cohort
Adjusted Model (v2)
50-54/55-58 +0.027 +0.039 -0.018 -0.003 -0.100
55-58/59-61 -0.244 -0.187 -0.109 -0.242 -0.265
59-61/62-66 +0.348 +0.279 +0.165 +0.276 +0.228
62-66/67-69 -0.008 +0.010 +0.066 +0.031 +0.319
67-69/70-78 -0.041 +0.031 +0.021 -0.048 -0.522
70-78/79-81 +0.052 +0.076 +0.172 +0.123 +0.270
79-81/1986 +0.073 +0.066 +0.042 +0.183 +0.092
50-54/1986 +0.208 +0.314 +0.339 +0.320 +0.022
Original Model (vl)
50-54/55-58 +0.027 +0.037 -0.016 -0.004 -0.064
55-58/59-61 -0.238 -0.189 -0.136 -0.224 -0.197
59-61/62-66 +0.341 +0.266 +0.159 +0.212 +0.169
62-66/67-69 -0.015 -0.015 +0.026 +0.011 +0.239
67-69/70-78 -0.072 -0.023 -0.029 -0.049 -0.374
70-78/79-81 -0.036 -0.038 +0.027 +0.147 +0.068
79-81/1986 +0.008 +0.013 -0.009 -0.104 +0.003
50-54/1986 +0.016 +0.051 +0.021 -0.011 -0.157
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Table 7 .8  Proportion(%) o f births occurring in 0-7 months o f  the first
marriage by marriage cohort 1945-75: five education levels
Marriage
Cohort
Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
45-49 0.79 0.39 0.76
50-54 1.18 1.02 0.90
55-58 0.99 1.10 1.64 1.05
59-61 0.73 0.83 1.49 0.96
62-66 1.07 1.24 1.47 1.68 0.59
67-69 1.30 1.46 1.61 1.91 0.71
70-75 1.27 1.75 2.30 1.84 0.63
Table 7.8 again reflects the fact that extremely low proportions of women in China 
engaged in pre-nuptial sexual activities. Before 1975, less than two percent of all brides 
were pregnant on the day of the wedding, the highest value being 2.3 percent for the 
junior middle school educated. Generally speaking, the better educated had a slightly 
higher level of pre-nuptial pregnancies with a more rapid rise than the less educated. The 
exception was university educated women who had only less than 1 % births bom in the 
first seven months of marriage. This was most likely due to the fact that they were more 
aware of contraceptive knowledge and used it more effectively than other groups, thus 
avoiding this kind of ‘scandal’ better, rather than that they engaged less in pre-nuptial 
sexual activities than other groups. All of this suggests that the better educated took a less 
serious attitude to sexual activity before marriage—a cultural taboo. As we mentioned 
before, there was growing evidence of premarital sexual behaviour in China from the 
later 1970s and perhaps much more in the 1980s, although we lack statistical information. 
However, the absolute proportion of pregnant brides in the whole nation in the early 
1980s is believed to be well below 5%, though for some better educated groups it might 
be slightly higher. Thus the influence on M value contributed by pre-marital pregnancies 
was still negligible (see Chapter 4).
247
1.6 Differentials in fecundabilitv
In Table 7.9 and Figure 7.4 (three-year moving average trend), we present mean 
fecundability based on Bongaarts’ model for the five cohorts respectively. To avoid 
truncation bias (see Chapter 3), we provide a general picture of fecundability only from 
1941 to 1975, thus all women who had enough time (five years) under observation to be 
in the samples. For the university educated population, the estimate is not fully reliable 
to interpret its fecundability level as the sample size is very limited.
As we found in other chapters, the most striking features of the fecundability 
estimates (FB) in Table 7.9 are the extremely low level of mean fecundability of illiterate 
women, and the wide differentials in levels of the mean fecundability of these five 
cohorts, which grew wider from 1940 onwards. The pattern of the differences also 
indicates that the positive relationship between the mean fecundability and education 
persisted over time. The features of the educational pattern of fecundability were 
consistent with similar findings in Jain’s study (1969b:82) on Taiwan urban women in 
1962, which showed mean fecundability to be 0.093, 0.131 and 0.149 for women from 
no education, to primary school, and junior or above respectively. The same finding was 
also made by Freedman and Takeshita (1969:75). It is also plausible that Taiwan women 
enjoyed a higher level of fecundability than their mainland counterpart at comparable 
education level and time.
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Table 7.9 Mean fecundability by marriage cohort 1941-75: 
five education levels
Marriage
Cohort
Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
1941 0.03928 0.07230 0.06466
1942 0.04239 0.04979 0.05203 0.07889
1943 0.04260 0.05827 0.11875 0.08370
1944 0.04337 0.07541 0.17421 0.14363
1945 0.04322 0.05151 0.07889 0.09554
1946 0.04871 0.08431 0.14363
1947 0.04316 0.06697 0.18566 0.13218
1948 0.05200 0.06880 0.11802 0.25175
1949 0.05012 0.07874 0.08243 0.27308
1950 0.04714 0.06558 0.12081 0.15247
1951 0.06058 0.08701 0.11019 0.11060 0.09554
1952 0.06588 0.07683 0.09132 0.11519 0.06764
1953 0.06095 0.09434 0.11012 0.19399 0.26031
1954 0.06649 0.09541 0.10227 0.17900 0.18566
1955 0.06399 0.08424 0.14103 0.11433 0.05623
1956 0.06995 0.10071 0.11849 0.09223 0.08474
1957 0.07476 0.10089 0.12840 0.14805 0.10297
1958 0.04059 0.07022 0.12636 0.09554 0.05078
1959 0.03612 0.06915 0.09506 0.15247 0.20373
1960 — 0.04311 0.07912 0.10265 0.04466
1961 0.04607 0.06356 0.11542 0.12820 0.10297
1962 0.06140 0.09788 0.11417 0.16430 0.10601
1963 0.07248 0.10991 0.12186 0.17421 0.17421
1964 0.06219 0.09817 0.14239 0.18884 0.10988
1965 0.07975 0.10687 0.14249 0.13258 0.13218
1966 0.06960 0.10373 0.16882 0.17012 0.18067
1967 0.09122 0.12724 0.18552 0.21445 0.22288
1968 0.10065 0.14270 0.18591 0.18976 0.19068
1969 0.08614 0.13349 0.18193 0.17626 0.24339
1970 0.08260 0.13055 0.14043 0.22467 0.12589
1971 0.08376 0.12936 0.15226 0.17256 0.21422
1972 0.07883 0.11663 0.16747 0.14878 0.14012
1973 0.09985 0.13608 0.14686 0.23642 0.13009
1974 0.11221 0.16214 0.18507 0.18382 0.29030
1975 0.11640 0.16706 0.16788 0.22842
The possible reasons for such low levels of fecundability among the less educated 
cohorts are obvious. The less educated a woman was, the more likely she was to accept 
the traditional pattern of arranged marriage, (see Chapter 8) and sexual behaviour among 
couples could be expected to be more limited at the beginning of such marriages. The
249
mean age at first marriage was about three years younger for the illiterate women than 
for the better educated, such as women educated until senior middle school (see Table 
7.16), which means that illiterate brides were in a less reproductive age category than the 
better educated brides. Lavely and Freedman (1990:365) also suggest that age at marriage 
may have another effect at any specific age. As in general the less educated married 
earlier and thus in longer marriage duration, so they had less intercourse than those who 
married latter but aged the same. Finally, longer duration of breastfeeding by the less 
educated was certainly another factor.
Figure 7.4 Mean fecundability (three-year moving average) by marriage cohort 
1941-75: five education level
a: The less educated women (1941-75) b: The better educated women (1941-75)
0 .0 6
1941 1946 1951 1956 1966 1971
Although variations in the trend of mean fecundability appeared among better 
educated groups, probably due to the small sample size at the earlier dates, a substantial 
rise in fecundability is evident for all five cohorts after the 1940, especially after 1960. 
(see Figure 7.4) It rose slightly during the second half of 1940s, just after the Japanese 
War was over, then worsened again with the outbreak of the civil war. Among the mid 
1940s cohorts, the educational differential in mean fecundability was minor around 0.007-
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0.05. It increased substantially to a level of 0.019-0.1 for women married in 1950, and 
then slightly decreased to 0.03-0.07 in 1957, which indicates either that fecundability rose 
more quickly among the less educated than the better educated cohorts, or that the better 
educated groups began to practise birth control earlier than others. There was a 
predictable trough for those married during the crisis of 1958-60 for all five groups, 
while less educated women suffered a more severe and longer decline in fecundability. 
Finally, a dramatic increase occurred in all cohorts from the middle of the 1960s 
onwards. The total rise amounted to 300 and 270 percent for the less educated and better 
educated cohorts respectively during the thirty-five years. The difference also reached its 
highest level in the 1970s cohorts. Among these five cohorts, the women who were 
educated until primary school or junior middle had the largest increases in fecundability, 
while those who were educated beyond senior middle school had the least improvement, 
which might be due to spacing behaviour, especially in the 1970s.
The impact of the increase in fecundability on the interval between marriage and first 
birth can be seen in Table 7.10 and Figure 7.5, where the observed mean first intervals 
for the five cohorts are given together with mean second birth interval. As we can see, 
the observed mean first interval fell from 31 and 25 to 19 and 18 months for the less and 
better educated cohorts respectively from the 1940 to the late 1970s. Table 7.10 also 
indicates a generally consistent negative correlation of education and the length of the 
first birth interval. This finding is confirmed by what is indicated in Lavely and 
Freedman’s study (1990:365) on mean first birth interval by wife’s education for two 
major regions of China (Upper Yangzi and North China) from 1952 to 1976. The gap in 
the mean first birth interval between these two groups narrowed, reaching its minimum 
towards the end of the 1970s. As in the pattern of mean fecundability, the women who
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were educated until primary school or junior middle had the largest decrease in length 
of first birth interval, while the women who were educated beyond senior middle schools 
had the least decrease.
Figure 7.5 Mean length(months) of the first two birth intervals by year of 
first marriage and first birth 1940-80: five education levels
a: Illiteracy b: Primary school
c: Junior middle school d: Senior middle school
e: University and college f: China as a whole
Legend: H  1st parity; -I- 2nd parity
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Table 7.10  M ean length(months) o f  the first birth interval by first marriage
cohort 1940-80: five education levels
1st Marriage 
Cohort
Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
1940-44 33.88 29.94 27.36 20.29 28.38
1945-49 31.32 27.74 23.04 23.63 16.28
1950-54 27.28 26.07 24.00 22.89 21.91
1955-58 30.50 26.12 24.00 23.83 26.89
1959-61 31.14 27.68 24.60 23.33 23.04
1962-66 25.33 22.92 20.82 20.63 23.08
1967-70 23.36 20.29 18.92 17.63 18.96
1971-75 22.12 19.46 18.77 18.43 19.82
1976-80* 20.07 17.80 18.31 17.98
♦Estimated by the information from the In-Depth Fertility Survey in 1985.
Table 7.11 Mean length(months) of the second birth interval by first 
birth cohort 1940-70: five education levels
1st Birth 
Cohort
Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
40-44 36.05 34.05 31.67
45-49 34.45 34.70 32.35 30.33 35.60
50-54 33.97 32.85 32.12 32.99 30.12
55-58 39.19 32.83 31.49 31.60 39.55
59-61 35.39 37.56 35.90 38.25 48.40
62-66 30.82 30.80 32.98 35.67 35.90
67-70 30.30 30.19 30.98 34.80
In Table 7.11, we also present the trends of the interval between first and second 
births. The mean second birth intervals presented in Table 7.11 are based on closed birth 
intervals occurring within nine years after the first birth. Compared with the first birth 
interval, the second kept more or less steady, though a substantial decline is still obvious 
among the less educated groups, in a fall from about 36 months in the 1940 first birth 
cohort to 30 months for the later 1960s cohorts. However, this declining trend was not 
totally consistent, as the second birth interval of the better educated group showed no 
long-run decline at all. A most noticeable feature is a minor difference in length of 
second birth interval among these five cohorts. There was only about a five-month
difference among them over time. After the 1960s this interval for the better educated 
group was growing longer, which was obviously due to the much earlier (1960s) family 
planning campaigns in urban areas, where the majority of the better educated population 
were living. However, a substantial decrease in the second birth interval did occur for 
the less educated group and may be attributed to a rise in fecundability. But for the better 
educated group, the relationship between birth interval and fecundability became less 
clear, as deliberate spacing behaviour appears to cloud the issue.
1.7 Differentials in breastfeeding
It has been broadly found that the length of breastfeeding is negatively related to the 
length of mother’s schooling time. Similarly, from a survey in metropolitan Cebu in the 
Philippines in 1983, Stewart et al. recently (1991:195) found that highly educated mothers 
from families in the highest income/asset categories were among the least likely to breast­
feed. For every country that could be investigated in the WFS, the length of breastfeeding 
decreased monotonically with increase in education, with the single exception of Fiji.6
In Table 7.12 we present the mean length of breastfeeding by the year the birth 
occurred and mother’s education level by information from 1985 In-Depth Fertility 
Survey. This is estimated from the distribution of children according to length of 
breastfeeding by years since birth occurred and mother’s current age. Apparently, the 
gaps of the average duration of breastfeeding between better educated, less educated and 
illiterate mothers were generally consistent over time. The durations stayed at more or 
less the same level at 18, 17 and 13 months for three education cohorts respectively until
6 Benoit Ferry and David P. Smith 1983: Breastfeeding Differentials, Comparative Studies, No. 23, 
(WFS).
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the middle of the 1970s, then declined dramatically to 13, 12 and 8 months respectively. 
This obviously could be due to differences in the momentum of improvement in 
employment opportunities for Chinese women with different eduction over time, and an 
earlier fundamental change in attitudes to reproduction among the better educated women 
after 1978. Compared with other countries in Trussell et al. (1992:300) study, the pre- 
1970s pattern here shared similarity with other developing countries in Asia, the Pacific 
and Africa, where mothers breastfed their children about 18 and 13.7 months for those 
educated less than three years and above seven years respectively. The downward trend 7 
in China was consistent with the patterns of natural fertility and fecundability by 
education shown in Table 7.3 i.e. it remained more or less at the same level (a slightly 
rising general trend) until 1977 and rose strikingly afterwards.
Table 7.12 Mean length(months) of breastfeeding by year the births occurred
1960s-1981 and mother’s current age: three education levels
No schooling Primary Secondary+ Total
By year the births occurred
-1967 17.71 15.97 13.10 16.46
1968-72 17.97 16.83 13.05 16.58
1973-77 18.52 17.67 13.45 17.26
1978-81 13.57 12.46 8.53 11.67
Total 17.10 15.86 11.48 15.51
By mother’s current age
40+ 17.98 16.52 12.99 16.63
30-39 16.61 15.84 11.22 15.22
<30 13.45 11.75 8.22 11.21
Total 17.11 15.85 11.5 15.51
♦based on the distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding and confined to children
born at least three years before, and excluding children who died before age two.
Meanwhile the proportion of children who were never breastfed rose steadily from
0.65%, 1.78% and 5.8% to 1.17%, 2.72 and 7.3% for the three education cohorts
respectively, though it was always low, especially for illiterate mothers. The education 
differentials in the mean length of breastfeeding and the proportion of non-breastfed 
children were very obvious. Four months of difference in the mean length of 
breastfeeding between the less and the better educated was persistent over time, while the 
differential in the proportion of non-breastfed children grew slightly wider from about 5 % 
to over 6%.
Figure 7.6 Children’s breastfeeding 1960s-81: three education levels 
(three regions as a whole)
I. The mean length of breastfeeding(months)
a: By year the births occurred b: By mother’s current age
17
30-39
II. The proportions of children who were not breastfed (%)
c: By year the births occurred d: By mother’s current age
A very similar phenomenon but probably not so significant, shown in Figure 7.6 and
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Table 7.13, is that the proportion of children who were not breastfed at all increased over 
time, especially in the better educated group, while it remained relatively stable for the 
less educated mothers. This suggests that these proportions were affected by education, 
but not so strongly influenced by age or the time the birth occurred.
Table 7.13 The proportion(%) of children who were not breastfed by year the births 
occurred 1960s-1981 and mother’s current age: three education levels
No Schooling Primary Secondary+ Total
By year the births occurred
-1967 0.65 1.78 5.80 1.73
1968-72 1.25 1.79 5.70 2.29
1973-77 1.43 2.21 6.75 2.65
1978-81 1.17 2.72 7.34 3.49
Total 1.08 2.11 6.54 2.51
By mother’s current age
40+ 0.59 2.76 3.98 2.29
30-39 1.28 1.70 7.13 2.63
<30 1.01 2.52 6.76 2.45
Total 1.08 2.11 6.54 2.51
♦based on the distribution of children according to length of breastfeeding and confined to children born
at least three years before, and excluding children who died before age two.
1.8 Differentials in primary sterility
Although the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey and the 1987 One-Percent Population 
Survey give us full information on the proportions of ever married women with no live 
birth by age and education, for the better educated women, especially the university 
educated population, the information from the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey is slightly 
harder to interpret as the sample sizes of these better educated women are not quite 
adequate.
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Table 7.14 The proportions(%) of ever-married women who never had a 
live birth by age in the 1982 1/1000 Survey: five education levels
Age Group Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
15-19 68.71 67.21 70.26 85.83
20-24 31.06 36.38 49.99 59.36 57.14
25-29 6.20 7.49 17.22 26.85 35.97
30-34 1.89 1.87 4.08 5.06 12.41
35-39 1.77 1.65 1.81 2.86 0.49
40-44 2.00 1.52 1.66 2.14 4.37
45-49 2.06 2.41 3.44 4.09 1.74
50-54 2.98 4.44 5.75 5.05 4.55
55-59 4.56 6.00 5.93 7.34 12.50
60-64 5.23 7.44 18.25 13.64 6.25
65-67 5.87 12.06 13.46 13.33 7.14
Table 7.15 The proportions(%) of ever-married women who never had a 
live birth by age in the 1987 One-Percent Survey: five education levels
Age Group Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
15-19 65.88 62.96 66.78 70.56 100.00
20-24 25.23 29.52 34.51 41.37 76.53
25-29 2.19 4.84 7.54 11.49 40.17
30-34 1.47 1.43 2.24 3.05 8.48
35-39 1.24 1.05 1.51 1.87 3.63
40-44 1.34 1.15 1.22 1.36 1.19
45-49 1.52 1.33 1.31 1.24 1.17
50-54 1.85 1.82 1.86 1.75 2.35
55-59 2.78 3.23 3.04 3.13 3.55
60-64 4.28 5.95 5.83 6.26 7.20
The proportions of women without a live birth from the 1982 1/1000 Survey and the 
1987 Population Survey are presented in Tables 7.14 and 7.15. A fecund woman should 
have children when she has sufficient time in marriage, and in China, a universal and 
early marriage society, a married Chinese woman about 35 years old is believed to have 
had enough time to have a child, otherwise she is very likely infecund. This is reflected 
from the fact that the proportions of women without a live birth in Table 7.14 reached 
a trough at age groups 35-39 and 40-44 for the less educated and the better educated 
respectively. It is very likely that the married women were infecund if they never had a
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live birth after age 44 for the better or 39 for less educated.
Figure 7.7 Primary sterility: Proportions(%) of ever-married women who 
never had a live birth by age in the two surveys: five education levels
a: Illiteracy b: Primary school
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In Figure 7.7, information from the two surveys indicates a decline in the proportion
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of women with no live birth from the older age group 65-67 or 60-64 to the younger one 
35-39 in all five cohorts, and a huge drop from 55-59 to 45-49 which might be partly due 
to a dramatic improvement of medical service and public health programme in the 1950s, 
especially among the better educated cohorts. The significant declines of the proportions 
are also revealed by the similarity of patterns in the two surveys, especially among the 
less educated groups. All of this suggests that declines in primary sterility contributed 
somewhat to the natural fertility rise in cohorts of all education levels over time.
As far as differences in the proportions between age groups in the two surveys are 
concerned, on average these differences are about 2% for the less educated cohorts and 
irregular numbers for the better educated women. They also widen with age. This 
suggests a marked decline in primary sterility among the better educated and a modest 
decline among the less educated during the 1980s. The 1987 One-Percent Population 
Survey provides the information with much more adequate sample size and the 
proportions show a more regular pattern. The random fluctuation of the 1982 survey’s 
sample size may contribute to the growing differences with age when the proportions in 
1982 and 1987 are compared. Overall, however, a decline in the proportions between the 
two surveys might be one of the factors contributing to the dramatic rise in natural 
fertility in the 1980s.
A familiar phenomenon shown in Figure 7.6 is that on average the proportions of 
better educated ever-married women who never had a live birth were substantially higher 
than those of the less educated, especially in the 1982 survey. This pattern is also 
consistently shown in urban-rural differentials and regional variations: the proportions of 
childless were lower in rural areas and less developed regions than in urban areas and
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more developed regions. Apart from possible reasons discussed in earlier chapters, such 
as higher mortality leading to higher remarriage rate and hence to the chance of 
motherhood, and a higher rate of reporting error among the less educated, it is also 
possible that greater marital disruption rates occurred for the better educated, as these 
spouses were more likely to have been separated by occupational duties, as suggested by 
Lavely and Freedman (1990:367).
We might also mention that these unexpected differences diminished in the 
information from the 1987 survey, which shows that the proportions of better educated 
but childless women decreased in each age group compared with the same age group in 
the data from the 1982 survey, while it decreased much less for the less educated 
population. Apart from the fact that sample size is much more adequate in the 1987 
survey, and thus a more regular pattern is shown among those better educated groups in 
Figure 7.6, this also suggests that significant improvements in primary sterility have 
happened among cohorts of all education levels, especially the better educated.
1.9 Age at first marriage
The mean age at marriage has been rising over the past three decades in cohorts of 
all education levels. Table 7.16 shows that after the early 1940s the mean age at first 
marriage kept on increasing. This increase was relatively slow before 1970 and 
accelerated over the 1970s for the less educated. The increases were more marked at 
earlier dates among the better educated. The mean age at first marriage increased by 
about 1 and over 2 years during two decades of the 1950s and the 1960s, and by about
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2 and 1 during the 1970s for the less and the better educated cohorts respectively.
Table 7.16 Mean age at first marriage by marriage cohort 1940-81:
the five education levels
Marriage
Cohort
Illiteracy Primary Junior Senior University
40-44 17.72 18.07 19.13 20.28 21.45
45-49 17.98 18.26 19.68 20.92 22.89
50-54 18.22 18.42 19.31 21.29 21.23
55-58 18.42 18.73 19.71 21.77 23.54
59-61 18.86 18.85 19.56 21.78 23.72
62-66 18.85 18.89 20.12 22.66 25.16
67-69 18.97 19.53 21.09 23.36 25.61
70-75 20.20 20.94 22.12 23.56 26.25
79-81 21.75 22.11 23.19 23.22 26.32
Table 7.17 Mean length(months) of first birth interval by age at first
marriage and marriage cohort 1960s-1980: three education levels
Marriage Age at first marriage
Cohort < 17 17-19 20-22 23-25 Total
Illiteracy
-1960 27 24 24 26 25
1961-65 22 25 22 20 24
1966-70 26 22 21 19 22
1971-75 29 21 20 18 21
1976-80 12 19 20 17 19
Primary
-1960 24 23 25 20 24
1961-65 23 21 19 14 21
1966-70 19 19 18 17 19
1971-75 24 19 19 17 19
1976-80 23 21 17 17 17
Secondary+
-1960 27 19 17 21 20
1961-65 18 19 17 21 19
1966-70 14 16 16 16 16
1971-75 17 18 16 17
1976-80 18 19 19 16 17
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The information on duration marital fertility by age of first marriage and by 
education levels is not available, thus further discussion of the age impact on increases 
in natural fertility and related education differentials is not feasible. However, national 
information in previous chapters shows that duration marital fertility and fecundability 
have been consistently rising after controlling for age at first marriage. This indicates 
that, in addition to changes in age at first marriage, changes in natural fertility were also 
responsible for changes in marital fertility. Yet the detailed impact from changes in age 
at first marriage on marital fertility at different education levels remains somewhat 
concealed because of the lack of information.
However, from the information provided by 1985 In-Depth Fertility Survey shown 
in Table 7.17, we can see that the mean length of the first birth interval of all education 
groups decreased consistently over time after controlling for age at first marriage. The 
only exceptions were illiterate women married in the period of 1971-75 and the other two 
education groups married before age 22 after 1971, when the national birth control and 
later marriage and childbearing campaigns were launched, leading women to postpone 
births, especially those who married younger and were educated longer.
1.10 Summary
Education in China contributes to occupation differentials, resulting income and 
social status differentials, and to consumption, especially of food, which are key factors 
influencing natural fertility. Since 1949, the Chinese people’s education has been 
enhanced substantially, while educational differences still result in socio-economic
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conditions varying among people. Information from non-demographic surveys indicates 
that the well educated generally have a better occupation, which generally leads to higher 
income and better consumption. This feature seems to contribute to differentials in level 
of natural fertility and its proximate determinants.
The widely observed negative relationship between duration of education and level 
of fertility has been confirmed here. The general fertility and marital fertility of the better 
educated were distinctly lower than those of the less educated, though fertility of all 
education levels experienced a rise during the 1950s, when fertility was basically 
‘natural’. In the middle of the 1960s, the government carried out a birth control 
programme focused on the urban population, to which most of the better educated 
belonged. As a consequence, fertility among the better educated population experienced 
a sharp reduction at this time. The declining trend reversed slightly during the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’, as the birth control programme was disrupted. However, massive fertility 
reduction at all levels of education started after the early 1970s, when the national family 
planning campaigns were launched, while the marital fertility of younger groups such as 
15-19 and 20-24, was generally unchanged or even slightly increasing. The end of the 
‘Cultural Revolution’ and the beginning of the economic reform, in one way, acted to 
restore the highly educated’s socio-economic ‘privilege’ and to link people’s occupation 
and income with the duration of their education. This certainly would improve the better 
educated’s livelihood more than that of the less educated and thus favour their underlying 
natural fertility.
The observed trend of natural fertility by education divisions supports the main 
finding from the national level: natural fertility increased substantially over the period in
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China. However, this upward trend was not identical for all groups, being more 
significant among the better educated generally. The one exception was the university and 
college level educated cohort who had least increase of natural fertility. The most likely 
reason, similar to the one in the estimation of M for women in Shanghai, is that these 
women’s marital fertility schedules on average were more controlled, thus even the 
adjusted model may not be ‘adjusted’ adequately to fit this division, and leads to an 
underestimate of natural fertility, although an increasing trend over time was still 
indicated by the adjusted model. Among the different periods, it is also remarkable that 
from the latter 1970s to the 1980s, the natural fertility of all the education divisions had 
the greatest boost, particularly among the better educated.
Corresponding to this rise, similar evidence on fecundability, birth intervals and 
breastfeeding can be found for women by educational divisions as well. Mean 
fecundability was generally lower before the 1950s, particularly for illiterate women. A 
significant upward trend in fecundability over all education divisions can be observed 
after the 1940s. The better educated women seem to have experienced a greater rise in 
fecundability than less educated women. Factors contributing to this are found to be the 
shorter birth intervals and duration of breastfeeding. The first birth intervals of all 
education levels consistently shortened. Again, for university level educated women, the 
variance of the birth intervals appeared larger due to inadequate sample size. The 
downward trend in the second birth intervals before the 1970s is less clear among the 
better educated. This is partly because full information to estimate the second interval is 
only available up to 1970, and partly because the better educated exercised birth control 
as early as the 1950s, thus producing second intervals that were much less ‘natural’ than 
those that of the less educated. As for breastfeeding, educated mothers generally offered
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about three to four months less to their children than illiterate mothers. Similarly, the 
proportion of non-breastfed children was substantially higher among mothers educated 
at secondary school and above, but the difference in non-breastfed proportions between 
primary school educated mothers and illiterate mothers was very small.
Childlessness dropped substantially over the age span among all educational levels 
of women. Contrary to the findings on other proximate determinants, better educated 
women, within some elderly age groups, generally have more childlessness than the less 
educated. For this, venereal disease might be difficult to explain it. More likely reasons, 
apart from that the higher remarriage rate resulting from worse mortality among the less 
educated might indirectly act as a reducing factor to childlessness, were a higher rate of 
reporting error when some adopted children were deliberately misreported as natural 
children by the less educated, and greater marital disruption rates for the better educated, 
as these spouses were more likely to have been separated by occupational duties.
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Chapter 8 Background Determinants
I Background determinants
In the previous chapters, we have documented the changes in natural fertility and its 
proximate determinants in China as whole, as well as the urban-rural, regional and 
educational differentials over the past four decades. Here we come to the concluding 
analysis examining changes in the background determinants of natural fertility. As we 
illustrated in Chapter 2, fertility determinants may be roughly grouped into proximate 
determinants and background (ultimate) determinants. Although not covering all the 
proximate determinants, available data allow us to analyse the most crucial proximate 
determinants in detail, such as fecundability, birth intervals, breastfeeding, primary 
sterility, and age at first marriage. Moreover, a good deal of research has been carried 
out to examine the socio-economic determinants of China’s fertility transition. Therefore, 
our examination is limited to the link between the ultimate variables (such as socio­
economic and institutional factors) and natural fertility, to shed light on the general 
mechanism of natural fertility change, and how the roles played by socio-economic 
factors over time.
1.1 Economic development and income level rising
China has always been a rural country. In October 1949, the Chinese Communist 
Party officially took power and has been controlling the entire administration ever since.
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For almost thirty years up to 1979 the Chinese government, through the State Council 
and its associated departments, attempted to practise comprehensive central economic 
planning. The central economic planners, or policy makers tried to make as many 
decisions as possible concerning consumption, production of output, employment of 
input, distribution of income and investment. They assigned labour by directing workers 
to different factories, and attempted to control the consumption of final goods and 
services, either by setting the price of goods sold through public retail outlets and letting 
the consumer decide what and how much to buy, or by rationing goods through coupons.
They also attempted to determine individual incomes. They set factory wage rates but 
also usually prevented dismissal or reassignment, thus guaranteeing job security. Farmers 
shared in the overall income of the farm through a system in which the final allocation 
of output and farm was divided on the basis of each person’s working time and quality 
in his production unit. The planners could vary farmers’ income by changing the 
purchase quotas and prices of farm products. Finally, they tried to determine the ratio of 
consumption and investment in the national income, by deciding the amounts of 
consumption and capital goods to be produced. It becomes clear that between 1949 and 
1978 the national economy made some progress although there was no programme, 
policy or plan consistently reaching success. How did this look in detail?
The period 1949-1957 was a period of recovery and substantial progress toward a 
return to normality after more than a decade of occupation by the Japanese and the civil 
war. Agricultural production may have returned to its probable peak level of the mid- 
1930s. The First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) is generally considered to have been a 
significant economic success, when national income grew at an estimated annual rate of
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9 percent. As shown in Table 8.1, Gross Social Product (GSP) per capita increased by 
50% during the period from 1952 to 1957, while people’s consumption also rose 
substantially. These developments were associated with the first significant rise in natural 
fertility since 1940.
During the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and Great Famine in 1958-1961, the development 
of industry was affected by policies putting emphasis on investment and the rapid 
expansion of heavy industry. Thus, much of the growth in industrial output stemmed 
from investment in heavy industry, from which consumers benefited relatively little. 
Although the Gross Industrial Product (GIP) per capita more than doubled from 1957 to 
1960-most of that gain was lost by 1962. One feature of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ was 
that the rate of accumulation as a percentage of national income rose from an already 
relatively high level of 24% in the First Five-Year Plan years (1952-57) to 40%; Such 
high rates of accumulation for an economy with a low level of income implied little 
interest in the immediate material welfare of the population.
The Great Famine has been discussed at length in the previous chapters. It was 
generally implied in most comments at the time that the decrease in grain production of 
28 percent—56 million tons—was caused by bad weather conditions. However, it was 
subsequently noted that of the total decline in grain production for 1959-61, at most a 
fourth can be attributed to adverse weather; the major reason for the rest of the decline 
was the implementation of ‘Left’ policies.1 For the consumption level, this was the worst 
time since 1949. During these years, for example, the average annual per capita grain 
consumption fell 19.4 percent for the entire nation, (see Table 8.6)
1 Liu Suinian and Wu Qungan 1986: China’s Socialism Economy: An Outline History (1949-1986), 
Beijing, Beijing Review Press.
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The period of 1963-66 was a second recovery time in the post-1949 history. 
Following the Great Famine, there was a gradual return to normalcy, the agricultural tax 
and state purchases of grain were reduced substantially in both 1961 and 1962. The 
labour released from urban workers who had moved to cities during the ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ increased the farm labour force by 15% in the spring of 1961 compared with 
the year before. However, it was not until 1964 that the national income or the combined 
gross agricultural and industrial output reached the 1958 level. The material consumption 
also returned to the previous level, which prompted the second fertility boom since 1949.
Table 8.1 Gross social product (GSP), gross industrial 
product (GIP) and consumption level in real terms 1952-85
Year
GSP1 GIP Consumption
(per capita) (yuan)
1952 100.00 100.00 100.00
1955 127.19 149.73 115.10
1957 151.94 203.24 122.90
1960 242.93 465.10 105.60
1962 143.08 235.75 103.70
1965 204.61 358.66 132.70
1968 189.72 327.98 137.80
1970 279.26 544.40 147.30
1973 325.58 679.91 161.10
1975 357.07 762.53 163.80
1978 433.42 975.82 177.00
1980 491.34 1131.30 206.70
1982 553.83 1238.81 232.40
1985 792.95 1881.18 313.70
1 GSP and GIP per capita both were set at 100 in 1952 in real terms. 
Source: 1988 China Statistical Yearbook, p38 and p291.
The ‘Cultural Revolution’ took place in 1967-76. Some economic rationality and 
adjustment came to a halt, with the launching of this movement in 1966, which led to 
domestic turmoil and brought catastrophe to the national economy. Although the GSP per 
capita increased by more than 150% from 1965 to 1975, and capital accumulation as a
proportion of national income still kept a relatively high level, the consumption per capita 
in real terms saw virtually no improvement from 1968 to 1976.
From 1978 onwards was a period of the ‘Economic Reform’. The Chinese 
Communist Party set a new economic course and began to carry out ‘Reform of the 
Economic Structure’,2 which emphasized individual incentives and greater reliance on 
market forces to stimulate economic efficiency and acknowledged that some people must 
become rich before others can improve their well-being. The impact on people’s lives 
from the change in overall economic policy was marked, and linked with active attempts 
to influence development through the shift in investment towards consumption.
The first target of reform was to raise the living standard of 800 million peasants. 
Rural reform consisted of several changes, which included increased financial incentives 
to peasants, such as reduced taxes on agricultural products and raised agricultural 
procurement prices, decentralized planning, and most important, changes in agriculture 
organization by building around the agricultural household responsibility system. Results 
were almost miraculous, between 1980 and 1990, gross agricultural output rose 204 
percent in real terms at an average annual rate of 7.4%, the rural population’s income 
per capita rose to 160% at an average annual rate of 5%. Additional data, derived from 
a survey of over 30,000 peasants in 600 counties, revealed that rural per capita incomes 
increased at an average annual rate of 14.7% between 1978 and 1985, peasant living 
standards rose in five years after 1978 by more than the total gain that had occurred
2 Central Committee of the Communist Party of China: Decision of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China on Reform of the Economic Structure (Adopted by the 12th Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of China at Its Third Plenary Session on October 20, 1984), reprinted in Beijing 
Review 27, No. 44, (October 29, 1984).
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between 1952 and 19773.
The reforms made in the industrial sector were primarily readjustments of the 
centrally planned administrative command system in the form of decentralized 
administrative controls. The reforms included campaigns to eliminate losses in state- 
owned enterprises, the substitution of income taxes for the remission of profits to the 
state, and expanding local managerial decision-making authority. Results here were even 
more significant. Between 1980 and 1990, gross industrial output value rose 250% in real 
terms at an average annual rate of 9.6%, worker and staff income per capita rose to 
151% at an average annual rate of 4.1% in real terms.
Table 8.2 The proportions(%) of labour force engaged in 
primary, secondary, tertiary industries 1952-85
Year Primary Secondary Tertiary
1952 83.5 7.4 9.1
1955 83.3 8.6 8.1
1957 81.2 9.0 9.8
1960 65.7 15.9 18.4
1962 82.1 8.0 9.9
1965 81.6 8.4 10.0
1968 81.7 8.6 9.7
1970 80.8 10.2 9.0
1973 78.7 12.3 9.0
1975 77.2 13.5 9.3
1978 70.7 17.4 11.9
1980 68.9 18.3 12.8
1981 68.9 18.4 12.7
1985 61.1 20.7 18.2
Source: China Social Statistical Materials 1987, p41.
Changes consistent with economic development also happened to labour structure 
after 1949, the proportions of labour engaged in the secondary and tertiary industries rose
3Alvin Rabushka 1987: The New China, Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, Westview Press, 
Colorado, p75.
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over time, except for the fluctuation that occurred during the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and 
Great Famine in 1957-1962 (see Table 8.2). Industrialization accelerated after 1978, the 
proportion of the labour force engaged in primary industry dropped dramatically. When 
the new economic policies were implemented, peasants were encouraged to start non- 
agricultural business. This shift brought about a large rise in peasants’ income. As we 
discussed in Chapter 7, occupation is one of the key factors to determine income level, 
which is strongly related to consumption and thus to natural fertility. So a secular 
industrialization after 1949 in China contributed to a substantial rise in the national 
average of private income and therefore indirectly prompted the rise in natural fertility.
1.2 Urbanization
Urbanization can be defined simply as the process of increasing the concentration of 
a population into towns and cities, usually involving movement of people from rural areas 
where agriculture and related activities are the main source of livelihood. China is 
generally considered to be a rural country. Compared with many other developing 
countries, the level of urbanization in China is low: only 20.8 per cent of its total 
population lived in urban areas in 1982. However, it is also a country of great cities. 
There are now more than 400 million urban residents. Although cities of considerable 
size, and a widespread network of market and administrative towns, are not new in 
China, it is only really in the last forty years that an urbanization based on 
industrialization has emerged, largely concentrated in relatively few centres as a result 
of state-sponsored projects.
China first experienced rapid urban expansion during the decade of 1950s (see Table
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8.3), as the consequence of the industrial development of the First Five-Year Plan of 
1953-57, with the industrial expansion of long-established administrative cities like Xian 
and Nanjing and the creation of entirely new cities like Baotau. The proportion of the 
population living in urban areas was around 10 per cent in the early 1950s, and rose 
rapidly to about 20 per cent by the end of that decade, mostly due to migration. In the 
early 1960s, as many as 20 million former peasants were dislodged from urban areas and 
returned to the countryside. Then in the ‘Cultural Revolution* many people were sent to 
the countryside.
Table 8.3 The proportions(%) of urban population and non-peasant
population 1949-85
Year Population
(10,000)
Urban P 
(%)
Non-peasant P 
(%)
1949 54167 10.64
1952 57482 12.46
1955 61465 13.48
1957 64653 15.39
1960 66207 19.75
1962 67295 17.33 14.59
1965 72538 17.98 14.02
1968 78534 17.62 13.33
1970 82992 17.38 12.68
1973 89211 17.20 12.72
1975 92420 17.34 12.56
1978 96259 17.92 12.93
1980 98705 19.39 14.05
1982 101590 20.80 14.48
1985 105004 36.61 17.11
Source: 1990 China Statistical Yearbook, p89.
There was little further change until the early 1980s: the proportion in 1981 was only
20.2 percent for China as a whole. The 1970s showed a remarkable stability in the 
proportion of urban dwellers until 1979. This was mainly due to the strict control of 
immigration from rural to urban areas in this period. In the years of the economic reform
after 1979, partial but significant increases in the freedom of people to move around, and 
the commercial growth of parts of rural China, led to new urban growth, including that 
of many small towns as well as big cities. This growth was also due to a rise in the urban 
birth rate because of the age structure of the population, which included a larger share 
of people bom in the baby-boom of the 1950s, who were of childbearing age in the 
1980s.
1.3 Public health programmes “
Since 1949 the Chinese government has had an extensive programme to improve the 
people’s health. A health system and medical care for the whole nation were organized, 
and attention was also paid to the protection of health of mothers, infants and children. 
One indicator of the improvement achieved was the decline in the annual death rate from 
20 per 1000 in 1949 to 6.4 per 1000 in 1981. Infectious diseases such as plague, 
smallpox, venereal diseases, kalaazar, recurrent fever and typhus were successively 
eradicated or brought under control. Mortality caused by respiratory diseases, digestive 
disease, and acute infectious diseases dropped, and heart and cerebrovascular disease and 
malignant tumours became the leading causes of death.
One feature of medical services in China is the low cost and the associated low 
quality as the government is willing to use a large number of physicians, and some of 
these may not be well qualified. As a result, the number of hospital beds and doctors per 
10,000 population rose from 6.7 and 1.48 in 1949 to 13.6 and 21.41 in 1985 respectively 
for the nation as a whole (see Table 8.4). Most people are able to obtain fairly
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inexpensive medical care though the quality of service may be doubtful at times. The 
health care system in China is based on a three-tier system managed and financed locally. 
In the first tier, part-time (barefoot in rural areas) doctors provide preventive and primary 
care, and free contraceptives. More serious illnesses are referred to the second tier, 
factory or commune health centres with junior doctors. The most seriously ill patients are 
referred to the third tier: city or county hospitals staffed with senior doctors.
Table 8.4 Number of doctors and hospital beds (per 10,000 population): 1949-85
Year
Doctors Hospital beds
Urban Rural Nation Urban Rural Nation
1949 6.99 6.65 6.7 6.34 0.45 1.48
1952 7.4 14.63 0.79 2.79
1955 8.1 3.60
1957 13.01 7.55 8.4 20.78 1.37 4.56
1960 9.0 9.90
1962 10.2 38.77 4.52 10.25
1965 22.17 8.18 10.5 37.75 5.10 10.55
1968 9.0 12.10
1970 8.5 41.76 8.46 13.39
1973 8.8 16.00
1975 26.57 6.53 9.5 46.10 12.30 17.38
1978 10.8 48.46 14.07 19.38
1980 32.22 7.65 11.7 46.96 14.83 20.17
1982 12.9 47.60 14.60 20.31
1985 34.38 8.43 13.6 46.64 15.10 21.41
♦Source China Statistical Yearbook, 1984, pp.516-517; China Social Statistical Materials 1987, pl94.
The effect of health on the fertility level in human populations has not been a subject 
of considerable discussion in demography, yet it is very obvious that status of health is 
likely to affect the biological mechanisms directly related to natural fertility, such as age 
at menarche, coital frequency, reproductive life span and so on. Apparently, the 
substantial improvement in people’s health must be one of the most important factors in 
the rise of natural fertility in China after the 1940s.
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1.4 M arriage pattern
In China, at least for the majority Han population, sexual activity outside marriage 
has been a cultural taboo. Cohabitation and illegitimate fertility are very rare. Almost all 
conceptions take place within marriage according to Chinese custom. Thus sexual 
behaviour, at least in the early stages of marriage, is influenced to a certain degree by 
the style of forming marriage. It could be expected that sexual activities is initially 
limited or problematic if a couple did not known each other well before.
Figure 8.1 Proportions(%) of women whose first marriages were 
arranged 1950s-1985: Hebei, Shaanxi, Shanghai
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In traditional Chinese society, marriage overwhelmingly used to be ‘arranged 
marriage’. Since 1950, the general policy in China has been to discourage the practice 
of arranged marriages and promote marriage as a free association between a man and a
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woman. It is also believed that the proportion of arranged marriages has been decreasing 
since 1950. We might expect some indirect impact from this trend on the frequency of 
intercourse among couples, especially in the early durations of marriage. The In-Depth 
Fertility Survey in 1985 provides information on the percentage of ever-married women 
whose first marriage was arranged by marriage cohorts, which allows us to examine 
indirectly the relationship between marriage pattern and natural fertility.
Table 8.5 Proportions(%) of women whose first marriages were arranged 
by marriage cohort 1950s-1985, and by age at first marriage and region
By region
Hebei Shaanxi Shanghai Total
-60 27.40 47.60 22.60 34.40
61-65 13.60 26.70 10.80 17.86
66-70 9.70 25.70 5.70 13.37
71-75 8.90 21.60 4.10 11.40
76-80 5.30 17.80 2.50 7.62
81-85 3.20 12.30 1.10 4.85
Total 9.60 24.50 5.50 12.90
By age at first marriage (three regions as a whole)
<17 17-19 20-22 23-25 26+
-60 49.22 31.68 18.65
61-65 30.88 21.41 9.14 10.98 5.39
66-70 22.32 18.71 11.61 4.80 2.90
71-75 30.41 17.57 12.11 3.50 4.29
76-80 13.33 16.93 11.09 4.51 2.09
81-85 13.03 11.22 6.96 3.29 0.31
Total 39.10 21.49 10.49 4.31 1.60
In Table 8.5 and Figure 8.1, we present the proportions(%) of women whose first 
marriages were arranged, by region and marriage cohort. Evidently, the proportions(%) 
of arranged marriages in the three regions declined dramatically from 27.4, 47.6, and
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22.6 in the 1950s to 13.6, 26.7 and 10.8 during 1961-65 for Hebei, Shaanxi, and 
Shanghai respectively (see Figure 8.1). Afterwards, the declining trend was slower but 
still clear. The pattern is also clear: the more developed the region, the lower the 
proportion of first marriages being arranged.
In Table 8.5, we also present the percentage of women whose first marriages were 
arranged by age at first marriage. There appears to be a negative relation in the 
proportions of arranged marriages and age at first marriage. Obviously, those women 
who married at later ages tended to be better educated or well employed, thus they were 
more likely to select their husbands at their own wills. Here again, mass education 
contributed to an improvement in women’s social status, and thus indirectly to an increase 
in natural fertility.
1.5 Nutrition
So far as the biological aspect of natural fertility is concerned, nutrition is a very 
important factor. The reasons for the association between fertility and nutrition have been 
fairly well analysed. Biological studies have proved that nutritional status, through its 
effects on menarche, lactational amenorrhea, intercourse frequency, and other 
reproductive processes, may have significant implications for the levels of natural 
fertility, for example, malnutrition can cause a decrease in fecundability. In China, the 
major crops are wheat and rice, therefore, changes in natural fertility would have been 
closely associated with the harvest of the previous year, at least in rural areas. Over a 
long time period, these changes in natural fertility could be expected to have been linked 
with fluctuation in food consumption per capita. Fortunately, the statistical yearbooks
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provide the information on food (grain, oil, meat, sugar) consumption per capita from 
1952 to 1985, which enables us to discuss this matter in detail.
Table 8.6 Chinese people’s annual main food consumption (per capita) 1952-85
Year Grain
(k.g.)
Eating oil 
(k.g .)
Meat(pork)
(k.g.)
Sugar
(k.g.)
1952 198 2.1 5.9 0.91
1955 198 2.2 4.9 1.29
1957 203 2.4 5.1 1.51
1960 164 1.9 1.6 0.97
1962 165 1.1 2.2 1.60
1965 183 1.7 6.3 1.56
1968 193 1.6 6.3 2.25
1970 187 1.6 5.8 1.96
1973 192 1.7 7.1 2.18
1975 191 1.8 7.4 2.17
1978 195 1.6 7.7 3.42
1980 214 2.3 11.2 3.83
1982 225 3.5 11.8 4.42
1985 254 5.1 14.0 5.60
♦Source\1984 China Statistical Yearbook, p477.
Table 8.7 Chinese people’s daily nutrition from main food in 1952, 1978, 1983
Year
Calorie
(1000c)
Protein
(g )
Fat
(g.)
1952 2270.0 69.6 28.3
1978 2311.0 70.8 29.9
Urban 2715.0 81.6 49.0
Rural 2224.0 68.5 25.7
1983 2877.4 82.8 47.2
Urban 3182.5 87.5 74.9
Rural 2805.9 81.7 40.7
♦Source: China Social Statistical Materials 1987, p213.
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 show Chinese people’s annual food consumption and daily 
nutrition per capita for selected years from 1952 to 1985. Obviously, the trend of food
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consumption was very consistent with that of natural fertility. It rose substantially during 
1952-1957, fell to a trough during the great famine, significantly recovered during 1962- 
1965, then stayed more or less unchanged during the ‘Cultural Revolution’ from 1966 to 
1976, and finally increased dramatically after 1978. Generally speaking, food 
consumption saw no great improvement from 1957 to 1978. Natural fertility did increase 
during this period among some minority groups, such as the better educated, those living 
in more developed regions, and so on, but whether this was mainly contributed by better 
food consumption or behaviour factors, such as a decline in the length of breastfeeding 
or a change in attitudes to sex remains unknown, because no detailed food consumption 
information for these minority groups is available.
1.6 Education
As mentioned above, educational variation might be another key factor contributing 
to differentials in natural fertility. Besides the cross-sectional analysis of natural fertility 
of the population with different education levels in Chapter 7, a similar analysis is to 
examine the dynamic changes in education achieved, and their connections with changes 
in natural fertility.
China was well behind the developed nations in education in the first half of this 
century. About 80% of the total population was illiterate and only 20% of children 
attended schools before 1949.4 So it was the comprehensive aim of the Communist 
government to build a new society and a new state for the nation when it took power in
4 Da Li 1991: Seventy Years’ Change in China, People's Daily, (overseas edition) July 18, 1991.
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1949. Although economic reconstruction had first priority due to the general problems 
of maintenance, the importance of transformation in China’s society was stressed again 
and again, i.e., women liberated from the bonds of tradition, mass culture and mass 
education created for both men and women, illiteracy eliminated, and so on.
The Chinese government has placed a strong emphasis on improving the educational 
level of the people since 1949, and universal education has been introduced. In detail, 
attendance at elementary school (primary school) for children was regulated, enabling 
children seven years or older to attend school and compulsory education was introduced 
later. Meanwhile, secondary and higher education were strengthened, technical education 
was stressed, the education of workers during their spare time and that of the cadres at 
their posts were also strengthened. And finally national physical education was also 
promoted. The mass orientation in educational policy, on the whole, achieved certain 
successes. Education institutions were set up and expanded systematically at all levels. 
Illiteracy was sharply reduced.
Table 8.8 shows official data on the enrolment of Chinese students per 10,000 
population by level of school for the selected year from 1949 to 1985. During this period, 
enrolment in higher education institutions increased more than sevenfold; enrolment in 
secondary schools increased more than twenty-one times; and enrolment in primary 
schools about threefold. It is noteworthy from Table 8.8 that during the economic crisis 
of 1959-61 and the beginning of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in 1966-68, student enrolment 
declined, enrolment of primary school students had its the first trough and that of 
university students had its second trough in the post-1949 history. Due to the dramatic 
decline of fertility during the 1960s in urban areas and the 1970s in the whole nation,
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student enrolment in primary schools and secondary schools began falling after 1978. 
Table 8.8 also indicates that percentages of female students in each level of school have 
been rising since the 1950s. In general, mass education has been raising up the class of 
people’s occupations, which are strongly related to rises in income and consumption and 
thus possibly to a rise in natural fertility.
Table 8.8 Number of students by education level (per 10,000population) 
and the proportion(%) of female students1 1949-85
Year
All students Female students(%)
I II III I II III
Before 1949 25.5 20.3 17.8
1949 450 23 2.2
1952 889 55 3.3 32.9 23.8 23.4
1955 864 73 4.6
1957 994 110 6.8 34.5 30.2 23.3
1960 1417 225 14.5
1962 1028 124 12.3 34.8 33.5 25.3
1965 1602 197 9.3 39.3 29.9 38.2
1968 1278 179 3.3
1970 1269 319 0.6
1973 1521 392 3.5
1975 1633 490 5.4 45.2 39.3 32.6
1978 1526 693 8.9 44.9 41.4 24.1
1980 1489 578 11.6 44.6 39.4 43.0
1982 1381 465 11.4 43.7 39.2 26.5
1985 1278 487 16.3 44.8 40.2 30.0
*Source: China Population Statistical Yearbook 1989, p216; China Social Statistical Materials 
1987pl58. 1, I: primary schools, II: secondary schools, III: institutions of higher education.
One of the important elements of education in China is political and moral 
indoctrination. In the early 1950s, Communist Party and Youth League organizations 
were founded in schools, and political lectures about Marxism and Dialectical 
Materialism were set compulsorily, to carry out political and ideological work among 
Chinese youth. Secularization, which might be a side effect of this political education, 
changes attitudes and ideas towards sexual behaviour generally, which were originally
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derived from Chinese traditional religions. All old Chinese religions believed that sexual 
behaviour was dirty and could harm people’s health. After the massive programme of 
education, virtually all people educated after 1949 have no strong religious belief any 
more (only a handful of religious schools were reopened after 1979). This might also be 
a factor contributing to the increase in natural fertility.
1.7 Housing condition and family pattern
The rapid decline in mortality and longer lifespan, and higher fertility in the earlier 
years of the People’s Republic produced a big rise in the total population after 1949, but 
the rise in absolute numbers of people in both urban and rural areas during the time was 
not matched by sufficient investment in housing and infrastructure. In fact, taking the 
average floor-space in housing available to inhabitants, arguably a major aspect of the 
quality of life, the per capita square metres of urban inhabitants declined from 4.5 in 
1952 to 3.6 in 1978.5 A survey conducted in 216 cities in 1979 revealed that about one- 
third of all urban households did not have sufficient living space.6 Housing pressure in 
the urban areas was not reduced until the 1980s when the economic reform began and 
major economic policy shifted from investment to consumption. In general, the larger the 
cities, the worse the overcrowding and relative lack of investment in infrastructure. In 
rural areas, although housing has always been privately owned, food and clothing 
generally took priority over housing. As incomes were so low before 1979, few peasants 
could afford to build new houses for the increasing size of families. Moreover, they also
5See Beijing Review, No. 48, 1979, pl2.
6See Editorial Committee 1981: Encyclopedia o f China, Encyclopedia Publish House, Beijing, pp.540- 
541.
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had to apply for permission to use extra land for building, even if funding was available.
State investment in urban housing has increased significantly since 1979. In rural 
areas, a boom in new house-building has also occurred due to rising income levels and 
the relaxing of restrictions on the use of collectives’ land for private housing. The urban 
housing expansion has been under the direction of municipal housing bureaux and also 
that of the state industrial enterprises which have responsibility for their own staffs’ 
housing. The construction boom has become a new and evident feature of both urban and 
rural landscapes, though regional variations in the scale of construction still exist. An 
important indicator of the improved living condition is the increased amount of living 
floor space, from 4.2 and 8.1 square meters in 1978 to 8.5 and 16.0 in 1987 for urban 
and rural areas respectively, as Table 8.9 shows. This increase in urban areas cannot be 
used as a check on the increase in real incomes, because the increased space was not 
determined by each household allocating its income for this purpose, but by decisions 
about space made by the administrative process. However, the increase in rural areas was 
roughly consistent with doubled real per capita incomes of the peasant population. Since 
1979, substantial housing improvement has occurred in most regions, which strongly 
prompts the tendency towards nuclear family households.
Table 8.9 Housing conditions in Chim(sq.m. per capita) 1978-87
Year Urban Rural Nation
1978 4.20 8.10 7.40
1980 4.96 9.40 8.54
1982 5.61 10.73 9.66
1985 6.66 14.70 11.76
1987 8.50 16.00
’“Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1988; China Social Statistical Materials 1987, p87.
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The changing housing conditions and increasing prevalence of the nuclear family 
might also have some indirect effects on natural fertility. Assuming other factors being 
the same, sexual behaviour is expected to vary among families according to different 
living spaces, and between nuclear and non-nuclear families, given that accommodation 
is not spacious in China. For example, two couples sometimes live in one bedroom or 
two joint bedrooms in some urban areas. Even in the nuclear families, sexual behaviour 
is also expected to differ according to whether or not children have separate bedrooms 
from their parents.
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II Multiple analysis of background determinants
For the purpose of examining changes in the socio-economic phases to link with 
changes in natural fertility, the following socio-economic variables can to be considered, 
such as per capita GNP (here we use GSP) and labour structure, per capita annual 
income, per capita main food consumption, percentage of urbanization, doctors or 
hospital beds per 10,000 population, housing conditions, students enrolled per 10,000 
population, female illiteracy rate, and so on. The analysis begins with an examination of 
correlation coefficients. Positive relationships between natural fertility level and these 
variables are expected, except with female illiteracy rate and proportion of labour 
engaged in primary industry. As a fact, economic development is always linked with 
other developments such as in health and education, thus it will not surprise us if most 
variables are highly correlated to each other. Therefore is worthwhile to select the 
variables most relevant to natural fertility by carrying out a multiple regression analysis.
II. 1 Data for the study
There are systematic time series data for several socio-economic variables, while 
some fragmentary information has also been gathered or estimated for China as whole 
for the selected years: 1952-1981, and 1986. These 31 years are chosen mainly because 
of data availability. Nevertheless, these dates also cover most of China’s development 
from the early 1950s to the middle 1980s. Thus our focus here can be on information for 
both the past and the most recent period.
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Table 8.10 Nomenclature of the socio-economic variables
Notation Definition
NF2 Natural Fertility Level M (by original model)
NF1 Natural Fertility Level M (by adjusted model)
C l Consumption Level per Capita (yuan)
C2 Food Grain per Capita(jin) (1 jin  =  0.5 k.g.)
C3 Eating Oil per Capita (jin)
C44 Pork Meat per Capita (k.g per average month)
C55 Sugar per Capita (k.g.)
L33 Proportion of Labour Engaged in Tertiary Industry
L l l Proportion of Labour Engaged in Primary Industry
NP Number of Newspaper Copies Issued per Million Population
BP1 Number of Radio Stations per 100 Million Population
BP2 Number of Wired Broadcasting Stations per Million Population
EP1 Number of Universities and Colleges Students per Million
Population
EP2 Number of Secondary School Students per Million Population
EP3 Number of Primary School Students per Million Population
SP GSP per Million Population (1952 as 100)
U1 Proportions of Urban Population
M l Number of Hospital Beds per 1000 Population
M2 Number of Doctors per 1000 Population
ER1 Proportion of Illiterate Women Aged 20-24
ER3 Proportion of Women with Secondary School Education Aged 20-24
Nineteen sets of annual data have been collected and they represent various socio­
economic conditions in China. Gross Social Product Value (GSP) is an index used by the 
Chinese government to reflect the general level of economic development. U1 is the 
proportion of urban population among the total. C l is the national average level of per 
capita consumption, which is the consumption part of the gross national income divided 
by total population. C2, C3, C4, and C5 are per capita food consumption of grains, oil, 
pork, and sugar respectively. M2 and M l are the number of doctors and the number of 
hospital beds per thousand population respectively. EP1, EP2, and EP3 are the numbers 
of students enrolled in primary, secondary school, and university and college per million
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populations respectively. ER1 and ER3 are the proportion of illiterate and secondary 
school educated respectively among the female population aged 20-24 derived from the 
1982 1/1000 Fertility Sample Survey. BP1 and BP2 are the number of wired and wireless 
broadcasting stations per million population. NP is newspaper copies per 10,000 
population. L ll , L22, and L33 are the proportions of labour engaged in the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary industries. As L11+L22+L33 = 1, only two of them are 
selected. The notations and definitions for these variable are presented in Table 8.10.
The means and standard deviations of these variables are presented in Table 8.11. 
These figures represent the unweighted averages of different periods from 1952 to 1986. 
Generally speaking, some socio-economic factors had no substantial change until 1979, 
such as urbanization, main food consumption, or labour force of primary industry, 
whereas consistent improvement took place over time in medical services, education and 
other cultural aspects. The most significant socio-economic changes happened after the 
1970s, indicating the accelerating process of development after 1978 when the economic 
reform began. Taking per capita pork consumption as an example, the value almost 
doubled from 1977 to 1986. All of this suggests that increase in natural fertility before 
1978 was mainly contributed by improvement in social and cultural factors such as 
education and medical service, while rise in natural fertility after 1978 was mainly due 
to economic factors, especially improvement in food consumption after 1978, which was 
much more significant than others.
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Table 8.11 The means and standard deviations (in parentheses) by periods from 1952 to 1986
1952-58 1959-61 1962-66 1967-69 1970-78 1979-861
SP 0.239 0.368 0.317 0.363 0.594 1.014
(0.055) (0.075) (0.064) (0.037) (0.084) (0.326)
U1 0.142 0.191 0.177 0.176 0.174 0.250
(0.013) (0.007) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.109)
Cl 93.100 104.000 122.000 133.300 155.300 280.800
(10.000) (9.170) (6.600) (1.150) (11.190) (114.800)
C2 389.600 339.300 353.500 355.900 376.800 448.000
(6.190) (29.710) (22.850) (14.240) (12.960) (43.750)
C3 4.416 3.663 2.828 3.303 3.277 6.223
(0.524) (0.878) (0.635) (0.189) (0.113) (2.966)
C44 0.451 0.167 0.424 0.538 0.609 0.966
(0.048) (0.078) (0.158) (0.042) (0.045) (0.168)
C55 1.314 1.428 1.563 2.273 2.368 4.395
(0.244) (0.417) (0.182) (0.141) (0.485) (1.158)
L ll 0.790 0.684 0.820 0.817 0.772 0.672
(0.092) (0.078) (0.004) (0.001) (0.031) (0.041)
L33 0.097 0.157 0.099 0.096 0.099 0.137
(0.025) (0.036) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010) (0.022)
NP 0.036 0.066 0.052 0.048 0.112 0.150
(0.011) (0.016) (0.010) (0.003) (0.024) (0.022)
EP1 0.056 0.137 0.099 0.033 0.043 0.131
(0.024) (0.014) (0.019) (0.020) (0.028) (0.032)
EP2 0.924 1.912 1.521 1.981 4.929 5.488
(0.439) (0.338) (0.330) (0.465) (1.493) (0.577)
EP3 9.708 13.080 12.740 12.890 14.920 14.550
(1.622) (1.395) (2.448) (0.478) (1.274) (0.573)
Ml 0.403 0.940 1.048 1.217 1.662 2.053
(0.125) (0.104) (0.063) (0.021) (0.207) (0.086)
M2 0.800 0.923 1.022 0.900 0.933 1.228
(0.039) (0.059) (0.042) (0.030) (0.088) (0.109)
BP1 10.750 19.780 12.300 10.110 9.597 14.590
(1.758) (1.414) (1.283) (0.095) (0.099) (7.685)
BP2 1.772 3.440 3.067 2.867 2.726 2.578
(1.220) (0.251) (0.123) (0.016) (0.064) (0.117)
ER1 0.803 0.686 0.558 0.438 0.411 0.288
(0.041) (0.031) (0.047) (0.021) (0.014) (0.089)
ER3 0.046 0.088 0.148 0.179 0.228 0.440
(0.014) (0.013) (0.023) (0.001) (0.050) (0.096)
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1983, 1985, 1988. 
values.
, The average of 1979, 1980, 1981, 1986’s
II.2 Correlation analysis
As their names indicate, although background determinants, such as cultural or socio­
economic variables, can only influence natural fertility by altering one or more of the
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proximate determinants, we still wish to seek explanations for the links between natural 
fertility and these variables, no matter how they are related to each other, directly or 
indirectly. Here, we measure the annual underlying level of natural fertility by the index 
(M) labelled as NF2 and NF1 given by adjusted and original Coale and Trussed’s model 
respectively. A starting point in explaining the variation of NF2 is to find out how closely 
related these socio-economic variables are to the NF2, or how highly correlated the two 
variables are. Our study begins with an analysis of correlation coefficients. Positive 
relationships between the natural fertility index NF2 and these variables are expected, 
except illiteracy (ER1) and low income occupations(Lll), Table 8.12 is the multiple 
correlation matrix which fully displays correlation coefficients between NF2, NF1, and 
each of the socio-economic variables.
Some important features are revealed in Table 8.12. As we expected, many values 
of the coefficients between natural fertility and socio-economic variables are relatively 
high, such as gross social product (SP), pork consumption (C44), medical services (Ml, 
M2), and education level achieved by young women(ERl, ER3), while other socio­
economic variables such as BP1, BP2, EP1, EP2, EP3 are not significantly correlated to 
NF2. Some are even contrary to our earlier expectations. For example, there is a positive 
relationship between NF2 and L l l ,  although the coefficient is just 0.108, too trivial to 
mean anything, but as we expected, the proportion of labour engaged in primary industry- 
-overwhelmingly in rural areas, lower income and relatively bad socio-economic 
background, should have a negative relationship with NF2. This leads us to observe them 
in detail. Four plots in Figure 8.2 are also very useful for informally examining the 
strength of the relationship between some socio-economic variables and natural fertility, 
though such an examination is essentially subjective.
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Table 8.12 The correlation coefficient matrix 1:1952-81, 1986 (Part I)
NF2 NF1 SP U1 Cl C2 C3 C44 C55 Ml M2
NF2 1.000 0.823 0.503 0.307 0.568 0.496 0.271 0.760 0.587 0.490 0.470
NF1 0.823 1.000 -0.035 -0.083 0.072 0.094 -0.086 0.328 0.057 0.043 0.017
SP 0.503 -0.035 1.000 0.812 0.954 0.671 0.638 0.828 0.951 0.854 0.787
U1 0.307 -0.083 0.812 1.000 0.901 0.525 0.731 0.557 0.788 0.558 0.745
Cl 0.568 0.072 0.954 0.901 1.000 0.701 0.727 0.828 0.955 0.750 0.822
C2 0.496 0.094 0.671 0.525 0.701 1.000 0.862 0.790 0.686 0.283 0.432
C3 0.271 -0.086 0.638 0.731 0.727 0.862 1.000 0.595 0.635 0.168 0.427
C44 0.760 0.328 0.828 0.557 0.828 0.790 0.595 1.000 0.845 0.684 0.598
C55 0.587 0.057 0.951 0.788 0.955 0.686 0.635 0.845 1.000 0.813 0.822
Ml 0.490 0.043 0.854 0.558 0.750 0.283 0.168 0.684 0.813 1.000 0.740
M2 0.470 0.017 0.787 0.745 0.822 0.432 0.427 0.598 0.822 0.740 1.000
BP1 -0.341 -0.524 0.306 0.698 0.396 0.117 0.508 -0.083 0.249 0.028 0.379
BP2 -0.151 -0.163 0.158 0.258 0.095 -0.338 -0.156 -0.176 0.105 0.360 0.306
NP 0.403 -0.112 0.925 0.608 0.800 0.505 0.405 0.743 0.827 0.910 0.705
L ll 0.108 0.496 -0.611 -0.543 -0.503 -0.417 -0.538 -0.285 -0.523 -0.408 -0.452
L33 -0.260 -0.555 0.460 0.580 0.401 0.239 0.495 0.068 0.368 0.237 0.427
ER1 -0.604 -0.230 -0.816 -0.610 -0.770 -0.273 -0.195 -0.715 -0.809 -0.953 -0.707
ER3 0.625 0.108 0.954 0.740 0.928 0.579 0.492 0.848 0.961 0.913 0.871
EP1 -0.147 -0.443 0.393 0.587 0.437 0.206 0.411 0.037 0.383 0.218 0.699
EP2 0.377 -0.083 0.794 0.371 0.617 0.342 0.136 0.636 0.724 0.911 0.581
EP3 0.182 -0.113 0.605 0.343 0.440 0.070 -0.007 0.438 0.486 0.820 0.495
Number of observations for each variable: 31.
Table 8.12 The correlation coefficient matrix 1, 1952-81, 1986 (Part II)
BP1 BP2 NP L ll L33 ER1 ER3 EP1 EP2 EP3
NF2 -0.341 -0.151 0.403 0.108 -0.260 -0.604 0.625 -0.147 0.377 0.182
NF1 -0.524 -0.163 -0.112 0.496 -0.555 -0.230 0.108 -0.443 -0.083 -0.113
SP 0.306 0.158 0.925 -0.611 0.460 -0.816 0.954 0.393 0.794 0.605
U1 0.698 0.258 0.608 -0.543 0.580 -0.610 0.740 0.587 0.371 0.343
Cl 0.396 0.095 0.800 -0.503 0.401 -0.770 0.928 0.437 0.617 0.440
C2 0.117 -0.338 0.505 -0.417 0.239 -0.273 0.579 0.206 0.342 0.070
C3 0.508 -0.156 0.405 -0.538 0.495 -0.195 0.492 0.411 0.136 -0.007
C44 -0.083 -0.176 0.743 -0.285 0.068 -0.715 0.848 0.037 0.636 0.438
C55 0.249 0.105 0.827 -0.523 0.368 -0.809 0.961 0.383 0.724 0.486
Ml 0.028 0.360 0.910 -0.408 0.237 -0.953 0.913 0.218 0.911 0.820
M2 0.379 0.306 0.705 -0.452 0.427 -0.707 0.871 0.699 0.581 0.495
BP1 1.000 0.260 0.139 -0.558 0.769 -0.006 0.174 0.762 -0.109 -0.024
BP2 0.260 1.000 0.228 -0.445 0.476 -0.372 0.181 0.390 0.207 0.586
NP 0.139 0.228 1.000 -0.592 0.387 -0.806 0.889 0.308 0.921 0.761
L ll -0.558 -0.445 -0.592 1.000 -0.906 0.281 -0.468 -0.636 -0.454 -0.440
L33 0.769 0.476 0.387 -0.906 1.000 -0.144 0.323 0.762 0.212 0.296
ER1 -0.006 -0.372 -0.806 0.281 -0.144 1.000 -0.899 -0.107 -0.788 -0.762
ER3 0.174 0.181 0.889 -0.468 0.323 -0.899 1.000 0.365 0.805 0.633
EP1 0.762 0.390 0.308 -0.636 0.762 -0.107 0.365 1.000 0.115 0.152
EP2 -0.109 0.207 0.921 -0.454 0.212 -0.788 0.805 0.115 1.000 0.770
EP3 -0.024 0.586 0.761 -0.440 0.296 -0.762 0.633 0.152 0.770 1.000
Number of observations for each variable: 31.
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Figure 8.2 Plots of index of underlying level of natural fertility NF2 (M) against 
some socio-economic variables 1952-81, 1986
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Figure 8.2(a) shows that there are three outliers far away from the majority, which 
are the observations made during the economic crisis of 1959-61. In fact, with the 
progress of the campaign for industrialization, millions of commune labourers were 
diverted from agriculture activities to mine coal and produce iron, in addition, the rural- 
urban migration was dramatic in the previous year, resulting from the great expansion 
of industrial construction and the relaxation of central control on worker recruitment. The 
ratio of industrial to agricultural labour changed spectacularly from 1:13.8 in 1957 to
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1:3.5 in 1958. As a result, the rural labour force left for agricultural activities became 
far less than adequate. There immediately followed a prolonged drought, then heavy 
floods and other natural calamities which severely damaged agricultural production. 
Obviously, the three outliers are due to the lower level in natural fertility caused mainly 
by malnutrition in 1959-1961 and lower proportion of rural labour force caused by earlier 
labour movement. So without these three outliers, a negative sign of coefficient is 
obvious between NF2 and L l l ,  and a similar phenomenon can be expected in other 
relationships which are contrary to our earlier expectations. Some coefficients, although 
have not been distorted so seriously as to change their signs, like that between NF2 and 
L ll  by the three outliers, would have been much more significant without these three 
outliers, such as one between NF2 and M2, see plot(c) in Figure 8.2.
The correlation coefficient values between NF1 and the socio-economic variables in 
Table 8.12 present much more unrealistic signs. NF1, the natural fertility level estimated 
by the original version of Coale and Trussell’s model, counter-intuitively was negatively 
related to urbanization U l, eating oil consumption C3, and gross social product SP. With 
variables of other food consumption and medical service, although the signs were 
positive, as we expected, the values of coefficients were too trivial to mean anything 
statistically. Thus, again, it suggests that the original version of the model is unable to 
provide reasonable estimates of natural fertility in this case, and the adjusted version 
apparently does much better here.
Some concluding remarks can be made. The strong relationships between natural 
fertility level and some socio-economic variables suggest that increase in natural fertility 
in China to a large extent matched the pattern of socio-economic development. It is quite
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obvious that increase in natural fertility was directly or indirectly due to industrialization, 
and the improvements in food consumption, medical service and education achieved. 
However, apart from the casual reasons such as the Great Famine during 1959-61, some 
weak relationships between NF2 and a couple of socio-economic indices perhaps imply 
that other factors, such as social customs, cultural traditions etc., may also be responsible 
for changes in natural fertility, for which no numerical information is available.
II.3 Multiple regression analysis
The bi-variate relationships between the index of natural fertility and some selected 
socio-economic variables have been examined in the preceding section. Some of these 
variables are highly correlated to each other (see Table 8.12). We therefore should 
further select those socio-economic variable most relevant to changes in natural fertility 
by carrying out a multiple regression analysis. Obviously, variable SP is a general index 
to reflect socio-economic development and represented well by other socio-economic 
variables. Thus it is strongly correlated with these variables, and therefore should not be 
chosen for the regression. Similarly, there is no need to include both the number of 
doctors and the number of hospital beds per 10,000 population in the regression, thus we 
exclude the number of hospital beds as an independent variable. However, as highly 
intelligent computing packages have been developed, this job could be done by computer 
both more efficiently and reasonably provided we set proper criteria. For simplicity, here 
we use the more conventional approach.
Before we proceed to our multiple regression analysis, it is to be pointed out that 
this sort of quantitative analysis always has its own limitations. There are several reasons
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why demographic relationships are inexact. First, demography is a social science that 
studies the behaviour of people. People do not always behave predictably. Second, no 
model can include all variables which can fully explain the dependent variable. Such 
variables as income, education, occupation, culture, nutrition, medical service, - to 
mention only a few - may be determinants of natural fertility, but certainly not all of 
them. Often because of shortage of observations (small N) or lack of data, some variables 
must be excluded from a model. Even if it is assumed that the impact of an omitted 
variable tends to cancel out or is trivial, this unidentified source of error may be serious. 
Finally, errors result from problems of measurement and data-collection. The use of a 
survey questionnaire often leads to measurement error. Or a variable may be ambiguously 
or poorly defined, thereby causing measurement error. This problem may not be serious 
if there is an equal probability of positive and negative errors occurring. Given the 
foregoing reasons, we have to state the assumptions of the multiple regression model 
before we carry out this analysis:
1, A linear equation can describe the relation between NF2 and other independent 
(socio-economic) variables.
2, These socio-economic variables are non-random and fixed.
3, The error term is normally distributed, and has zero expected value and constant 
variance for all observations, that is, the error term is ‘homoscedastic’ as opposed to 
‘heteroscedastic’.
4, The error term of any one observation is uncorrelated with any other observation, 
that is, there is no ‘serial or auto correlation’.
Generally speaking, heteroscedasticity, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation are the
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three main problems in multiple regression analysis. Heteroscedasticity more often occurs 
in cross-section analyses in which data are collected from units that vary in size. In this 
case, our data are collected from units that keep the same size, thus we should not have 
to worry about heteroscedasticity. As we will see, the main problem involved in this case 
is multicollinearity. In many cases, multiple regression models have been well defined 
theoretically in both dependent variable and independent(explanatory) variables. Examples 
of this are many macroeconomic models. But in this case, so far there is no existing 
multiple regression model available in which natural fertility as the dependent variable 
and socio-economic determinants as the explanatory variables are both theoretically 
defined. Thus in practice, it is necessary to include as many explanatory variables as 
possible (because they are theoretically relevant), and to see empirically whether or not 
they are important. Table 8.13 presents the result of multiple regression analysis using 
the SPSS’s BACKWARDS method by starting to include all eighteen explanatory 
variables into the equation.
In Table 8.13, the R square is a measure of the extent to which the independent 
variables have jointly explained the variation in the dependent variable, and an adjusted 
R Square value as a goodness-of-fit measure which takes some account of the number of 
explanatory variables included in the regression relative to the number of observations. 
Obviously, both R square values are high (0.89 and 0.85 respectively), implying that the 
major part of variance in natural fertility can be jointly explained by the remaining eight 
socio-economic variables, attached significance levels (Sig F), which indicate how stable 
estimated coefficients (B) are to their own variances and how relevant these remaining 
variables are to the dependent variable empirically. The remaining ten explanatory 
variables are excluded from the equation because they cannot meet the basic criterion-
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Tolerance = 0.01 and F significance = 0.10.
Table 8.13 Multiple regression analysis: stage one (Tol = 0.01, F Sig = 0.10) 
Dependent variable: NF2, Index of natural fertility (M)
1 Variables in the equation
Variable B SEB Toler F Sig F
EP3 -0.039 0.008 0.158 22.08 0.00
ER1 -0.510 0.159 0.074 10.24 0.00
BP1 -0.025 0.007 0.088 13.49 0.00
L ll -0.509 0.242 0.209 4.42 0.05
C44 0.307 0.092 0.147 10.98 0.00
U1 1.560 0.677 0.062 5.32 0.03
C55 -0.116 0.034 0.046 11.35 0.00
M2 0.422 0.115 0.233 13.40 0.00
Constant 1.623 0.367 19.54 0.00
2 Variables not in the equation
Variable Partial Toler Min Toler F Sig F
C3 0.060 0.077 0.035 0.08 0.79
C2 -0.086 0.061 0.029 0.16 0.70
Cl -0.033 0.013 0.013 0.02 0.88
ER3 -0.068 0.007 0.007 0.10 0.76
EP1 -0.061 0.024 0.021 0.08 0.78
L33 0.094 0.059 0.042 0.19 0.67
BP2 0.045 0.136 0.033 0.04 0.84
EP2 -0.161 0.153 0.035 0.56 0.46
SP -0.213 0.040 0.036 0.34 0.56
Ml 0.129 0.032 0.032 0.41 0.53
Goodness-of-fit
R Square 0.888 F 21.74
Adjusted R Square 0.847 Signif F 0.00
Durbin-Watson 2.378 Standard Error 0.04
As we mentioned before, any insignificant F-statistics which occur may result from 
multicollinearity. However, it does not follow that if multicollinearity were absent then 
all the explanatory variables would have significant F-statistics. Conversely, a high 
degree of multicollinearity will not necessarily result in insignificant F-statistics. As Table
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8.14 shows, some of these eight explanatory variables which remain in the equation of 
Table 8.13 are still highly correlated with each other. The correlation coefficient between 
C44 and C55 is as high as 0.8449.
Table 8.14 The correlation coefficient matrix 2, 1952-81, 1986
Correlation Ul C44 C55 M2 BP1 L ll ER1 EP3
Ul 1.000 0.557 0.788 0.745 0.698 -0.543 -0.610 0.343
C44 0.558 1.000 0.845 0.598 -0.083 -0.285 -0.715 0.438
C55 0.788 0.845 1.000 0.822 0.249 -0.523 -0.809 0.486
M2 0.745 0.598 0.822 1.000 0.379 -0.452 -0.707 0.495
BP1 0.698 -0.083 0.248 0.379 1.000 -0.558 -0.006 -0.024
L ll -0.543 -0.285 -0.523 -0.452 -0.558 1.000 0.281 -0.440
ER1 0.610 -0.715 -0.809 -0.707 -0.006 0.281 1.000 -0.762
EP3 0.343 0.438 0.486 0.495 -0.024 -0.440 -0.762 1.000
Here, we can see from Table 8.13, although all the eight remaining variables have 
very significant levels of estimated coefficient (below 0.05), some of them have still very 
low levels of Tolerance, such as ER1, BP1, U l, C55, which clearly also suggests a high 
degree of intercorrelation (multicollinearity) among the eight remaining explanatory 
variables. For example, variable Ul is the index of urbanization, which reflects socio­
economic development and is represented well by other socio-economic variables. Thus 
it is strongly correlated with these variables, and therefore there is no need to keep it in 
the equation. In SPSS, the Tolerance is a measure to show the relative importance of an 
explanatory variable when it is not in the equation by one minus a difference of R squares 
between the equations with and without this variable. So this measure is a tool to detect 
and correct multicollinearity, which shows the relative importance of an explanatory 
variable if it is not in the equation. Following this rule, the larger Tolerance value a 
variable has, the more this variable should be picked up into the equation. If the criterion 
of the Tolerance value is raised from 0.01 to 0.15, which means raising the threshold to
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prevent unqualified variables remaining in the equation, and regression is still carried out 
by the BACKWARDS method, we have a new model given in Table 8.15 to present the 
second stage of the multiple regression analysis.
Table 8.15 Multiple regression analysis: stage two (Tol = 0.15, F Sig = 0.10) 
Dependent Variable.. NF2 Index of natural fertility (M)
1 Variables in the equation
Variable B SEB Toler F Sig F
EP3 -0.026 0.006 0.394 16.64 0.00
BP1 -0.012 0.003 0.665 16.69 0.00
C44 0.209 0.066 0.414 9.93 0.00
M2 0.220 0.117 0.327 3.54 0.07
ER1 -0.323 0.117 0.200 7.57 0.01
Constant 1.082 0.188 - 33.12 0.00
2 Variables not in the equation
Variable Partial Toler Min Toler F Sig F
U1 0.264 0.068 0.068 1.808 0.19
C55 -0.416 0.085 0.084 5.019 0.03
L ll 0.074 0.388 0.168 0.131 0.72
3 Goodness-of-fit
R Square 0.817 F 22.27
Adjusted R Square 0.780 Signif 0.00
Durbin-Watson 2.078 Standard Error 0.05
Now we have five explanatory variables, EP3, BP1, C44, M2, ER1, and an 
intercept remaining in the equation to explain changes in natural fertility. In Table 8.15, 
as we expected, coefficients of explanatory variables ‘pork consumption’(C44), ‘number 
of doctors’(M2), are positive values-0.209, and 0.22 respectively. This means that their 
increases can positively contribute to the rise of natural fertility, while the negative 
coefficient values (-0.323) of explanatory variables ‘illiteracy of young women 20- 
24’(ER1) mean that drops in values of these variables also contribute to increases in
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natural fertility.
EP3 as the ‘number of primary school students per million population’ also shows 
a negative impact on natural fertility in the equation. Any increase in EP3 could result 
from an increase in the proportion of primary school aged children among the total 
population purely due to rising fertility, or to an increase in primary school enrolment 
due to a mass education policy. Strong evidence indicates that the average education level 
achieved has risen substantially since 1950. Thus EP3 can be used as a measure 
representing national education level attained which, as we expected, should have a 
positive impact on natural fertility, because on average educated people have relatively 
privileged socio-economic and cultural positions. In the equation, however, the coefficient 
of EP3 in the equation has a negative value(-0.026). One possible reason is that 
opportunity costs were relatively high when children were regarded as potential labour— 
‘economic assets’. Even though the Chinese government mostly provided a rather low fee 
basis, families especially in rural China had to tighten their budgets (over 70% was for 
food) to spare a ‘part labour’ to go to school. The result could be a decline in food 
consumption, while the expected ‘profit’ from this educational investment would yield a 
return only in five to ten years. Thus it could be negatively related to the natural fertility.
Similarly, the coefficient of ‘number of wireless broadcasting stations per million 
population’(BP1) also has a negative value(-0.012). The possible reason for this could be 
that listening to the radio might be a substitute for other enjoyments (say sexual activities) 
during leisure time. Moreover, the radio itself used to be an expensive economic durable 
commodity in China and buying one might entail families tightening their remaining 
budgets. In any event, the value coefficient (-0.012) is too small to bear much
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interpretation.
In Table 8.15, we have a quite satisfactory result, which we believe fits the reality 
much better. Although the adjusted R Square falls slightly from 0.85 to 0.82, both F- 
statistics and Tolerance of the five remaining variables have very significant levels, the 
F Sig values of each remaining variables are still well below 0.10, after we drop U l, 
C55, and L ll  from the equation. In addition, another important measure, the Durbin- 
Watson (DW) statistic in Tables 8.13 and 8.15, is the commonly used test for 
autocorrelation. Because the estimated standard errors of the regression coefficients could 
be biased downward in the presence of autocorrelation, conclusions drawn from 
hypothesis tests and confidence intervals can be erroneous, although the coefficients 
themselves are unbiased estimators. As in this case the DW value dropping from 2.378 
to 2.078 is within the zone of 1.6-2.4 where there is no autocorrelation at the significance 
level of 0.01 given 31 observations, we have no reason to worry about autocorrelation 
existing in this case. Figure 8.3 suggests that the expected values estimated by the model 
simulated the actual trend very well.
The results in Table 8.15 present a final version of the model, in which coefficients 
of variables C44, M2, and ER1 are very significant, while those of EP3 and BP1 are 
relatively trivial. It suggests that the dynamic trend in improving food consumption and 
medical services, and the decrease in illiteracy of young women (20-24) explained the 
major part of the changes in natural fertility. In other words, substantial improvement in 
food consumption and medical services, and dramatic decrease of illiteracy in young 
mothers played the key roles in the increase in natural fertility. The coefficients of 
EP3(Primary school enrolment) and BPl(Radio stations) are too trivial to mean anything.
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Figure 8.3 Index o f underlying level o f fertility NF2(M):
observed trend and simulated values by the model 1952-81, 1986
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Table 8.14 indicates that there is still some intercorrelation among these remaining 
variables. In practice, the problem is not so much of determining whether 
multicollinearity is absent or present, but rather of determining the degree to which it 
exists, and the consequences this has for the estimated model. It is most unlikely that 
multicollinearity will be entirely absent from the sample data. Here we believe that if all 
coefficients of explanatory variables remaining in the model make sense theoretically, and 
meet all statistical criteria, thus being empirically significant, and finally provide a good 
simulation of the trend of the dependent variable, then this model is acceptable. Yet, as 
we mentioned, a statistical model for a social phenomenon can never be fully reliable for 
a variety of reasons. Therefore it is always wise to be cautious in interpreting the results.
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Ill Summary
After 1949, the whole country of China experienced dramatic socio-economic 
development. Two of the most important factors with respect to natural fertility, 
people’s real income and consumption, apart from two severe setbacks during the ‘Great 
Famine’ in 1959-61 and the ‘Cultural Revolution’ in 1966-76, have been making 
substantial improvement during the periods of 1949-57 and 1963-66, and especially 
1979 onwards. The dynamics of consumption and in particular of food intake and 
nutrition, along with changes in other socio-economic elements such as health care, 
labour structure, education, ..., matched changes in the estimated underlying level of 
natural fertility. One by-product of the industrialization and urbanization after 1950, 
which transferred the labour force engaged in primary industry, mainly peasants from 
rural areas, into better paid industrial sectors in urban areas, contributed to the rise in 
the average level of people’s income and living conditions, therefore indirectly 
prompted the rise in natural fertility, particularly after 1979.
The increases in natural fertility before 1979 were mainly contributed by progress 
in social and cultural aspects. Two of the greatest achievements sifter 1949 were the 
extensive programmes of health care and education. A health system and medical care 
for the whole nation was well built. The number of hospital beds and doctors per 10,000 
population rose from 6.7 and 1.48 in 1949 to 13.6 and 21.41 in 1985 respectively for 
the nation as a whole. As an result, people’s life expectation was raised from about 25 
years in the 1930s, estimated by Barclay et al. (1976:620), to about 67 years in the 
1980s. Diseases, such as venereal diseases and recurrent fever, have been successively
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eradicated. Improved health is likely to contribute to those biological mechanisms that 
are directly related to natural fertility, such as age at menarche, coital frequency, 
reproductive life span and so on.
Similarly, the Chinese people’s education has been dramatically enhanced since 
1949. The mass orientation in educational policy, on the whole, achieved great 
successes, such as that illiteracy was sharply reduced. The proportions of people 
educated to different levels among the total population were rising over time, 
particularly for the female students. In general, mass education has been raising up the 
nature of people’s occupations, which are strongly related to rise in income and 
consumption.
On the social side, evidence suggests that the proportion of arranged marriages has 
been decreasing and that of nuclear families rising since 1949, particularly in urban 
areas. We might expect some indirect positive effect from this trend on the frequency 
of intercourse among couples. The sexual activities throughout marriage and the way 
of family life, are influenced to a certain degree by the style of forming the marriage. 
In a freely associated marriage and an independent nuclear family, sexual life would be 
relatively more cooperative and harmonious, and the family itself more stable.
Statistical analysis confirms strong relationships between natural fertility and socio­
economic variables, such as total national product, food consumption, medical services, 
and education achieved by young women. Though simple, our method of analysis leads 
to a regression model which simulates rather well the trend in natural fertility. Given 
the limited statistical information, it suggests that the dynamic trend in changes of food
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consumption and medical services, and the decrease in illiteracy of young women (20- 
24) explained the major part of the changes in natural fertility. Less clear was the 
impact of changes in other socio-economic aspects.
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Conclusion
During the last four decades, China has experienced a dramatic fertility transition. 
The total fertility rate for the nation as whole, which was around 6 in the mid-1950s fell 
to 2.31 in 1980. This fact, as an important phenomenon in demography, has been studied 
at length. However, the level of natural fertility, another very important demographic 
index, has received little attention. This thesis has tried to redress this imbalance. The 
data reviewed in this study come from three major demographic retrospective surveys 
taken since 1949: the 1/1000 Fertility Sample Survey in 1982, the In-Depth Fertility 
Survey in 1985, and the 1/100 Population Sample Survey in 1987. From this study 
conclusions have emerged from several aspects.
LI General fertility and marital fertility
The pattern and level of age specific marital fertility in 1950-54 constructed in this 
study from the 1/1000 Fertility Survey were remarkably close to those derived from other 
sources, such as from the Chinese Farm Survey in 1929-31. This underlying similarity 
strongly suggests that constructed marital fertility from the truncated information (before 
1964) is rather robust. In contrast, the marital fertility differences between the non- 
contracepting Chinese population in this century and non-contracepting European 
populations in earlier centuries were substantial and significant. The results further 
support the argument initiated by Penrose (1934:108) and upheld by the Princeton group 
(see Barclay et al. 1976, and Coale 1984a) that Chinese ‘natural’ marital fertility was 
very low.
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General fertility and marital fertility in the whole nation rose from the 1940s to the 
1950s, when it was mainly uncontrolled. Exceptions were Shanghai and Beijing where 
contraceptive practice had already started. During the Great Famine, fertility suffered a 
catastrophic fall throughout the nation, although less severe falls were seen in urban areas 
and a few northern and southern boundary regions, and among the better educated. In the 
middle 1960s, the government started to carry out a birth control programme focused on 
the urban population. As a consequence, those regions with higher proportions of urban 
population experienced a sharp fertility reduction. However, as is well known, the mass 
fertility reduction in the whole nation started in the early 1970s, when the national family 
planning campaigns were launched. Even then, the marital fertility of younger age 
groups, such as 15-19 and 20-24, was still increasing, or was only a little reduced, as 
they were under less pressure from birth control policies. Fertility reductions in the whole 
nation gathered momentum after the ‘Later, Longer, Less’ policy came into effect in 
1975 and even more with the ‘One Child’ policy in 1979, although these policies were 
relatively more relaxed in rural areas and particularly in ethnic minority regions. Again, 
marital fertility of women aged 20-24 was still rising generally. This may be a joint 
product from the 1980s’ economic reform, which substantially improved people’s 
livelihood and thus favoured underlying fertility, and from an upward trend of mean age 
at marriage to above 20 thus leading fertility of those aged 20-24 representing an earlier 
duration of marital fertility than before.
The widely observed negative relationship between duration of education and level 
of fertility has also been confirmed here. Both the general and the marital fertility of the 
better educated are markedly lower than among the less educated. The fertility of women 
at all education levels experienced a rise during the 1950s, when it was basically
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‘natural’. Since the middle 1960s, when the government started to carry out a birth 
control programme focused on the urban areas, fertility among the better educated 
population saw a sharp reduction. The declining trend reversed slightly during the 
‘Cultural Revolution’, as the birth control programme was disrupted. However, massive 
fertility reduction at all education levels started in the early 1970s, when the national 
family planning campaigns were launched. The end of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and the 
beginning of the economic reform in some ways restored the better educated’s socio­
economic ‘privilege’ and linked people’s occupation and income with the length of their 
education. This enhanced the better educated’s livelihood more than that of the less 
educated and thus favoured their natural fertility.
1.2 Coale-Trussell’s model and its adjustment
It was Trussed (1979:46-48) himself who first realised that using original Coale- 
Trussell’s model to discover the underlying level of natural fertility for a contracepting 
population was not possible. This failure is believed due to the improper assumption that 
younger married women were not limiting their births at all. In reality, however, in some 
developing societies after World War Two, like China after the 1960s, and many 
developed societies like Sweden in this century or even earlier, the existence of birth 
control among young age groups, including age group 20-24, seems likely. So the 
problem of the original model is a wider and more profound issue than just an assessment 
of Chinese trends.
The model’s vital problem lies in the assumption that at age 20-24 no birth control 
exists and then v(20-24) was set as zero originally. So the question becomes, as v(a) has
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to be set arbitrarily in the first place, how big an adjustment or shift is appropriate? Here, 
I assume, on average, that the marital fertility of age 17.5-22.5 is much more likely to 
be ‘natural’ than that of 20-24 in China after the 1960s. This assumption subsequently 
assumes that the marital fertility of age 20-24 is partly controlled. This assumption is 
based on the real situation given that the mean age at first marriage for Chinese women 
was about 21-22 in the 1970s, plus one and half years of average duration between 
marriage and first birth, during which time birth control was unlikely according to 
Chinese custom. As in the model, v(a) is acting as the X-axis or a dimension to measure 
changes of the ratio of observed fertility to the natural standard, n(a), L«[r(a)/n(a)]. 
Therefore it has to be linear with respect to age. So any necessary adjustment that has 
to be made on v(a), is just the same shift applying over all v(a)’s values.
Based on this adjusted assumption and a new v(a) schedule, I estimated M from 
1950 to 1986 for China as a whole. To check the plausibility of the new schedule, I 
carried out a correlation analysis against estimated mean fecundability in 1952-78. The 
correlation coefficient between mean fecundability and the index of natural fertility (M) 
by the adjusted v(a) is significantly higher than the one estimated from the original model 
without any adjustment. This suggests that the adjusted model has a better chance of 
providing an accurate estimate of underlying fertility, at least in certain cases, such as in 
this study. The results of adjustments varying the shift on v(a) from +0.14 to -0.14, 
corresponding to assumed different age intervals of ‘natural fertility’, also indicate that 
underlying fertility estimates based on the assumption of fertility of women at age interval 
17.5-22.5 being ‘natural’, have the highest correlation with fecundability. So the 
adjustment on v(a) by -0.14 seems most preferable. Nevertheless, it is not in a position 
to claim that assumption of marital fertility of age 17.5-22.5 being natural, upon which
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the adjustment of v(a) is to be made, is the best or unique. This feature of the 
unobtainable optimal adjustment on v(a) is decided by the model itself, simply because 
v(a) has to be set arbitrarily in one way or another. Unless age at entry into marriage and 
childbearing are homogeneous, any arbitrary assumption of a certain five-years age 
interval as ‘natural’, which can also fit reality perfectly well, seemsjiot£xisting. The best 
idea is to assess it relative to reality to see whether it is rational.
Three schedules of marital fertility, two from non-mainland Chinese regions, Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, and one from Japan, were selected to test our adjusted model. The level 
and pattern of marital fertility schedules from these three populations before the 1960s 
were very close to those of mainland Chinese, and were mainly ‘natural fertility’. The 
estimated underlying level of natural fertility also rose until the 1960s in both versions 
of the model. After that the rising trend stopped or even reversed when assessed by the 
original model. This phenomenon, similar to what was found by Trussell from Sweden, 
is unlikely to match reality, since a dramatic economic development and significant 
improvement in consumption have occurred in all three populations since the War, which 
makes an arrested increase of trend in underlying fertility very difficult to explain. The 
problem is clear: the increasing popularity of family planning after the 1960s led younger 
married women to use birth control, even including those aged 20-24. Evidence from 
these three selected populations, particularly from Taiwan, suggest that the modified 
version of the model is able to provide more realistic estimates of underlying fertility (M) 
than the original version. However, the degree of adjustment, which is based on the 
Chinese situation, may not be most appropriate to all three populations, as overestimates 
and underestimates are obvious for Japan and Hong Kong respectively. For the 
Taiwanese, who had the closest conditions to the mainlanders (the two regions’ patterns
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and levels of marital fertility were almost identical), the adjusted model seems to provide 
very plausible estimates. This further indicates that our assumption of natural fertility at 
age interval 17.5-22.5 and subsequently the amount of adjustment, -0.14 on v(a), 
designed for the Chinese case, although simple, is nonetheless reasonable and sufficient 
for our purpose.
This study has tried to use both the original model and its adjusted version to 
examine changes in the underlying level of natural fertility in China. The two sets of 
estimated M values from the two versions are very close until the later 1960s, when the 
marital fertility was essentially ‘natural’. But after that, especially after 1979, the adjusted 
model seems to be a more sensitive way to capture changes in the underlying level of 
natural fertility than the original model, as it identifies a growing trend of natural 
fertility, which matches the situation of rapidly changing conditions favouring natural 
fertility. After the late 1960s the natural fertility based on the original model seems 
considerably underestimated, leading to unrealistic results. The same conclusion holds 
after the two versions of the model are applied to urban-rural, regional and educational 
divisions.
1.3 The underlying level of natural fertility
The underlying level of natural fertility in China in the 1950s seems to confirm the 
general observation of Barclay et al. (1976:615) that fertility in rural China in 1929-31 
was remarkably low relative to that of recorded European populations. Their estimate of 
natural fertility in rural China in 1929-31 was about 0.62, which is quite close to an 
estimated level of 0.68 in the early 1950s for China as a whole. The estimated natural
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fertility levels for mainland China are also close to those for non-mainland Chinese and 
other Far East Asian nations, as these were about 0.79 (0.76 by the original model) for 
the later 1960s for the mainland, and 0.82 for Taiwan in 1956, 1.02 for Hong Kong in 
1961, 1.00 for Singapore in 1957, and 0.81 for Korea in 1961, as observed by Knodel 
(1977:228).
Concerning changes of natural fertility, the evidence from the reproductive histories 
of couples married between the 1940s and the 1980s in the three surveys strongly 
suggests that it increased significantly over the period in China as a whole. In the 1940s, 
although lacking data of age-specific marital fertility to estimate the natural fertility, a 
consistent trend in the 1950s and 1960s between natural fertility and duration-specific 
marital fertility, and other indices such as TFR and fecundability, suggests that natural 
fertility might have risen in this decade. The general pattern of natural fertility rising in 
China since the 1940s is obviously concentrated in certain periods, and strikingly in 
three: 1950-57, 1963-68, and 1979 onwards. All three periods are marked by economic 
development and consumption improvement. Apart from economic factors, each increase 
has its own characteristics: the 1950-57 rise is related to post-war peace and prosperity, 
while 1963-68 is attributable to the post-famine baby-boom, and the last rise is prompted 
by the social and ideological revolution which has swept China since the 1980s.
The urban-rural division confirms the national rising trend in natural fertility, though 
natural fertility is generally lower among rural women than their urban counterparts. 
There was only a slightly higher proportion of pre-marital conceptions in urban areas, 
which may not be sufficient to fully account for the urban-rural differential in underlying 
level of natural fertility. All the regional and educational division evidence confirms the
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national trend, but shows that more significant rises occurred in coastal areas and the 
three municipality cities, and less marked rises in inland provinces or ethnic minority 
areas; and that more significant rises took place among the better educated generally, 
with smaller rises for others. Exceptions were trends observed from Shanghai’s and 
university educated women, the increases of their natural fertility were not as distinct as 
expected. The possible reason is a more controlled marital fertility for these women aged 
20-24 than those in other regions or of other education groups so that even the adjusted 
model may not be ‘adjusted’ adequately to this particular situation and thus is unable to 
detect the real amount of the rise.
This rise in natural fertility in the whole nation may be wholly or in part an artefact 
of changing patterns of premarital sexual behaviour. Pre-nuptial pregnancies can lead to 
post-nuptial births and thus artificially inflate marital fertility at ages where newly-weds 
make up a large proportion of married women. This inflated marital fertility leads to M 
being overestimated. However, observed evidence suggests that extremely few women 
engage in pre-nuptial sexual activities. Less than three percent of urban Chinese brides 
were pregnant on the day of their wedding, and less than two percent in rural areas. 
Despite a lack of the most recent statistics, there was growing evidence of premarital 
sexual behaviour from the later 1970s and perhaps more in the 1980s. But so far as the 
observed period in this study is concerned, the proportion of pregnant brides for the 
nation as a whole was well below 5%—a much lower level than in many other countries. 
Thus the influence on estimated M values contributed by the pre-marital pregnancies is 
negligible.
From the early 1940s the mean age at first marriage kept increasing until the 1980s.
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This increase was relatively slow before 1970 and accelerated over the 1970s. The 
national average of age at first marriage rose by 2.6 years during the 1950s and the 
1960s, and by 1.6 years during the 1970s. However, after age at first marriage is 
controlled for, we still found that marital fertility in marriage duration 13-24 months 
increased over the three decades from the 1950 to 1980, and first birth interval shortened 
after 1970. This certainly removes any idea that the increase in natural fertility in China 
was mainly due to the mean age at first marriage rising from an age of less reproductive 
potential to one of peak potential.
1.4 Fecundability and birth intervals
Our estimate of mean fecundability for Chinese women obtained by using an adjusted 
version of Bongaarts’ well-known model is consistent with other studies, such as the 
average monthly conception rates estimated by Coale et al. (1988:19) and fecundability 
for Taiwanese women by Jain (1969a:80). All these estimates confirm the arguments that 
Chinese women’s fecundability was traditionally very low. The fact that the fecundability 
of modem Chinese women, even among those with better socio-economic status, such as 
women living in urban areas and or having longer education, was still substantially lower 
than that of European populations in the past, may well be related to a variety of factors, 
especially Chinese culture and custom, rather than mainly due to socio-economic 
underdevelopment. For example, longer durations of breastfeeding and negative attitudes 
towards sex in traditional beliefs about good health encouraged men to restrain sexual 
desire. However, this comparatively low level of fecundability did not prevent the 
population’s growth. It was the ‘universal’ and early marriage and ‘natural’ fertility 
patterns that overcame the low fecundability and high mortality and kept the population
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growing, albeit slowly, before the 1950s. The rapid population growth after 1949 was 
mainly connected with increasing fecundability, which resulted in a shortening of birth 
intervals, and with a reduced length of breastfeeding, combined with significant 
improvements in health and decline in mortality.
The estimated mean fecundability for rural China, and for less educated women, is 
even lower. The main causes are believed to be the even longer duration of breastfeeding 
and the more limited coital frequency which probably resulted from the prevalence of 
arranged marriage and young ages entry into unions. Given that Chinese fecundability 
was historically low, a substantial rise in the fecundability of the nation as a whole after 
1940, especially after 1950 is evident. It rose slightly from the later 1940s, after the War 
finished with the Japanese surrender. The national economy then recovered somewhat, 
only to worsen again with the outbreak of the civil war. During the mid 1940s, 
fecundability remained around 0.045. It then increased substantially from 0.052 for 
women married in 1950 to 0.085 in 1957 for China as whole. There was a predictable 
trough of 0.039 for those married around the troubles of 1958-60, with a steady recovery 
after 1961. Finally, a substantial increase occurred in the later 1970s to 0.16, the total 
rise amounting to 250 percent for the whole nation over the forty years. The most recent 
evidence of shortening first birth interval also indicates that this increasing trend was still 
holding in the 1980s.
Reform towards free marriage, a rising age at marriage, and a reduction in 
breastfeeding are possible factors to promote the fecundability increase since the 1940s. 
As a consequence, birth intervals, particularly first intervals, have been reduced 
dramatically since the 1930s, although the trend among second intervals is less clear after
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the 1960s, when reproductive behaviour was affected by birth control practice. Similar 
evidence can be found from women among educational divisions. Mean fecundability was 
generally lower before the 1950s, particularly for illiterate women. A significant upward 
trend in fecundability in all educational divisions can be observed since the 1940s. Better 
educated women seem to have enjoyed a greater rise in fecundability than the other less 
educated.
The impact of the rise of fecundability on the interval between marriage and first 
birth can be identified in the observed mean first interval, which fell from around 40 
months to about 20 months for the nation as a whole between the 1930s and the later 
1970s, and to about 15 months by the middle of the 1980s. Looking at urban-rural 
divisions, the observed mean length of first interval fell from 31 and 34 months to 16 and 
20 months for the urban and rural areas respectively between the 1940s and the later 
1970s. Examining regional divisions, it is evident that the first birth interval in most 
regions has shortened. Again, the first birth intervals for women in all educational 
divisions have also consistently shortened. Similar trends have been observed in other 
Asian countries where they have been partly attributed to increases in age at marriage and 
changes in marriage customs.
Compared with the massive decline in first intervals, the mean second birth 
intervals, kept more or less steady, though a substantial decline is still obvious in the fall 
from 35 months in the first birth cohorts of the middle 1940s to 30 months at the end of 
the 1960s for the whole nation. For the urban-rural divisions, two declining trends were 
fairly close until the 1960s. Since then, they began to diverge. The second interval has 
risen, steadily in the 1970s and more rapidly in the 1980s in urban areas. In rural areas,
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it remained unchanged in the early 1970s and picked up afterwards. This observed 
lengthening of birth intervals in the 1970s is likely to reflect mainly the influence of the 
‘Later-Longer-Less’ policy rather than of conditions favourable to fertility deteriorating. 
For the regions, the evidence is somewhat mixed, notably in a few well-developed 
regions such as Tianjin, Helongjiang, Jilin, and Shanghai where birth control might play 
a role in this scenario. The downward trend in the second birth intervals before the 1970s 
is also less clear among the better educated. This is partly because the full information 
needed to estimate the second interval is only available up to 1970, and partly because 
the better educated exercised birth control as early as the 1950s, thus leading to second 
intervals to be much less ‘natural’ than those of the less educated.
1.5 Breastfeeding
The average duration of breastfeeding in the three regions of Hebei, Shaanxi, and 
Shanghai as a whole, indicated by the In-Depth Fertility Survey in 1985, stayed more or 
less unchanged at 17 months until the middle of the 1970s. This was somewhat higher 
than that in most other developing countries seen in studies such as the one by Trussell 
(1992:301). Then it declined dramatically to 11.7 months in the 1980s. This matched well 
with the trends of rising natural fertility and fecundability. The proportion of children not 
breastfed, another indication of the importance of breastfeeding in developing countries, 
was very low but rose steadily from 1.73% to 3.49%. The breastfeeding patterns show 
marked differences between the three regions, although the mean duration dropped in all 
three surveyed regions, particularly after the 1970s and for those mothers aged below 40. 
Mothers in Shanghai generally undertook about four months less breastfeeding than those 
from less developed regions like Shaanxi. Analogously, the proportion of non-breastfed
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children was substantially higher in Shanghai.
There appears to be an increase in breastfeeding duration with age, which is also 
consistent with findings in other developing countries. The more recent the cohort a 
woman belonged to, the shorter the breastfeeding she undertook, especially those aged 
under 30. This might be due to the trend of increasing education and employment 
opportunities for Chinese women, and a fundamental change in the socio-economic 
structure and ideology after 1978. This evidence may support the argument based on 
cross-sectional findings that the degree of modernization (urbanization) was negatively 
associated with duration of breastfeeding and that shortening the duration was inevitable 
as modernization spread. An interesting phenomenon is that the proportion of non­
breastfed was mainly influenced by birth cohort rather than by age, while the duration 
of breastfeeding was mainly influenced by the mother’s age.
The average duration of breastfeeding in China before the 1970s was longer in rural 
areas than in urban. Corresponding to this, the proportions of urban women who did not 
breastfeed their children were consistently higher than for rural women. Similarly, 
educated mothers carried out three to four months of breastfeeding less than illiterate 
mothers. Moreover, the proportion of non-breastfed children was also substantially higher 
among mothers educated up to secondary school and over, but the difference of non- 
breastfed proportions between primary school educated mothers and illiterate mothers was 
trivial.
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1.6 C hildlessness
Following the conventional approach, we use childlessness as a proxy to measure 
primary sterility among Chinese women. This is probably justifiable and more robust than 
in many other countries, given the fact that marriage and childbearing are virtually 
universal in China. The observed U-shape curve of proportions of childless is consistent 
with observations from other developing countries. Percentages of childless among 
Chinese women were close to those of neighbouring nations in Far East Asia, though 
Chinese women had relatively lower proportions of childless in the same age spans.
The 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey and the 1987 1/100 Population Survey paint a 
broadly similar picture of a declining proportion of women with no live birth from the 
oldest age group, 65-67, to a younger one, 35-39, with a dramatic drop from 50-54 to 
45-49. The differences of childlessness over the age groups in the two surveys suggest 
that changes in primary sterility have contributed somewhat to the natural fertility rise 
in China. This trend is confirmed by Feeney and Wang (1993:71), who find that in the 
1988 Two-Per-1000 Fertility Survey there are notably lower proportions of childless 
women than in the 1982 1/1000 Survey and this trend continued after 1981 up to 1987, 
the latest year in the 1988 survey. This tendency over the decades might be partly 
associated with the fact that elderly Chinese women often have difficulty in recalling 
children who died as infants. But more fundamentally, it seems to have resulted from the 
improvement of people’s health and medical services, particularly the elimination of 
venereal diseases and tuberculosis.
For urban-rural divisions, childlessness, as expected, dropped over age spans in both
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urban and rural areas, but unexpectedly it was higher on the urban side. Possible 
explanations are (1), higher remarriage rates resulted from worse mortality in rural areas 
and may indirectly have acted as a reducing factor to childlessness by giving women with 
sterile husbands a chance to remarry, (2), a higher rate of reporting error in rural China 
where some adopted children were misreported as natural children, and finally (3), urban 
areas might have had a higher incidence of venereal disease before 1949. As for regional 
variations, in the coastal regions childlessness generally dropped more significantly and 
the proportions were also broadly lower. Exceptions do exist, such as in the three 
municipality cities which historically had the highest proportions childless. These cities 
were likely to have been affected by more severe venereal diseases. Similarly, lower 
proportions of childless were also observed in some inland and less-developed regions 
such as Yunnan, Guizhou, and Inner Mongolia. Within education divisions, again, there 
were more childless among the better educated elderly women, generally, than the less 
educated. This might be difficult to explain as due to venereal disease. Among the better 
educated, one extra likely reason, apart from the lower remarriage rates and reporting 
errors mentioned above, were higher rates of marital disruption, as these spouses were 
more likely to have been separated by occupational duties.
1.7 Socio-economic process and statistical analysis
Since 1949, the whole of China has indeed experienced dramatic changes in its 
socio-economic make-up. One of the most important factors with respect to natural 
fertility is people’s real income and consumption, which substantially increased during 
the periods of 1949-57, 1963-66, and particularly during the post-Mao economic reform 
after 1979. The dynamic changes in people’s consumption, and in particular food intake
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and nutrition, along with changes derived from economic development, such as labour 
structure and urbanization, matched changes in the estimated natural fertility.
Health care programmes and mass education in China have been other examples of 
the country’s main achievements. As an result, people’s life expectation has been raised 
by about forty years since the 1930s. We can expect that people’s improved health most 
likely led to a rise in natural fertility in China. The people’s education has also made 
dramatic progress since 1949. The mass orientation in educational policy has, on the 
whole, achieved great successes, and the illiteracy rate has been sharply reduced. The 
average duration of education has also been rising, in particular for female students. In 
general, mass education can contribute to people’s better health interactively and has 
played a part in upgrading the class of their occupations, which are strongly related to 
rises in income and consumption. In social aspect, evidence indicates that the proportion 
of arranged marriages has been decreasing and the proportion of nuclear families rising 
since 1949, especially in urban areas. We expect some indirect positive effect from these 
trends on the people’s sexual activities and family’s stability.
Correlation analysis also indicates strong linkages between natural fertility and socio­
economic variables, such as total national product, food consumption, medical services, 
and education level achieved by young mothers. Finally, a statistical regression model 
simulates rather well the trend in natural fertility. Given the limited quantitative 
information, the model suggests that the dynamic trend in improving food consumption 
and medical services, and the decrease in illiteracy of young mothers (20-24) explained 
the major part of the change in natural fertility.
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1.8 Further discussion
Some ideas about how to carry this study further are perhaps worth pursuing, since 
a number of interesting questions remain to be addressed completely, and some arise 
from the study itself. Further scope to carry on the study could be derived from both 
availability of more information and methodological development. One great benefit to 
the study of this topic in future could come from availability of the information from the 
1991 National Census. The latest information on the rise in natural fertility in the 1980s 
came from the 1987 One Percent Population Sample Survey, which only partially covers 
the 1980s. Ideally, we could estimate M for the rest of the 1980s, and explore 
relationships between natural fertility and the overwhelming changes in socio-economic 
and cultural areas in the 1980s more deeply and comprehensively, including geographical 
and educational variations, by fully exploiting the information from the 1991 Census. The 
detailed published data from the 1991 Census seem to be available recently.
From a biological point of view, as we mentioned before, the proximate determinants 
such as fecundability, breastfeeding, primary sterility, and age at first marriage, 
contributed to the increase in natural fertility. However, we estimated the natural fertility 
by Coale-Trussell’s model and by using marital fertility only from age groups 20-24 to 
40-44, which were affected most by the proximate determinants. So the rise in natural 
fertility studied here was mainly contributed by the changes in fecundability and post­
partum non-susceptibility, while behind these two, in fact, coital frequency and 
breastfeeding played critical parts. Relating to the socio-economic context, we can see, 
that it was both economic and socio-ideological factors that influenced the natural fertility 
operating through coital frequency and breastfeeding behaviour. Therefore we can fully
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recover the underlying mechanism behind natural fertility by gaining and analysing more 
data on coital frequency and breastfeeding.
As far as breastfeeding is concerned, this study had to rely on the 1985 In-Depth 
Fertility Survey (Phase-I), which first provided unique information on mainland Chinese 
women’s breastfeeding behaviour. Although it supplies quite comprehensive and detailed 
statistics about breastfeeding, it fails to provide adequate information either historically 
or geographically. It covers only three regions, and only starts from the 1960s and is 
truncated after 1982, so that interesting questions remain to be answered. These include 
the issue of what was the impact on breastfeeding and thus on natural fertility of the 
1980s employment boom induced by economic reform, and when ideological change in 
the traditional value system was also taking place. The In-Depth Fertility Survey (Phase- 
II), which covers six more provinces or regions and a more recent period than the survey 
(Phase-I), has just been carried out -a- few ero fjea rs  ago. When the its (Phase-II) 
information is available, it certainly will provide wjtlfthis study^nore space to explore.
Statistical information on coital frequency hardly existed in China at all, compared 
with other demographic statistics. However, sex as a cultural taboo is being touched on 
and has been discussed more openly since 1979. In particular, tentative surveys have been 
carried out recently, such as the survey carried out by W. Geng and B. Zha during 1988- 
1990. The comprehensive information on coital frequency with respect to different social 
strata, occupation, type of residence (urban or mral), time period, and education, will 
become available at some point. Thus it will provide a new and wider angle to this study.
Apart from advances prompted by extra information in the future, fresh research
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scope could also be rendered by methodological progress. In Chapter 3, an adjusted 
version of Coale-Trussell’s model has been developed, by deriving a new birth control 
schedule v2(a), while the other parameters remain the same. This adjusted model proved 
more sensitive in interpreting the underlying level of natural fertility in this case. Thus, 
an interesting question concerns the wider implications, such as applying this method to 
similar cases in other parts of the world, where women’s birth control behaviour starts 
earlier than original Coale-Trussell’s model assumed. Perhaps, a more fundamental 
contribution could be made by developing a general rule to determine or manipulate the 
v(a) schedule. This general rule could give a standard method whereby v(a) could be 
adjusted or reset, and should be able to apply to different circumstances where the degree 
and pattern of birth controlled fertility vary. We may call it a general flexible version of 
Coale-Trussell’s model.
The main purpose of the general and flexible version of the model would be to make 
comparisons between different populations. We would be able to work out different 
underlying levels of natural fertility in the countries concerned, and study differences in 
estimated levels of natural fertility between countries by separating the differences 
contributed by the model’s adjustment, and by the applied marital fertility schedule itself. 
We could make further comparisons between different Chinese populations, such as 
mainland Chinese and those in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, or comparisons among 
racially close populations, such as comparing the Chinese with the Japanese or Koreans, 
or even with totally different races. After these sorts of comparisons, we should be able 
not only to see the different roles played by natural fertility and birth control in each 
particular fertility regime, but also to go back to the model itself, to see whether its 
general version could offer insights not provided by the original formulation.
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Appendix
Table 10.1 A ge specific ever-married fertility rates(China as a whole)
Year
Age Group
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
1950 0.287 0.269 0.224 0.156 0.084
1951 0.277 0.261 0.217 0.151 0.081
1952 0.319 0.302 0.252 0.175 0.094
1953 0.310 0.284 0.236 0.164 0.089
1954 0.311 0.295 0.246 0.171 0.092
1955 0.325 0.301 0.251 0.175 0.094
1956 0.310 0.280 0.236 0.165 0.089
1957 0.334 0.312 0.272 0.189 0.102
1958 0.291 0.278 0.241 0.168 0.091
1959 0.229 0.225 0.184 0.124 0.067
1960 0.219 0.209 0.170 0.141 0.076
1961 0.182 0.187 0.143 0.096 0.052
1962 0.332 0.325 0.266 0.186 0.100
1963 0.397 0.374 0.328 0.258 0.139
1964 0.341 0.314 0.259 0.189 0.102
1965 0.337 0.316 0.258 0.197 0.097
1966 0.361 0.320 0.274 0.200 0.096
1967 0.311 0.293 0.225 0.166 0.079
1968 0.379 0.350 0.276 0.200 0.098
1969 0.330 0.314 0.245 0.179 0.085
1970 0.350 0.315 0.254 0.179 0.084
1971 0.347 0.310 0.229 0.166 0.074
1972 0.323 0.292 0.214 0.147 0.069
1973 0.321 0.281 0.194 0.125 0.058
1974 0.342 0.264 0.171 0.107 0.051
1975 0.314 0.244 0.140 0.087 0.041
1976 0.311 0.239 0.122 0.069 0.034
1977 0.300 0.223 0.105 0.057 0.024
1978 0.305 0.230 0.100 0.044 0.021
1979 0.335 0.243 0.096 0.041 0.019
1980 0.295 0.208 0.066 0.028 0.011
1981 0.350 0.226 0.072 0.031 0.013
* Source: the 1982 1/1000 Fertility Survey.
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Table 10.2 Index of fertility control(m) and underlying level of fertility(M), 
by the Coale-Trussell’s model(vl) and its adjusted version (v2) 1950-86:
China as a whole
Year M(vl) M(v2) m mse R2
1950 0.635 0.653 0.192 0.0017 0.802
1951 0.615 0.631 0.190 0.0017 0.797
1952 0.709 0.727 0.186 0.0017 0.782
1953 0.679 0.699 0.205 0.0015 0.836
1954 0.691 0.710 0.185 0.0018 0.781
1955 0.716 0.736 0.198 0.0016 0.821
1956 0.675 0.694 0.200 0.0014 0.840
1957 0.739 0.755 0.156 0.0014 0.757
1958 0.650 0.663 0.147 0.0016 0.700
1959 0.520 0.536 0.212 0.0029 0.730
1960 0.472 0.475 0.051 0.0014 0.108
1961 0.420 0.435 0.246 0.0046 0.698
1962 0.748 0.767 0.182 0.0022 0.724
1963 0.863 0.869 0.044 0.0004 0.437
1964 0.742 0.760 0.169 0.0012 0.814
1965 0.746 0.765 0.183 0.0003 0.950
1966 0.790 0.816 0.225 0.0001 0.991
1967 0.697 0.724 0.275 0.0009 0.943
1968 0.841 0.873 0.267 0.0006 0.959
1969 0.745 0.774 0.272 0.0008 0.945
1970 0.778 0.812 0.308 0.0003 0.985
1971 0.772 0.816 0.394 0.0005 0.982
1972 0.720 0.763 0.408 0.0010 0.969
1973 0.714 0.769 0.533 0.0016 0.971
1974 0.719 0.789 0.666 0.0039 0.957
1975 0.662 0.738 0.776 0.0072 0.941 .
1976 0.655 0.746 0.932 0.0135 0.924
1977 0.643 0.754 1.141 0.0103 0.961
1978 0.666 0.799 1.309 0.0218 0.937
1979 0.722 0.883 1.441 0.0272 0.936
1980 0.647 0.826 1.744 0.0281 0.954
1981 0.729 0.930 1.745 0.0329 0.946
1986 0.701 0.949 2.173 0.0293 0.945
Restriction: the five-years age groups from 20-24 to 40-44 are used for the estimation.
* m estimates, mse(mean square error) and R2 values are same in two versions of the CT model.
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